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Abstracts

Scarlet-Letter Politics: The Rhetoric of Shame in the Campaign to
Unseat President Barack Hussein Obama
Myra Mendible
Florida Gulf Coast University

This essay considers the politics of racial shaming as deployed against
B arack Obama, arguing that it targeted "black" and "foreign" bodies as
threats to the "American" body politic.

From Modern Rock to Postmodern Hard Rock: Cambodian
Alternative Music Voices
LinDa Saphan
College of Mount Saint Vincent

Cambodian modernity was driven by the political agenda of the
Sihanouk government beginning in the 1 950s, and Cambodian rock and
roll emerged in the 1 960s in step with Sihanouk' s ambitious national
modernization project. Urban rockers were primarily upper-class male
youths. In. the postcolonial era rock and roll was appropriated from
abroad and given a unique Cambodian sound, while today ' s emerging
hard rock music bOlTOWS foreign sociocultural references along with the
music. Postmodern Cambodia and its diaspora have seen the evolution of
a more diverse music subculture of alternative voices of hard rock bands
and hip-hop artists, as well as post-bourgeois and post-male singers and
songwriters.
Keywords: Modernity, Postmodernity, Cambodian Music, Alternative
V oices, Rock, Hard rock

Latinos, African Americans and the Coalitional Case for a
Federal Jobs Program
Alan A. Aja
Brooklyn College, CUNY
William Darity, Jr.
Duke University
Darrick Hamilton
The New School

In the late 1 970s, amidst growing unemployment in black and Latino
communities, the newly-formed Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC)
supported the Congressional B lack Caucus (CBC) in its call for full
employment in the run up to the passage of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act
of 1 978. Never fully implemented, the act has been de facto an unfunded
mandate for close to 40 years. Only recently has it been resurrected by a
handful of lawmakers, while both discussion and support for a national
j obs program has begun to gain stearn in the media and the general
public. With support from labor market research and other empirical
evidence, we propose and outline for a bold policy : a National
Investment Employment Corps to provide a permanent j ob guarantee for
all citizens with the purpose of maintaining and expanding the nation' s
physical and human infrastructure. Given the disproportionate effect of
the recent economic downturn and labor market bias on African
Americans and Latinos, we argue that a National Investment
Employment Corps program would address the employment needs for
blacks and Latinos by assuring full-employment and simultaneously
ensuring long-term benefits for the nation' s well-being.

National Fantasies, Exclusion, and the Many Houses on
Mango Street
Lorna L. Perez
Buffalo State College

This article argues that understanding what the house in Sandra
Cisneros' s The House on Mango Street symbolizes is foundational to
contextualizing the radical possibilities that Cisneros enacts in her work.
Unlike most critics who read "the house" as referencing the title of the
text, I argue that the novel is full of houses, notably the house located on
Mango Street that narrator Esperanza Cordero longs to escape from, and
the house away from Mango Street that she longs to one day have. By
reading these two houses through Homi Bhabha' s notion of the
"unhomely" and Gaston B achelard' s notion of "felicitous space", we can

better understand a critique of the house in light of its resonance with the
American Dream on the one hand, and a reconfiguration of that
symbolism through a feminist intervention on the other.
Keywords: Cisneros, Houses, American Dream, Women, B achelard,
Bhabha

Free Your Mind :

Contemporary Racial Attitudes and
Post Racial Theory

Lakeyta M. Bonnette
Georgia State University
Sarah M. Gershon
Georgia State University
Precious D. Hall
Truckee Meadows Community College

The inauguration of the United States first Black President has prompted
mass discussions of race relations in America. It is often articulated that
America is now in a post-racial society . However, the question still
remains : does the election of a B lack president demonstrate that America
is now a "color-blind" society? To answer this question, we rely on data
collected by PEW (2007 ) . Our results suggest that white and African
Americans differ significantly in the extent to which they express post
racial attitudes . Specifically, we find that whites more commonly express
post-racial attitudes, claiming that racism and discrimination are rare, in
opposition to African American views. On the other hand, blacks are
more likely to believe that discrimination still occurs . We further find
that whites ' post-racial beliefs are significant determinants of their
attitudes towards race-related policies, such as affirmative action.
Keywords: Race, Obama, Post-racial, Public Opinion, Racial Attitudes,
Racial Politics, African American.

Ida B. Wells and the Forces of Democratization
Jane Duran
University of California at Santa Barbara

The work of Ida B . Wells is examined not only from the standpoint of
her anti-lynching writings, but from a perusal of her diaries and her
efforts as a young woman. It is concluded that she exemplifies the best
of the notion of a genuine democratic political force.

The Geopolitical Context of Chamorro Cultural
Preservation in Guam, U.S.A.
Maria-Elena D. Diaz
University of Oklahoma

An unincorporated Pacific Island territory of the United States, Guam
has been under American rule since 1 89 8 . While proudly "Chamorro,"
the descendants of indigenous islanders have been American citizens
since 1 950. U . S . foreign policy, Americanization of island institutions,
immigration flows from Asia and Micronesia, and economic uncertainty
present challenges to the perpetuation of Chamorro culture-a syncretic
blend of indigenous, Spanish, and American influences that has endured
through centuries of foreign domination. As a gateway from the East to
the United States and a frequent destination for Micronesian immigrants
from the Compacts of Free Association, Guam regularly receives
immigrants from Asia and other Micronesian islands. Many immigrants
arrive on Guam to fill labor shortages as professionals or construction
workers , while others arrive with limited resources and skills that don ' t
easily transfer across cultures. Adding t o this mix, a major U . S . military
build-up is underway to transform Guam into a forward base in the
Pacific. This article provides a case study of Guam through an overview
of historical influences on Chamorro culture, a description of the island ' s
contemporary multicultural society, and a discussion o f current
geopolitical and social forces impacting Chamorro culture in the land
"where America' s day begins."
Keywords: Chamorro studies, ethnic studies, cultural preservation, ethnic
stratification, indigenous studies, colonialism

Ethnicity and Impressions of Personality Using the Five-Factor
Model: Stereotyping or Cultural Sensitivity?
Andrea Kay Cooper
San Juan College
David Chin Evans
University of Washington

The current research investigates whether communities use ethnicity as a
cue when forming personality impressions of others . Past research has
shown that dress, smiling, hairstyle, and even facial symmetry of targets
produce systematic differences in personality impressions across the
domains of the Five Factor model of personality. We investigated
whether the stated or apparent ethnicity of groups and individuals also
produce stereotypic impressions of personality. This study compared

impressions across members and non-members of the target groups and
examined "cue utility" i.e. whether impressions of the groups agreed
with aggregated self-impressions by group members. In all, the results
clearly suggest that people utilize ethnicity as a cue when forming
impressions of the personalities of groups and individuals, and although
those impressions are exaggerated consistent with stereotype theory, they
confer some utility in interpersonal perceptions across cultures.
Stereotypes are a strategy used to interpret the complex social
environment in the absence of more specific information. When that
information is available, perceptions of others become more refined and
accurate.
Keywords: stereotyping, ethnicity, Five Factor model, Native Americans,
cultural sensitivity, personality

Dirty Jew-Dirty Mexican: Denver's

1949 Lake

Junior High School

Gang Battle and Jewish Racial Identity in Colorado
Michael Lee
University of Colorado at Boulder

This article details how Jews and Mexicans in Denver, Colorado came
together in 1 949 in the wake of a widely publicized interracial gang
battle at one of the city' s local middle schools . It documents the response
of the local chapter of the Anti-Defamation League and its involvement
in a interracial neighborhood council and how Jewish racial identity in
Denver was informed by the broader racial geography of the West-a
racial geography that was too often shaped by contrast with Mexicans.
The article also challenges the notion that Denver was relatively free of
anti-Semitism. Indeed, the 1 905 lynching of Jacob Wesskind suggests a
more nuanced story than the received wisdom about Jews being "at
home" in Denver.
Keywords: Jews, Mexicans, anti-Semitism, lynching, Denver, Colorado

Black Political Attitudes and Political Rap Music
Lakeyta M. Bonnette
Georgia State University

Many argue that political or message rap no longer exists . Scholars and
critics point to rap music as a genre that is completely negative and only
diminishes the progress of the Black community by offering and
supporting stereotypes of African Americans (Johnson, Jackson and
Gatto 1 995 ; Carpentier, Knobloch and Zillman 2003) . On the contrary, I

argue that all rap music is not the same and that in fact, there is a
subgenre in rap music, political rap, that discusses political issues and
candidates exclusively. In this article, I proffer a criterion for identifying
political rap music to demonstrate a distinction between the subgenres of
rap and the prevalence of political rap within mainstream radio. Finally,
I examine the lyrical content of political rap for the assertion of Black
Nationalist ideology.
Keywords: Rap, B lack Nationalism, political rap, Black political
attitudes, popular culture, public opinion

ARTICLES
SCARLET-LETTER POLITICS: THE RHETORIC OF
SHAME IN THE CAMPAIGN TO UNSEAT
PRESIDENT BARACK HUS SEIN OBAMA

Myra Me ndible
Florida Gu lf Coast University
In his March 2008 speech on race in America, President Obama
alluded to the "memories of humiliation" that haunt an older generation
of blacks in America. His words invoked a time when routine acts of
racial shaming served to keep African American men and women "in
their place. " Publicly shamed bodies serve as emblems of what a society
rejects; the stigmatization of black bodies was instrumental in maintain
ing the nation' s racially segregated social order and shaping its political
culture. Through shaming practices bodies are criminalized, demonized,
cast out or differentiated. In terms of racial history, President Obama' s
speech locates this tactic safely i n America' s past. Yet both the 2008 and
20 1 2 presidential campaigns suggest that public shaming remains a polit
ically expedient way to inscribe boundaries of race, ethnicity and other
social categories .
This essay considers the politics o f shaming deployed during the
20 1 2 Obama-Romney presidential race and during Obama' s tenure . I ar
gue that the nation' s first black president has been the object of a sham
ing campaign specifically targeting the "black" body and the "foreign"
body as potential threats to the "American" body politic. Examining
news media and Internet sources, I show how racially-charged shaming
rhetoric and imagery exploit long-standing social anxieties and stereo
types. I focus on public shaming gestures and inducements that function
as political tactics intended to enforce hierarchies and boundaries be
tween "white America" and its others.
Forging a more united and inclusive society was one of B arack
Obama' s defining themes during his first presidential campaign. Follow
ing his successful run, pundits and academics alike heralded the advent
of a "post-racial" American society. Many claimed that the election of
the nation' s first African American president showed that race and other
embodied social categories no longer played a significant role in
America' s electoral processes. Any mention of lingering systemic ine
qualities or racial hostilities could now be discounted by the fact that the
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son o f a n American white woman and a Kenyon Muslim had been
elected president of the United States. But despite President Obama' s
own attempts to "transcend" race and broaden his constituency, his first
term and subsequent campaign for re-election suggest that many Ameri
cans regard the nation' s changing demographics and the increasing influ
ence of diverse social groups with ambivalence, suspicion, or outright
enmity .
Obama' s first term exposed certain fault lines in American society,
evoking deep-seated apprehensions about race, immigration, and
America' s status in a post-9/ll world and fueling a reactionary backlash.
Throughout his first term in office, Obama faced grinding opposition,
divisiveness, and hostility from "Tea Party" Republicans specifically and
the GOP generally-so much so that an analysis by The Washington
Times showed that in 20 1 1 Congress set a "legislative futility record":
they accomplished less than in any other year in history (Dinan, 20 1 2,
para. 2). Republican opposition to Obama has been categorical: in a 20 1 1
Gallup poll Obama earned a 1 2 percent approval rating among Republi
cans, versus 80 percent among Democrats, making his third year in of
fice the most polarizing on record (Jones, 20 1 2, para. 1) . This deep
divide-or what political scientists call "asymmetric polarization"-can
not be explained fully by pointing to ideological differences . The results
of a recent study by political scientist Keith Poole, which estimated con
gress and the president ' s ideological positions by tabulating their "votes"
on legislation, suggest that President Obama may be, as a Washington
Post headline put it, "the most polarizing moderate ever" (Cillizza and
B lake, 20 1 2, emphasis added) . Contrary to the popular perception
(shaped no doubt by repeated references to Obama as "radical" or "ex
tremist"), Poole' s study found that President Obama is more ideologi
cally moderate than any Democratic president since the end of World
War II ("An Update on the Presidential Square Wave," 20 1 3 ) .
The deeply polarized state o f the union today is a far cry from the
one Obama envisioned during his 2004 Democratic Convention speech
when he said, "There is not a Black America and a White America and
Latino America and Asian America-there ' s the United States of
America." Despite the promise implicit in his election and subsequent re
election, the gridlock and disrespect that greeted his presidency and con
tinue during his second term provokes questions about what identity cat
egories are legitimized, included, or disavowed in the discursive
construction of a post-Obama American culture. It also calls attention to
the lingering impact of race on political attitudes. Critics publicly de
nounce Obama with a ferocity usually reserved for foreign enemies or
tyrants, high level officials often stoking the fires and leading the charge.
These public displays have implications for minorities, whose lives are
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directly impacted by any reactionary backlash. For example, in a 20 1 2
AP survey 5 1 percent of Americans expressed explicit anti-black atti
tudes compared with 48 percent in 2008. Similarly, while 52 percent of
non-Hispanic whites expressed anti-Hispanic attitudes in a 20 1 1 AP sur
vey that rose to 57 percent in a more recent study (Ross and Agiesta,
20 1 2). Sonya Ross and Jennifer Agiesta (20 1 2) report that more than half
of respondents associated words such as "violent" and "lazy" with Afri
can Americans and Latinos. As a result, "many African-Americans have
talked openly about perceived antagonism toward them since Obama
took office. As evidence, they point to events involving police brutality
or cite bumper stickers, cartoons and protest posters that mock the presi
dent as a lion or a monkey, or lynch him in effigy" (para. 1 0) . These
tactics can help shape public opinion and thus public policy: support for
affirmative action or other social programs, for example, fluctuates in
accordance with prevailing attitudes towards minority populations
(Savani, et aI, 20 1 1 ) . Racialized shaming displays intentionally exploit
the tension produced by competing impulses in American society, partic
ularly between individualism and community, between a politics of as
similation and one of differentiation. As Caroline Howarth (2006)
explains, "Stigmatizing representations, as all representations, are more
than ways of seeing or cognitive maps: they filter into, and so construct,
the institutionalized practices of differentiation, division and discrimina
tion" (p. 45) .
Shaming tactics often "brand" Obama b y culling familiar carica
tures of African-American men such as the "coon" "Sambo" or "Uncle
Tom" to imply that Obama lacks the dignity or status necessary to war
rant respect or represent America on the world stage. When President
Obama attended the 0-20 summit in London, controversy ensued over
Obama' s supposed bow before Saudi King Abdullah. A Washington
Times editorial called it a "shocking display of fealty to a foreign poten
tate" and a "servile gesture" that ran contrary to American tradition ("Ed

itorial" 2009). One cartoon combined two affronts : the President bows to
a foreign leader but also seems to "moon" Uncle Sam-thus suggesting
not only his indignity but also his arrogance and disdain for America
(Figure # 1 ) . Another links this subservience theme with the notion that
Obama "apologizes" for America (Figure #2) . In 20 1 0, another carica
ture making the rounds online recycled the Obama-as-subservient theme:
it depicts the president as a shoe shine boy polishing Sarah Palin's
shoes. I Issues of "Tea Party Comix," which were circulated and sold
online by its creator, Tom Kalb, featured a series of Obama-as-coon carI For a look at several "coon" images, their racist roots, and their revival during
O bama' s presidency, see <http : //w w w . authentichistory . com/di versity/african/3 -coon/S
chickwatermelonlindex.html>
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icatures (McMorris-Santoro, 20 1 0) . As Lawrence B obo (20 1 1 ) points
out, "the cultural production of demeaning antiblack images-post-cards
featuring watermelons on the White House lawn . . . Obama featured in
loincloth and with a bone through his nose in ads denouncing the health
care bill, a cartoon showing police officers shooting an out-of-control
chimpanzee under the heading 'They ' ll have to find someone else to
write the next stimulus bill' [Figure #3]-are ugly reminders of some of
the more overtly racialized reactions to the ascendancy of an African
American to the presidency of the United States" (p. 32).
FIGURE # 1

FIGURE # 2
I enjoy.tM butt':'kiS-Si."� ·andtM money, but!
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FIGURE #3

Other images brand Obama as a threat by associating him with neg
ative stereotypes of black men, linking the president to images of the
black "gangsta" or thug. One goes so far as to imagine Obama as black
rapist; it shows a nude Lady Liberty sitting on the edge of a bed weeping
as a smiling Obama says, "Oh stop your whining. You gave all the con
sent I ' ll ever need November 2008" (Figure #4) . When asked about her
cartoon, conservative blogger Darleen Click denied any racist intent:
"This is supposed to be a post-racial era. Then deal with the fact that the
President of the United States is the head of a gang that just raped our
American principles." 2 Clearly, there are still blatantly racist images and
claims circulating widely even in this presumably more "enlightened"
post-Obama era. As Kay Whitlock (2012) points out, "Criminalizing nar
ratives about President Obama reflect not only a politic of contempt, de
nunciation, and fear-mongering. They also strike - and are intended to
strike - a deep, often unconscious, repository of racist hostility in many
people; a virulent (though often unacknowledged) racism that is neces
sary to the further institutionalization of inequality" (para. 8).

2 The image has since been removed from the site, along with the blogger's comments.
For a discussion of this event and the broader criminalizing narrative applied against Obama
see Kay Whitlock's article, "Criminalizing President Obama." This essay includes links to
various images and their historical correlates . <http://criticalmassprogress.comI20l2/02IlSlci
criminalizing-president-obama/>
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Shaming gestures such as these draw on judgments and strictures
that a group shares, core rules and expectations which if broken merit
social or moral condemnation. Invoking shared values, the group re-en
forces its boundaries and internal coherence. As a form of differentiation
and disapproval, collective shaming acts help maintain social and moral
hierarchies. They structure and regulate group behaviors, constituting
and enforcing social identities such as gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity,
religion. David Leverenz argues in Honor Bound: Race and Shame in
America (20 1 2) that racial shaming in particular "affirms the coherence
of a dominant racial group" (p. 8). "For over three hundred years,"
Leverenz writes, "shaming after shaming firmed up the pretense that di
chotomized skin colors justified white control" (p. 24) . He notes that
racial shaming tactics typically aim "to reconsolidate white power rather
than to make black targets feel ashamed" (p. 9). This is likely because
there is no "corrective" or "redemptive" response possible on the part of
the target of race-based shaming. If as Leverenz contends racial shaming
sees "black" as more basic than "person" (p. 9), the intent is not to "im
prove" or "reform" the raced other (for how does one "redeem" skin
color?) but to empower the shamer. In Leverenz ' s view, the "more anx
ious white people are about their status, the more they need to flaunt their
superiority" (p. 25).

20 1 2]

S CARLET- LETTER POLITICS

7

The dread of miscegenation or of waning "white power" has a long
history in America and is readily tapped for political effect. From
Lothrop Stoddard's The Rising Tide of Color Against White World
Supremacy, published in 1 920, to Pat Buchanan's 200 1 book, The Death
of the West, to the 2009 Atlantic Magazine headline proclaiming the "end
of white America," the notion that white U . S . -born citizens are an "op
pressed maj ority" (in Rush Limbaugh's words) increasingly fuels para
noia. The perceived or actual erosion of white privilege earns
considerable media attention and invokes elegiac rants from conservative
pundits. Obama's presidency, combined with the psychological and eco
nomic effects of the great recession, add further weight to the belief that
whites-particularly white men-are under attack. As David Leonard
(20 1 2) notes in an Ebony opinion piece, white nationalists seized upon
President Obama's re-election to increase their ranks : "At Storm
front.org, the hub for global racism, readers were met with a new intro
duction to the website : 'The recent Obama victory and the resultant anti
Obama backlash has caused a lot of Whites to visit Stormfront (reader
ship surged up to 600% more than normal). Welcome. ' " (para. 6-7).

Sociologist Charles Gallagher (20 1 1 ) explains that, "We [whites] went
from being a privileged group to all of a sudden becoming . . . the new
victims . . . . Y ou have this perception out there that whites are no longer in
control or the maj ority" (Blake, para. 5-6). In this context, acts of public
shaming and humiliation can help assuage bruised egos and reaffirm the
group's higher status and worth. Through shaming gestures, an anxious
hierarchy may "restore psychological comfort for the group" (Adshead,
20 1 0, p. 206).
AMERICAN (W HITE ) PRIDE AND RACIAL S HAMING IN THE
AGE OF OB AMA
Most Americans do not identify with the more overt racism ex
pressed by white supremacist organizations or post-election Twitters . 3
Thus the contemporary politics of shaming often requires a more delicate
balance: it must stoke latent racial anxiety and "white pride" discourses
while not challenging our positive national self-image as a tolerant E
Pluribus Unum democracy. Thus racial shaming strategies often involve
coding and deflection. Going beyond a longstanding duologue of white
3 Following the 20 1 2 election, the "n" word and "monkey" were trending high on Twit
ter, with outraged and angry posts denouncing President Obama and his black and Latino
supporters. For a sampling of these posts, see J. Lemieux, Ebony (November 8, 20 1 2) . Online
http://www.ebony.comlnews-views/obama-wins-ngger-trends- I 00#axzz2M7Z5cE2F. For the
results of a data-mapping survey of these posts, see "Mapping racist Tweets in response to
Pre s i d e n t Obam a ' s r e - e l e c ti o n , " The G u a rdi a n , N o v . 1 2 , 20 1 2. O n l i n e http : //
www . guardian.co. uk/news/datab log/20 1 2/nov/09/mappi ng -raci st-tweets-pres ident -obama
reelection
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and black, this tactic deploys "patriotic" themes historically aligned with
Anglo-American cultural myths and values. These appeals express nos
talgia for "traditional American values" and for a time when America
ruled the world proudly and "without apology." It invokes an imagined
community united by religious (Judeo-Christian) and economic (capital
ist/free market) kinship and energized by a so-called "Protestant work
ethic. " Shaming Obama here depends on excluding him from these foun
dational narratives-portraying him as an outsider who holds no authen
tic ties to "American" history or values. He is, as Mitt Romney charged
during the campaign, someone who "doesn't believe in American excep
tionalism" ("Obama Rebuts Charge," 2012) .
During both presidential campaigns, Obama's racial difference was
often recoded to signify an indeterminate otherness, a threatening "un
Americanness" that calls into question his legal and cultural right to be
president of the United States. In this way, shame is attached to the presi
dent by imbuing him with the taint of the foreign and arousing suspicions
about his "true" identity or intent. In March of 2010, Republican Na
tional Committee fundraising plans made this strategy explicit, calling
for an aggressive campaign capitalizing on "fear" of President Obama
and socialism. These negative associations evoke a potentially threaten
ing Otherness that invites public condemnation. Thus during the 20 1 2
campaign, Romney campaign co-chair and former New Hampshire Gov.
John Sununu explained to Fox News that Obama doesn't understand how
the "American system functions" because "he spent his early years in
Hawaii smoking something, spent the next set of years in Indonesia"
(Volsky, 2012, para. 2). During a conference call the same day, Sununu
remarked that he wished that "this president would learn how to be an
American." After President Obama's lackluster performance in the first
presidential debate, Sununu said of the Harvard-educated Obama, "When
you're not that bright you can't get better prepared." Later on an
MSNBC, Sununu claimed that the debate had revealed Obama's "incom
petence" and referred to the president of the United States as "lazy"
(Rothman, 20 1 2) .
N o one is a member o f an exclusive collectivity, and people who are
subordinated along one axis of social division may well be dominant
along another. But "red letter politics" require reductive categories and
associations to clearly differentiate and "brand" the target group. Refer
ences to welfare or food stamp recipients are often used as code-words
for blacks or Latinos, reducing the multiplicity of these identities to fit
neatly into a rigid caste system. Once poverty is raced, it is stigmatized,
turned into a sign of some moral or character failing inherent in the target
group. B lack poverty and unemployment rates, extirpated from their
complex historical roots, are thus attributable to "their" essential lazi-
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ness, criminality, or willingness to "scam" the system. After all, to con
front capitalism's failings is to turn the gaze inward: to invite a sense of
collective responsibility and perhaps even stir up the embers of shame.
One group "saves face" through a gesture of deferral and disavowal
while the other becomes the public face of need, dependency, and lack.
So it is that during both presidential campaigns Obama's opponents
made it a point to distinguish "hard working Americans" (read: whites)
from those who lack the "Protestant work ethic" identified with WASP
culture in America. Ronald Reagan had famously chided "welfare
queens" during his presidency, and Hillary Clinton revived these associa
tions when she ran against Obama: "I have a much broader base to build
a winning coalition on," she told a USA Today reporter. Clinton then
cited Sen. Obama's weak "support among working, hard-working Amer
icans, white Americans" (Kiely and Lawrence, 2008). When Representa
tive Joe Wilson from South Carolina shouted "You lie ! " at President
Obama during his 2009 healthcare address before Congress, he was re
acting to the false notion that Obama aimed to provide illegal immigrants
with government healthcare subsidies. Leverenz (20 1 2) aptly notes that
in "antebellum South Carolina, Wilson's accusation would have pro
voked a duel, since it was a flagrant shaming" (p. 1 7 3) . But for those
who defended Wilson's disrespectful outburst, the issue seemed to boil
down to the same equation: Obama was going to force "us" to provide
handouts for "them" (losers, moochers, and illegals).
In his 2008 speech on race, "A More Perfect Union," Obama
pointed to the "lack of economic opportunity among black men, and the
shame and frustration that came from not being able to provide for one's
family" (Obama, 2008, para. 32) . Throughout his presidency, however,
he has been criticized for not directly addressing black unemployment
rates-almost twice that of whites. Maintaining a "post-race" stance,
Obama has responded to critics by saying that "it's a mistake to start
thinking in terms of particular ethnic segments of the United States rather
than to think that we are all in this together and we are all going to get
out of this together" (Jackson, 2009). The President's attempts to pro
pose "color blind" economic policies during the great recession have not
stopped opponents from culling the myth of black entitlement. Here
scarlet-letter politics associate blacks and minorities with Romney's 47
percent "who are dependent upon government, who believe that they are
victims, who believe the government has a responsibility to care for
them, who believe that they are entitled to health care, to food, to hous
ing, to you-name-it" (Corn, 20 1 2, para. 2). One Romney campaign ad
falsely accused Obama of gutting welfare reforms, claiming that "Under
Obama's plan, you wouldn't have to work . . . . They just send you a
welfare check" (Edsall, 20 1 2) . After Obama's re-election, Romney told
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donors that Obama had been re-elected because of the "gifts" that he
offered African American and Latino voters (Daniel, 20 1 2) .
During the 20 1 2 presidential campaign, Newt Gingrich echoed his
1 994 Contract with America, which targeted federal food stamp entitle
ment programs for elimination. At a Fox News-Wall Street Journal spon
sored debate in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, he referred to President
Obama as "the best food stamp president in history," culling associations
between the black president and entitlement programs. Relying on racist
stereotypes that attribute blacks ' economic status to laziness or lack of
Willpower, Gingrich asserted the difference between "them" (Obama and
the 95 percent of blacks who supported him in the first election) and "us"
(a maj ority white Republican audience, and by extension, "real" i.e.
"hard working" Americans) : "We believe in work. We believe people
should learn to work and that we ' re opposed to dependency" (20 1 2,
Green, para. 1 ) . Despite the fact that most recipients of federal food aid
are children, elderly, and severely disabled persons and that only 22 per
cent of all food stamp recipients are black, Gingrich was able to exploit
assumptions and familiar stereotypes for effect-eliciting a standing ova
tion in the process.
Criticism of the President often involves an amorphous "Othering"
process : references to Obama' s "questionable" birth certificate raise
doubts about whether he was "really" born in America; allusions to his
"Kenyon father" the "Luo tribesman" arouse suspicions about Obama' s
"Africanness" ; use of the word "socialist" in conjunction with any policy
Obama proposes, regardless of how "centrist" or moderate or capitalist,
spooks middle-class Americans into opposing what might benefit them
economically ; and opportune uttering of his middle name, Hussein,
works to denote Muslim or Middle Eastern affiliations with all that en
tails in post-91 l 1 America. Thus distortion and misinformation persist,
circulated via popular conservative media outlets, talk radio, internet
blogs, and even prominent political leaders. Not surprisingly, a Harris
poll conducted in March of 20 1 0 showed that 67 percent of Republicans
(and 77 percent of Tea Party supporters) believe Obama is a socialist,
another 45 percent that he is the "domestic enemy that the Constitution
speaks of' and 45 percent that he was not born in the United States and is
therefore ineligible for the presidency (For example, Figure #5 assumes
that Obama was born in a village in Kenya) . Twenty-four percent sur
veyed believe he may be the Anti-Christ (Taylor, 20 1 0 ) . In a television
interview on July 23, 2009, Watergate conspirator Gordon Liddy sug
gested that Obama might be "an illegal alien" (Stelter, para. 1 4) . Such
notions persisted throughout Obama' s first term and buttressed legal ra
tionales for "policing" people of color. As Melissa Harris-Perry notes,
"As the president was being asked to show his papers to the nation, state
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governments in Arizona, Alabama and South Carolina empowered police
officers, school officials and merchants to demand proof of citizenship
from anyone they deemed suspicious of immigration violations-suspi
cions that are triggered primarily by racial, ethnic and linguistic profil
ing" (para.

6).
FIGURE #5

This need to position Obama as somehow "outside" the parameters
of what is legitimately "American" was first on display during the 2008
presidential campaign, though during that contest Senator John McCain
corrected an audience member who referred to Obama as a Muslim.Yet
during the 2012 campaign stop in Florida, GOP presidential hopeful Rick
Santorum smiled and nodded as a woman in the audience told him, "1
never refer to Obama as President Obama because legally he is not [pres
ident] .... He is an avowed Muslim and my question is, why isn't some
thing being done to get him out of government? He has no legal right to
be calling himself president" (Aigner-Treworgy, 2012, para. 2). When
questioned about his silence in the face of this factually inaccurate claim,
Santorum responded, "1 don't feel it's my obligation every time someone
says something I don't agree with to contradict them." Further fueling
fears of Obama's otherness, Santorum told audiences at Columbus, Ohio
campaign stop: Obama's agenda is "not about you. It's not about your
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quality of life. It' s not about your jobs. It' s about. . . . Some phony theol
ogy . . . . not a theology based on the Bible" (Walshe, 20 1 2 , para. 2-3) .
Obama was born i n Hawaii in 1 96 1 and did not even visit Kenya
until 1 987, but this has not stopped some prominent conservatives from
attributing his "difference" to his Kenyon ancestry. James Mann (20 1 0)
coined the phrase the "Kenya paranoia" in reference to this phenomenon.
But Mann is "not talking here about simply the ideas of Republicans, the
right wing or the political fringes. Rather, the Kenya paranoia has been
showing up in the politest society, among journalists and even high-rank
ing diplomats ." Mann argues that this "paranoia" about Obama' s "differ
ence" is not even restricted to Americans : a British television reporter
wanted to interview Mann about Obama' s views of the world because,
'' 'He has different roots than all other presidents, ' the reporter said. 'He
doesn't have ties to Europe' " (para. 6). Mann points to the irony of this
assumption that Obama is not "European" enough-despite a white
mother with British ancestry. Similarly, former Arkansas governor and
twice GOP presidential candidate Mike Huckabee attributed Obama' s
"difference" to his "having grown up in Kenya" (an untruth that forced
his political action committee spokesman, Hogan Gidley, to explain that
"the governor . . . wasn ' t talking about the president' s place of birth the governor believes the president was born in Hawaii") [Shear, 20 1 1 ] .
W e should note the use of the word "believes" rather than "knows," a s if
Obama' s citizenship was simply a matter of belief.
MAMMIES , HOOKERS, AND Ho's: MICHELLE'S B ODY AND THE POLITICS
OF SHAME

B lack women ' s bodies have historically been subjected to the regu
latory power of shame. The stigmatization of black femininity prompts a
level of self-discipline and surveillance reflected in Toni Morrison ' s The
Bluest Eye ( 1 970) in a passage describing African-American women ' s
attempts to tame their embodied differences : "They hold their behind in
for fear of a sway too free; when they wear lipstick, they never cover the
full mouth for fear of lips too thick, and they worry, worry, worry about
the edges of their hair" (77-7 8). Michelle ' s body reflect white America' s
lovelhate relationship with black female beauty: on the one hand, fea
tures often identified with black women (full lips , dark skin, muscular
physique) are highly desirable, and white women pay handsomely for
everything from lip injections to tanning beds to butt implants. On the
other, black women have long borne stigmas associated with primitiv
ism, animalistic, and excessive or aberrant sexuality. These competing
tensions inform some of the polarized reactions Michelle ' s body elicits.
Much is written about B arack Obama' s physical prowess-his com
petitive basketball games, daily workout on the treadmill and with free
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weights. A photo of B arack in bathing shorts at the beach went viral,
with bloggers commenting on the president' s pectorals and lean phy
sique. As Leola Johnson (2010) remarks, "the light-skinned, hyperfit
Obama is frequently sexualized and otherwise physically objectified by
his fans. Thus, in the early days of his administration, the most widely
circulated magazine and Internet images of Obama, featured in black and
white media alike, showed him as a hyperfit sex obj ect; a cool, sunglass
wearing business man; or a combination of those things" (p. 247).
Michelle shares her husband' s commitment to fitness, reportedly
doing an hour a day of cardio, weight training and calisthenics. She has
also made childhood obesity a priority, raising awareness of this health
issue and leading efforts to improve eating habits. Her stature, impressive
biceps, and grace, like Barack' s lean body, have been the subject of
much fascination and praise. Yet Michelle ' s body is also objectified as
shameful, made to sign in for a range of degrading stereotypes of black
women. Her "Let' s Move ! " campaign, White House vegetable garden
and efforts to encourage healthy eating habits have been mocked and
caricatured by political opponents. Despite the First Lady ' s enviable in
tellectual and physical strength or acclaimed fashion sense, her body has
consistently been the subject of degrading comments and racialized
shaming images .
One image that considerable Internet chatter was the photo-shopped
portrait of the First Lady on the cover of a leading Spanish magazine,
Magazine de Fuera de Serie, which featured the image of the First
Lady ' s face on the body of a bare-breasted female slave (Figure #6) . The
original painting, Portrait d' une negresse, was completed in 1800 by
French artist Marie-Guillemine Benoist as a tribute. The magazine' s
cover story "Michelle Tataranieta De Esclava, Duena De America"
("Michelle Great Granddaughter of a Slave, Lady of America") heaped
praise on Michelle, and the French/English artist who conceived the

piece, Karine Percheron-Daniel, has defended the image, arguing that it
acknowledges Michelle' s slave ancestry to celebrate her current status
and empowerment. But as Althea Legal-Miller (2012) writes in Clutch
Magazine, the "portrait robs Obama of her identity, voice, and intellect,
and visually shackles her to a politically passive subj ect, resigned to an
assigned role as slave." Legal-Miller concludes that "These images largely determined by stereotypes used to legitimize racial and gender
oppression-speak to a painful history of exploitation and erotic objectifi
cation, which continues to manifest in multiple contexts across the black
female diaspora" (2012, para. 5 ) . I cannot help but wonder if any major
magazine would have dared depict a topless Nancy Reagan, Barbara or
Laura Bush on their cover.
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of exaggerated buttocks" signaled "other, hidden sexual signs, both phys
ical and temperamental, of the black female" (p. 91) . By casting the
"stigmata of degeneracy" (p. 89) on black female anatomy and sexuality,
her "difference" could be read as a sign of her inherent inferiority and
"primitive sexual appetite" (p. 85). "Sarah B artmann' s genitalia and but
tocks summarized her essence for the nineteenth-century observer, as in
deed they continue to do for twentieth-century observers . . . " (p. 88).
The Musee de l' homme in Paris would finally return B artmann' s remains
to South Africa in 2002.
In recent years women of color have challenged dominant beauty
myths and embraced their curves-with rap music and celebrity
magazines singing the praises of big booty. Voluptuous female buttocks
have become a valuable commodity, exploited in adveltising campaigns,
music videos, and specialty men ' s magazines. However, there is a linger
ing stigma attached to the protruding butt in America' s conservative
mainstream, where it can still elicit tropes of race and class. In her arti
cle, "First Lady Got B ack," Erin Aubry Kaplan (2008) notes that a pro
truding butt has been "both vilified and fetishized as the most singular of
all black female features, more unsettling than dark skin and full lips, the
thing that marked black women as uncouth and not quite ready for civili
zation . . . " (para. 6). Kaplan celebrates the emergence of Michelle
Obama' s "solid, round, black, Class A boo-ta" on the nation' s political
stage, noting that "As America fretted about [Barack] Obama' s exoticism
and he sought to calm the waters with speeches about unity and common
experience . . . . Here was one clear signifier of blackness that couldn ' t be
tamed, muted or otherwise made invisible" (para. 5). To Kaplan and
other women who do not see their bodies reflected in the images typi
cally gracing magazine covers, Michelle' s butt evokes confidence and
even ethnic pride.
But among Obama' s opponents, Michelle' s butt is a political tar
get-a sign of shameful excess, lack of discipline, or low status. Wiscon
sin Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner made a comment about the First Lady ' s
"large posterior" while talking to church members at a Christmas bazaar
("US Rep apologizes"). Rush Limbaugh, not exactly a model of physical
perfection, has nick-named her "Michelle, My Butt." Like many other
conservative pundits, Limbaugh seems compelled to remark on
Michelle' s butt. Chastising John McCain for "kissing Obama' s butt" by
crediting him with the death of dictator Muammar Gadhafi, Limbaugh
remarked, "Obama doesn' t have a butt. Compared to his wife, he really
doesn' t have a butt" (Krepel & Rosenberg, 20 1 2, para. 24) . Media Mat
ters reported that "one of Andrew Breitbart' s websites posted a cartoon
of an overweight Michelle Obama eating a plate-full of hamburgers and
saying: "Shut up and pass the bacon ! " (Krepel & Rosenberg, 20 1 2, para.

16

ETHNIC STUDIES REVIEW

[Vol. 3 5 :1

1 9) . Another popular cartoon imposes the First Lady ' s face on the body
of a woman with exaggerated buttocks. The caption reads, "Muchelle
Obama Stars in B oogie Pork Fever."
Following suit, an Alabama High School head coach was caught on
tape blaming "fat butt Michelle Obama" for the new low-calorie school
lunches (Singleton-Rickman, 20 1 3 , para. 3 ) . These "fat butt" j okes and
images are not restricted to online cartoons or politicians who claim to
have "misspoken." Journalist David Kahane (20 1 1 ) wrote in a Natio nal
Review article: "Michelle would have a real shot of slipping into Queen
Kapiolani' s muumuu collection and making it her own, especially after a
few more meals of short ribs in Vail" (para. 5). One email circulating
during the 20 1 2 campaign compares the backsides of two European First
Ladies, Carla Bruni Sarkozy (former model and wife of former French
president S arkozy) and Spain' s Princess Letizia with Michelle ' s, con
trasting their fashion sense and butt size with a photo shopped image of
Michelle ' s backside where she appears as a kind of "mammie" figure
beside the sleek European women.
All of these negative associations are at play in an image circulating
on the Internet that not only exaggerates Michelle ' s backside but makes
it her defining feature. In this photo shopped image Michelle Obama is
reduced to a sign of vulgar excess, her body posed in a way meant to
evoke disgust in the viewer. As William Ian Miller argues in The A nat
omy of D isgust, the anus "is the essence of lowness, of untouchability" in
Western culture ( 1 997, p. 1 00). More than any other orifice, it has "the
lowest-status place on the body, rendered disgusting by feces and buf
foonish and comical by gas" (Miller, 1 997, p. 1 00). The body of the
First Lady appears poised to commit a shameful transgression that in
vokes both of these social taboos : defecating and farting in public. This
dual affront to social propriety and hygiene strips Michelle of dignity,
turning her into a figure that can evoke only contempt, opprobrium, or
disdainful laughter. Her imagined shamelessness (depicted through the
"mooning" gesture and punctuated by the facial expression) seems in
tended to taunt the viewer, and by extension, the American citizenry.
Another image (Figure #8) making the rounds via emails and Internet
po stings during the 20 1 2 campaign turns the First Lady into a street
walker: in it Michelle Obama is soliciting "clients" on the side of the
road, holding her skirt up to expose her genitals to passing cars. The
caption reads: "How Michelle and B arack Obama first met." Again, the
photo draws on familiar caricatures of black female sexuality as deviant,
excessive, or criminal-a contemporary Jezebel in the White House.
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FIGURE #8

Public shaming tactics have always been part of America' s political
culture, and caricatures of opponents invariably involve exaggerated
physical features . As Charles Press explains in his book, The Political
Cartoon, "The cartoon is really an exaggeration to get at an underlying
truth, which it conveys through a message, demonstrating a mood around
the social or political situation that inspired the cartoon." But while these
images always exaggerate traits or features, they rely for their meaning
and effect on pre-existing perceptions and assumptions about the individ
ual or group targeted. The shaming tactics I ' ve identified here all draw
on familiar racial stereotypes for their effect by culling a history of racial
associations that have stigmatized and differentiated African Americans.
The political effect of these tactics depends on the extent to which the
viewer is "in" on the pun, joke, or trope in play. Thus shaming tech
niques such as these can also backfire. Many conservatives reject these
tactics and refuse to be "in" on the joke, and Americans did give Obama
a second term. A January 20 1 3 Public Policy Poll shows that Democrats'
approval rating (- 1 2 at 3 8/50) is a net 48 points better than their Republi
can counterparts (-60 at I S/7S) [Public Policy Polling, Republicans in
Congress have only a 2S% approval rating even with the GOP base.
Given this reversal of fortune, it may well be that shame is finally com
ing home to roost.
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FROM MODERN ROCK TO POSTMODERN HARD
ROCK: CAMB ODIAN ALTERNATIVE
MUSIC VOICES

LinDa Sap han
College of Mount Saint Vincent

Music is the most abstract of all art forms . It is al so a flexible art
form subject to many influences and appropriation of different artists,
genres, and cultures. Yet when it comes to Cambodian music-espe
cially contemporary genres-one theme predominates for the audience:
authentic music. Some commentators remark that contemporary
Cambodian music consists merely of appropriation of foreign music, in
contrast to the prewar musicians who performed an authentic musical
repertoire. But as Butt argues, by definition music has no borders and is
pluralistic in sound: "Music ceases to be that hermetically-sealed object
existing apart from our everyday concerns, and becomes instead a line,
an infinitely-expanding polyphony of cultural practice" (Butt 2006, 1 1 ) .
W e will not linger o n defining the concept o f authenticity o r even at
tempt to attach it to any form of nationalism. Music that Cambodian
artists have crafted and are still crafting reflects pluralistic practices ex
tending beyond national territories.
In Cambodia, the performing arts, particularly music, are important
forms of sociocultural discourse. In the ethnomusicological tradition of
Cambodia, there are many accounts of the people' s j oy, despair, and he
roic action glorified by storytellers and expressed through traditional per
formance genres. Musical performance in Cambodia serves not only to
accompany religious rituals and convey cultural messages, but also to
convey the political message of each regime and each generation' s self
expression.
Before rock and roll came to Cambodia, there was already a strong
musical presence and lively popular music scene. Popular music emerged
from the Mohori ensemble because this is the only ensemble that does
not have a religious function or serve to accompany another art form
(Sam Ang-Sam, interview, 2009) . Popular music was created specifically
for entertainment by mixing the traditional music of the Mohori with
new melodies and rhythms. Already a popular musical form, Mohori ex
panded its repertoire and genres to reach a wider and younger audience
in the city and countryside alike. Rural people called the new form "j azz"
or "stepping music" after the proml11ence of drums (Keo 2004, 96) .
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These modern rhythms were popular in dancehalls and restaurants, where
it was possible to dance to traditional songs with dances such as the
Roam Vong, Roam Kbach, Roam Saravann, and later the Madison.
Modernity in Cambodia was an affair of the state: musicians em
braced Sihanouk' s plan for modernizing the country, while today ' s songs
reflect a pluralistic postmodern society and the diverse voices of global
ized performers . This paper will compare modern and postmodern music
and musical appropriation in the contemporary Cambodian alternative
music scene. An overview of the popular, rock, and hip-hop music of
Cambodian communities is beyond the scope of this article. I aim instead
to shed some light on musical appropriation before the Khmer Rouge
regime and today ' s alternative voices by using the lens of modernity and
postmodernity as analytical tools to understand music voices. I will not
judge the quality or authenticity of specific music, but will draw parallels
between early rock and roll and today ' s hip-hop musical influences.
ONE VOICE OF MODERNITY

When Norodom Sihanouk gained independence for the country in
1 95 3 , the whole population was ready to enter the modern world by
breaking its l ink with the colonial past. Cambodia embarked on a mod
ernization process dominated by technological progress and a new na
tional identity . Charles Jencks' s definition of modernism traces back to
Roman times and stresses the importance of the present time as a sense
of progress: "The term ["modernism"] has carried a progressive impulse
ever since, both technical and moral" (Jencks 2009, 20) . Buildings
sprouted all over Phnom Penh, symbolizing the new aesthetic age.
The modernization movement was not the work of a single individ
ual as stated by architect Vann Molyvann in an interview (2004). Ameri
can poet T. S. Eliot expressed this in his analysis of the modern poetry
movement: "No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning
alone. His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation
to the dead poets and artists" ( 1 982, 37). However, modernization in
Cambodia was first and foremost a top-down program of the state
searching to appropriate modern designs, genres, styles, and plans to in
ject into the Cambodian landscape. Without the royal figure of Norodom
Sihanouk, pre-Khmer Rouge development would have been quite differ
ent. He embraced modernization through agricultural and technological
development and was himself the embodiment of the modern Khmer
man.
Sihanouk' s enthusiasm convinced the Cambodian people to em
brace change. By promoting popular culture, Sihanouk gave legitimacy
to artists, increasing their esteem in the eyes of the population. Unlike the
French rulers, Sihanouk encouraged modern artistic practices . He truly
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loved Cambodia ' s traditional cultural heritage but also sought to open its
doors to new modern genres.
Cambodian musical appropriation of the pre-Khmer Rouge era was
intertwined with S ihanouk' s political agenda. Music served the govern
ment by strengthening national unity and spreading modernity among the
population . Early Cambodian rock and roll needs to be understood in this
political and historical frame of reference. As Grossberg (2000) notes,
"Rock and Roll is a cultural event that emerged at a particular moment
into a particular context" ( 1 1 2) . The emerging rock and roll played an
important role in the political project of the newly independent country
and its population seeking to become modern citizens. Cambodians were
modern citizens as defined by Marshall Berman ( 1 998), as embracing
their present and feeling comfortable and at home in this new era of
progress.
SIHANOUK: THE M O DER N M A N

Sihanouk came from a family who loved music and took pride in
their musical skills, providing him with a strong musical background. His
father was a competent musician and his mother listened to modern
French singers like Tino Rossi, Edith Piaf, and Charles Trenet. Once he
took power, S ihanouk became an enthusiastic patron of the arts, but he
was also an artist in hi s own right. He was a multitalented musician-he
played the saxophone, piano, and other instruments-as well as a com
poser, singer, filmmaker, poet, actor, and interior designer.
Sihanouk understood the important role that music played for his
people and he used that understanding to his political advantage. A mod
ern band performed before and after each of political speeches. The
Royal Military Orchestra accompanied him in all his travels about the
country , ensuring a l arge crowd at every public event he attended and

promoting his image as a popular leader. Sihanouk asked each ministry
to have its own musical band-the ultimate sign of patronage and sup
port for popular music. These bands performed all types of popular mu
sic, ensuring financial stability and social position for the performers.
Sihanouk selected the most prominent talents to perform with his per
sonal orchestra, including Ros Serey Sothea, Sin Sisamouth, and Sos
Mat. With the rock group B aksei Chamkrung B and a new musical trend,
the electric guitar band influenced by Cliff Richards, was discovered and
Sihanouk immediately invited the band to perform for him. Prominent
female singers Mao Sareth, Chhuon Malay, and Sieng Di worked with
the Royal Military Orchestra. They were the very first generation of fe
male singers to perform both traditional and modern music and to pro
duce vinyl records. They sang songs about the provinces and cities they
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visited, with titles like "Divine City of Medicine" (Kep City), "Summit
of B okor Mountain," and "Beautiful Mondulkiri Province. "
S ihanouk' s song 'Phnom Koulen, ' most likely written in the 1 950s,
extols the Phnom Koulen mountain range in northwestern Cambodia:
Beyond the lush green jungle lands,
Beyond the sloping valley,
Stands the golden mountain
Maj estic symbol
Of a time flown by,
Proud and haughty watcher
That judges from on high.
Oh ! Phnom Koulen
Let your old wisdom
Guide our young ways
Giving strength
To meet future days.
Mountain,
Guard thy country, guard its rich earth,
Guard the place of thy birth.
(http://norodomsihanouk.info/documentJdoc_2 1 97.html)
This song embodies Sihanouk' s vision of Cambodian culture as an
old civilization rich in traditional art forms yet seeking broader horizons
for new endeavors. It celebrates the cultural heritage while encouraging
the audience to embrace new foreign influences in the Cambodian land
scape. This song reassured the old guard of their value but spoke to youth
about the possibilities ahead of them. Similar to his political neutrality
during the regional Cold War, Sihanouk attempts in this song to bridge
the generation gap between old and young.
The love songs written early in his career as a composer reflect the
country' s emerging enthusiasm for joining Sihanouk' s social and politi
cal modernization project. The political agenda of these songs is easily
discernable. Sihanouk used these recorded songs broadcast on the radio
as a means of reaching out to the Cambodian people to encourage them
to celebrate his goal of establishing a modern country under his
leadership.
The pre-Khmer rouge era was idealized as the "Golden Era" and
Phnom Penh as the "Pearl of Southeast Asia." Sihanouk was able to
build prosperity, maintain stability, and avoid war through a policy of
neutrality during the Cold War precipitated by the support of Cambodian
and North Vietnamese communists by the Soviet Union and China. But
these benefits were achieved through Sihanouk' s authoritarianism and
came at a cost: there was no political freedom of expression, and mem-
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bers of the Communist Party were executed as traitors who undermined
the peace and political stability of the country. For Cambodians who sup
ported democracy and free speech, the moniker "Golden Era" did not
reflect the political reality of the time.
Sihanouk' s modernization program provided a social context for
musicians to thrive, creating new sounds and experimenting in new mu
sical territory. Having the head of the government supporting and play
ing modern music himself gave it social value among the population.
Without Norodom Sihanouk' s love for music, there certainly would not
have been such a thriving scene then.
As expected, the new songs celebrated the nation' s modernization.
There were no songs protesting political or social conditions as in West
ern popular music of the same era. The rock and roll bands that played at
Sihanouk' s speeches were there to bolster his political image as a popu
lar and charismatic leader, while his own songs celebrated the country ' s
beauty or supported his agenda in international relations.
THE ROCKER : URBAN BOURGEOIS YOUTH

Despite the many changing political regimes in Cambodia in a short
period of time following independence, there were still only two social
classes in the country : the urban dweller and the villager, with two dis
tinct life styles and means of accessing modernity and music. Traditional
music seemed to follow that division: one style practiced at the royal
palace, and the other in the villages. Rural Cambodians accessed music
mainly through the national radio, while urban dwellers had more op
tions, such as records from foreign countries. With the emerging popular
culture, a third social category became relevant to shaping and promoting
the new musical form: the urban bourgeoisie. While many musicians
were from the provinces, Phnom Penh became the hub for a subculture
of innovative musical genres. In the capital city, expanded career oppor
tunities opened up in the music industry working for recording compa
nies, performing in clubs, and playing for big-band orchestras in
ministries and private bands. Unlike folk musicians in the villages, the
new urban musicians performed a wide repertoire from traditional folk
songs to rock and roll tunes .
As with Sihanouk' s authoritarian political regime, the popular mu
sic scene was shaped from the top down, by the urban bourgeoisie. The
first generation of popular singers from the 1 950s to the early 1 960s
came from various social backgrounds-Ros Serey Sothea was a farm
girl while S in Sisamouth came from a middle-class provincial family
but all were professionally trained. The rockers came from the upper
middle to the elite class. They had no professional training but had a
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passion for music and the financial means to acquire needed instruments
and equipment.
Peter Manual reminds us that "modernity has often been identified
with the Enlightenment and Euro-American bourgeois culture" ( 1 995,
228). Cambodian modernity followed the Euro-American path of being
led by the bourgeoisie. The emergence of rock and roll began with the
urban elite, who were able to send their children abroad for studies or
leisure travel and could afford cultural materials such as magazines and
records, as well as musical instruments, microphones, amplifiers , and so
on to form music bands. Mol Kagmol from the band Baksei Chamkrung
recounted that a guitar and a microphone cost the same as two
motorcycles at that time (interview, 2009).
In the 1 950s and 1 960s very few Cambodians could afford a record
player or even records. Panabou, located near the Central Market, opened
in the early 1 960s and was the first record store in Phnom Penh. Later
many more stores offered e lectric guitars, such as Magasin D ' Etat, which
also had a concert hall. Music fans could order any records from their
catalog or that they found on top-hit lists in magazines-but only the
bourgeoisie class could afford to do so. Some musicians needed to save
carefully to buy the latest hit songs, while others had friends or family
who could bring records back directly from France or neighboring
countries .
Musicians performed at nightclubs, restaurant bars, private parties,
and universities-all frequented by urban bourgeoisie youth. For most
Cambodians, the radio was their only means of listening to the latest
songs. However, the national radio was bound by rules and conventions :
foreign-language songs were banned except for special programs broad
cast through international cooperation. The richest families could afford
to hire a band for a birthday party or embassy celebrations.
Traditionally a career in music was handed down through families
from one generation to the next. Later, singers sought opportunities for
social mobility through their skills, for example by participating in sing
ing contests. For them, the music industry meant a career and an income,
as depicted in the Cambodian film Pheakdey, produced in 1 973 by Ivon
Hem and starring Vichara Dany, in which a young girl is offered a record
deal in the city and gains financial stability and recognition.
With the birth of true rock and roll, music took on new purposes for
leisure and self-expression. The new musicians and singers came from
the middle- and upper-class families of Phnom Penh. The Mol brothers,
Kagmol and Kagmach, who started the first guitar band in the 1 960s,
B aksei Chamkrung, came from one of the wealthiest family in Phnom
Penh. Prince Sisowath Panara Sirivudh played with the band Apsara and
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while prince Norodom S irivudh, half brother of Norodom S ihanouk, sup
ported musicians materially.
Without the urban bourgeoisie youth of Phnom Penh possessing the
desire, wealth, and leisure time to create music, there would have been
no opportunity for modern popular music, and even less rock and roll, to
flourish. Urban youth sought a new musical genre to identify with and to
express themselves in this era of modernization and opening of the coun
try to the rest of the world. The Mol brothers, for example, were not
professional musicians ; they performed for free and would not accept
money for their services . Their parents tolerated their "hobby" as long as
it did not interfere with their studies. Thus popular music was a class
interest. Only the elite had access to the new music and they became
agents of change, spreading musical influences and establishing patterns
and networks of cultural exchange between Southeast Asia (and Sri
Lanka) and Europe.
THE MODERN MALE VOICE

Modernity was originally a male concern, as Marshall Berman
shows in his analysis of modernity in Goethe' s Faust ( 1 998), and Cam
bodia was no exception. While modern Cambodian music emerged from
the urban class, the voice of music was mainly male and the music indus
try was dominated by men. Songwriters of the time were exclusively
male, among them Pov S ipor, Mer Bun, Sin Sisamouth, Kung Van
Choeun, Has Salon, Voy Ho, Malapi, Ouk S inareth, and Samneang
Rithy. Even when the singers were women and sang about women, the
composer was always male. There was a clear gender-based division of
labor in the music industry, and female performers singers did not write
lyrics or music.
Singer Sieng Di recalled in an interview (2009) that the male singer
and song writer Sin Sisamouth wrote a love song for her to sing called
"Pruos te Srolan" (Because of Love) . The song expressed S ieng Di' s
husband' s devotion to her, but as seen through the eyes of the male com
poser. As a woman there was no precedent for her to tell her own love
story by composing the song herself. Sin Chann Chaya, Sin Sisamouth ' s
son, said that his father took time each day to listen t o people ' s life sto
ries and wrote songs based on them. Thus postcolonial-era popular and
rock and roll music had a decidedly male flavor. The famous song by
Oum Dora, "Stop Loving Me," sung by Ros Serey Sothea, is an example
of a melodramatic song about forsaken love that made the hit parade with
its obvious Latin rhythm influence. Sothea was accompanied by an
acoustic guitar played in a flamenco style. In thi s song she asks her lover
to stop loving her since they can ' t get along and have no freedom. The
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musical repertoire sung by female singers of the time reflects a male
perception of love and despair.
Some women were hired as lead singers for swing-style big bands
such as the Ministry of Information and the Military band. Singers Ros
Serey Sothea, Pen Ron, and Huy Meas worked for the National Radio
while Sieng Oi had a contract with the S KD Brewery band. These bands
played a traditional repertoire mixed with j azz and Western popular mu
sic influences . Rock and roll bands such as B aksei, B ayon, Apsara, Drak
kar, Garuda, Amara, and Sakira were all male. Unlike other neighboring
countries such as Indonesia that had all-girl bands like Dara Pusita, Cam
bodia had no all-girl band playing popular or rock and roll music.
In the pre-Khmer Rouge era, rock and roll and hard rock were sub
culture phenomena, heard only by university students, urban residents,
and people who had connections to embassies. Today the music of artists
whose recordings-if they even recorded- survived the Khmer Rouge
regime is no longer considered subculture, but popular music and part of
the Cambodian collective memory.
Early rock and roll musicians were inspired by Western popular art
ists from France and later from the United States and Britain, such as the
Beatles and Cliff Richards . Their music was not merely an imitation of
the Western sources-they produced an original modern Khmer sound
that later proved to be accessible to Western audiences. The Mol broth
ers ' B aksei Chamkrung, with three guitarists, a drummer, and a lead
singer, was the first band to combine different elements of Western rock.
The band ' s style was influenced by the British movie The Young Ones
( 1 96 1 ) starring Cliff Richards and the Shadows along with the Ventures.
They played everything from rock and roll to Latin styles like rumba and
bolero, adding their own original style to the Western genres. "What we
did with B aksei Chamkrung was, we added the bass line, the power
chord, and the solo part. And that breaks away from traditional Khmer
music," Mol Kagmach reported in an interview (20 1 0) .
After Baksei, rock bands sprouted all over Phnom Penh i n the early
1 97 0 s , most notably Aps ara, B ayon, Amara, Gadura, S akira, and Drak

kar. Apsara with its lead singer Panara Sirivudh, took its inspiration
mainly from Anglo-Saxon songs, with obvious influences from Little
Richard, the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, and the Beach B oys. The band
kept the melodies and translated the songs into Khmer. Other bands also
did Apsara cover versions of Western songs. Bayon, founded by Hong
brothers Samley, Sambath, and Samloth, covered many genres from the
Kinks and the Platters to French rocker Johnny Hallyday. In the early
1 970s their repertoire expanded to the Bee Gees and Santana. Performing
at nightclubs, weddings, and parties, they sang songs in the original En
glish, which they learned phonetically from album covers and radio
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broadcasts from the U . S . Navy ' s 7th fleet stationed in the South China
Sea. Samley Hong stated that his greatest successes were his interpreta
tions of Johnny Hallyday ("Souvenirs, Souvenirs") and Elvis Presley
("Blue Suede Shoes" and "Love Me Tender") . After Bayon, the band
Drakkar brought a whole new sound to the 1 970s with percussion, in
cluding bongos, added to the guitars and Santana as their main influence.
TODAY ' S POSTMODERN VOICES

The term "postmodernity" points to its predecessor, modernity, but
postmodernity is the outcome not only of modernity, but according to
Giddens ( 1 99 1 ) of globalization. Harvey ( 1 990) suggested that the world
had entered a new era since the 1 970s with the development of new tech
nologies that shifted societies from modern to postmodern. Jencks
( 2009) highlights a maj or difference between modern i s m and
postmodernism: "Post-Modernism is a social style of the arts and Mod
ernism an elite style" (24). In the postmodern era, the Internet and social
media have intensified the spread of cultural influences around the globe
and increased consumption and production of music across a broader
spectrum of people. The Cambodian music scene is no longer reserved
only for a bourgeois urban elite but can now be accessed by working
class and marginal people, making room for more diverse and alternative
voices heard through songs they write themselves. Contemporary
Cambodian music encompasses an eclectic variety of musical genres and
influences from many cultures.
The boundary between modernism and postmodernism in Western
countries is quite blurred. It is clearer in Cambodia, where the Khmer
Rouge regime created a sharper divide between the two. In the West, the
Punk movement developed as a protest against the apathy of rock and
roll, as noted by Grossberg (2000): "Punk emerged at, and responded to,
a particular moment in the history of rock and roll. It is, after all, not
coincidental that in 1 976 the first baby boomers were turning thirty. Punk
attacked rock and roll for having grown old and fat, for having lost that
which puts it in touch with its audience and outside of the hegemonic
reality" ( 1 1 7) . In Cambodia, there was no opposition to the previous
musical styles due to the disruption of culture by the Khmer Rouge and
lack of awareness of the Cambodian rock scene of the 1 960s and 1 970s.
As a result, the Cambodian subculture music scene today has little con
nection with the past.
ALTERNATIVE FEMALE VOICES

Contemporary Cambodian musical voices are marked by pluralism.
Women singers are composing their own songs, factory workers are
singing about their hardship and working conditions, and political singers
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and protest songs are now part of the musical landscape. The first
Cambodian all-girl band, the Messenger B and, was founded in 2005 by
seven garment-factory workers. Their Facebook webpage describes them
as a folk group with a social message: "As a grassroots advocacy group,
their mission is to compose and perform original songs that reflect the
current problems and situation face[d] by the working class and impover
ished people of Cambodia."
In the 1 970s, Y01 Aularaing and Meas Samon were the only singers
and songwriters who were making social commentary through their
songs. The former used irony to comment on Cambodia' s bourgeois con
formist society and the latter used humor to draw attention to social con
ventions around relationships. But in the pre-Khmer Rouge era political
and protest singers in the Western sense were unknown until the Messen
ger B and began giving a voice to the voiceless in Cambodian society,
especially to other factory workers as well as sex workers . Their moving
song "Land and Life" depicts the impact of forced evictions of people
from their ancestral lands to make way for development. These are very
brave women to tackle such an inflammatory political issue in a country
where women have been j ailed for protesting against forced evictions.
Under Norodom Sihanouk' s leadership there was little of freedom of
speech. Compared to the 1 960s and 1 970s, with today ' s mass media,
political protest messages can be sent around the world quickly, easily,
and cheaply. The Messenger B and offers an alternative view of social
reality that was previously unheard of on the popular music scene.
Postmodern music presents alternative voices not only in its musical
genres, but also in its radically changed image and role of women. S am
Rocker, lead singer and songwriter for the alternative rock band No For
ever, exemplifies this new freedom with her androgynous look. Both her
appearance and her role as lead singer for an otherwise all-male hardcore
band are beyond all conventional expectations of what a proper
Cambodian young woman should be. In a music scene that is still very
male dominated, she offers to her female audience an alternative femi
ninity that frees them from social expectations around gendered fashion
styles. She acknowledged her role and influence in an interview : "When
I was young I did many bad things . . . . Now I write songs for people
who were like me, and I want them to know that it is possible to stop
destroying yourself and take your life in a more positive direction"
(Thompson, n.d.)
Other women are following the same path, such as hip-hop singer
Bochan Huy, Laura Mam, and Chhom Nimol from Dengue Fever, who is
now cowriting songs with Zac Holtzman. The Messenger B and members
write their own lyrics as well.

20 1 2]

CAMBODIAN ALTERNATIVE MUSIC VOICES

33

Cambodian American hip-hop artist Bochan Huy undertook the
challenge of revisiting the famous "I' m Sixteen," a modern rock song
written by Voy Ho and sung by Ros Serey Sothea. The song has a defi
nite Western rock influence, and its message is clearly about embracing
the present and shying away from traditional themes, topics, and sounds.
It was covered by many local Cambodians, and later it taken up by Den
gue Fever with no alteration of lyrics or rhythm. Bochan Huy gave ''I ' m
Sixteen" a postmodern twist i n her original version, adding verses and
changing the story about a young girl celebrating her sixteenth birthday
to tell the story of the Cambodian diaspora' s struggle for survival.
Bochan' s hip-hop interpretation changed the tone and the message from
an innocent coming-of-age celebration to a feminist message of
empowerment.
Bochan explains that in her recreated version of the familiar song,
the lyrics play a crucial role, giving voice to her own experience as a
female performer in a traditional society: "Ros Serey Sothea sings of a
young woman coming of age and of her desires to explore and experi
ence both the bitterness and sweetness of life freely. In the background,
the men are singing and asking: 'Can I love you, Can I love you?' I
interpreted the song to be one that empowers women greatly as she sings
this in the face of a patriarchal society and in times where pre-arranged
marriages were very common and expected" (personal correspondence,
Feb. 27 , 20 14 ).
Bochan brings empowerment to her own music by being in control
of her topics and lyrics as the songwriter. Increasingly, female singers
today no longer require male songwriters to express their feelings and
experiences. Like Bochan, many women musicians in the diaspora
render a highly personal account of their life experience and stories in
their songs. As Manuel ( 1 995 ) explains, "The migrant' s search for a
sense of identity, like that of modernizing societies in general, is not
necessarily a postmodern process, but one which synthesizes traditional
and contemporary subjectivities in an often profoundly emotional man
ner" (23 5 ) .
Why have hip-hop and rap been embraced in Cambodia and among
the Cambodian subculture abroad, rather than other genres, like country
and western? Cambodian youth in Cambodia and in the diaspora com
munities feel a discontinuity with the past. They are experiencing eco
nomic disparity, social marginalization, and alienation from their
history--commonalities with the African American urban counterculture
that gave rise to hip-hop and rap. The social message was at the heart of
the birth of rap music.
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POSTMODERN ROCK BANDS

Today hard rock is growing rapidly in Cambodia. The alternative
music scene is emerging among the youth culture in Phnom Penh, just as
occurred with modern music in the 1 960s, but this time musical voices
are no longer confined to urban male bourgeois youth. The hard rock
scene has a platform for new groups to perform at the Show Box in
Phnom Penh, launched in 20 1 2, which offers an alternative to not only
Cambodian culture but also to the popular and dominant music scene,
taking its major influence from K pop. A year before the Show B ox
opened, the deathcore group Sliten6ix came together to offer a different
voice to the youth culture. The five members, all Cambodians, draw their
influences from bands like Slipknot, Slayer, Suicide Silence, and Chelsea
Grin. Sliten6ix' s appropriation is mainly on the abstract level of musical
ity: the sound and their added cultural references are what matters. As
Grossberg (2000) notes about rock and roll, "As many a rock and roll fan
has commented, the power of the music lies not in what it says but what
it does, in how it makes one move and feel" ( 1 1 2) . This clearly applies to
the heavy metal music scene emerging in Cambodia. In Sliten6ix' s You
Tube videos, it is difficult to distinguish the lyrics at all ; only a few curse
words can be heard. It is not the lyrics that are important, but how the
audience receives their performance. In the videos the band as well as the
audience are "headbanging" along with the music.
The year 20 1 1 saw another alternative punk rock band formed: the
ANTI-fate, who define themselves as pop punk and easy core. They can
be seen as a continuation of the three-guitar tradition that Baksei Cham
krong started in the 1 960s. They do cover versions of English songs by
bands like Simple Plan (a Quebec rock group), Green Day (including
their hit song "American Idiot"), Bowling For Soup, Blink 1 82 (unre
lated to the Irish pop rock band Blink), the activist band Anti Flag, and
Sum 4 1 (another Canadian rock group) .
The most postmodern band from Cambodia would certainly b e N o
Forever. Founded i n 20 1 2, i t calls itself the first post-hardcore and metal
band in Cambodia. Postmodernism is commonly defined as postmale,
posturban, and postbourgeois, but here is a band that applies the prefix
"post" to a musical genre. They do cover versions of groups like Asking
Alexandria, Sleeping With Siren, Bring Me The Horizon, A Day to Re
member, and the Prophecy.
As of this writing Cambodian hard rock bands are in an early stage
of development, in which headbangers ' sociocultural references , from
clothing styles to cursing and dance movements, are imported from the
West. Rogers (2006) describes four types of appropriation: cultural ex
change (where reciprocal exchange occurs between cultures of equal
power), cultural dominance (the imposition of dominate culture upon a
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subordinate one), cultural exploitation (the appropriation of a subordinate
culture by a dominant one without any form of reciprocity), and transcul
turation (cultural elements crafted from multiples sources) (477). The
Cambodian hard rock scene today is very much under the cultural domi
nance of Western hard rock, although Bochan demonstrates hybridity of
both cultures intertwined in her version of "I' m Sixteen." Like Native
American hip-hop described by Rogers, Cambodian American musicians
embody transcultural hybrid music by localizing mUltiple cultural
traditions.
YOUTH CULTURE PAST AND PRESENT

The Cambodian music scene before the Khmer Rouge era was a
small, close-knit community whose audience was also limited to a small
group of urban youth. Rock and hard rock were then a subculture rather
than mainstream genres. The subculture continues today for hip-hop,
heavy metal, and hard rock music among the youth culture in Cambodia
and abroad as mass media and affordable technologies now provide easy
access to all kind of musical genres.
There is a parallel between today' s youth subculture hard rockers
and rock and rollers of the 1 960s and 1 970s: the resistance they encoun
tered from the mainstream culture. Early Cambodian rock and roll was
viewed quite negatively by the older generation of the time, just as hip
hop, hard rock, and punk are viewed today. Part of the reason for the
negative reaction was the new dance called the Twist that was associated
with rock and roll. S inger Chum Kern went to Rome to study ceramics
and on his return he brought back Chubby Checker' s recording of "The
Twist." In 1 962 he planted the first seed of rock and roll in Cambodia
with "Kampuchea Twist," a Khmer version of the American song. Sup
ported by Sihanouk, Chum Kern was the first singer with a Western
sound with Khmer l yrics to be broadcast on the radio . This inspired other

musicians to seek new musical styles. But the new dance created quite a
controversy, with elders proclaiming it should be forbidden.
Ly and Muan, in their book Cultures of Independence (200 1 ), re
count a debate among high school students at the Lycee Descartes and
the adult reaction to the Twist. Some students defended the Twist as an
art form and sport. Here is an example of the many letters about the
Twist controversy that were published in school newspapers :
What hasn ' t been said about the twist? Its negative im
pact on dancers ' muscular system has been criticized.
After be-bop, the boogie-woogie, rock and roll, and the
Canasta, now it' s the Twist. . . . We don ' t laugh our
selves silly, we dance ourselves silly. It' s intoxicating.
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We imitate the "original" sin. But the Twist looks more
like the egotistical satisfaction of lonely people than the
original sin. The couple twists separately on the dance
floor without even touching each other. Is this some kind
of tribute to solitary pleasure? At a time when speed is
taking over human life, rhythm is also brought into step
and conditioned by the syncopated tempo.
But the Twist is already passe. We' re already talk
ing about the "Swim." . . . Whether we twist or we
crawl, humanity moves on. Hopefully they won ' t make
us dance on a volcano or walk on our heads. Who
knows, since gravity has been mastered? (Ly and Muan
200 1 , 2 1 0; my translation from French)
An article in the Ph nom Pe nh Post (December 1 8, 20 1 3) by Rom
Molyka described how today ' s urban youth are striving to develop a rock
scene . Veasna, lead guitarist for of the heavy metal band Sliten6ix, re
ported feeling misunderstood by the dominant culture: "People think that
we are monsters-even the musicians and the listeners. They said why
do you play this kind of music? It is useless. It doesn' t earn you any
money. " A similar experience was shared by pre-Khmer Rouge musi
cians such as Touch Saly, former singer with the band Sonexim, founded
in 1 964 by the National Import and Export Company. Saly recounted in
an interview that his parents and others told him he was wasting his
youth on music and looked like a zombie with his long hair.
Globalization is usually associated with American imperialism,
which weakens national and cultural identities. Chadha and Kavoori
(2000) and Morley and Robins ( 1 995) thought this approach to be overly
simplistic even though it seems to be validated in developing countries,
as seen in the rise of foreign programming on television and radio. The
pre-Khmer Rouge rock scene looked westward for its influences and
musical appropriation, in parallel with the national politic of moderniza
tion of the country. The Western cultural reference has changed since the
mid 1 990s with the rising popularity of Korean pop culture. The
Cambodian entrance into postmodernity encompassed two phases. First,
the center of reference for cultural identity shifted from the West to Asia.
Next, a flow of musical exchange, influences, and appropriation devel
oped among local Cambodians and in the diasporic communities .
Through Korean pop music, East and Southeast Asia are turning region
ally toward a new identity of shared Asianness.
The Cambodian American diaspora and the new tech-savvy youth
are rediscovering their Khmer identity that was disrupted by the Khmer
Rouge era and subsequently forgotten. Their music is marked by innova-

20 1 2]

CAMBODIAN ALTERNATIVE MUSIC VOICES

37

tive hybridization. Modem artists creatively mixed genres like rock" and
roll, jazz, Afro-Cuban, and hard rock with a traditional Mohori music
style, while postmodern artists combine rap, soul, rock and roll, techno,
punk, and hardcore to create unique musical trends.
CONCLUSION

Cambodian American hip-hop artists are the postmodern artists of
today, growing out of their lack of identification with either Cambodia or
the United States, as Peter Manuel ( 1 995) states : "Images of the parental
homeland may lack experiential referents in the migrants ' own lives,
while at the same time, migrants may feel alienated from the dominant
culture and media discourse of their new homeland" (235). Cambodian
Americans, like other migrants, have needed to redefine their social iden
tity and musical tastes within their new home country and in relation to
their motherland.
In this era of postmodern collage and global information, music
spreads around the world unimpeded, with no need for local interpreta
tion. Regardless of their location, people can now obtain music directly
from the original source through social media and internet downloads. A
postmodern world has emerged and is recreating its own identity through
a fundamental process of cultural appropriation.
As Jencks (2009) writes, "If pure Camembert cheese is modem,
then the mixed Cambozola is post-modem and the recent cross breed
Camelbert is very pm [postmodern]" ( 1 5 ) . Ros Serey Sothea' s original
song "I' m Sixteen" is the Camembert and Bochan ' s version is the
postmodern mixed breed: postmale, posturban, and postelite. Ros Serey
Sothea' s song was an early example of appropriation of the Western rock
sound combined with local composition. A diasporic Cambodian Ameri
can brought the song back to America and added another layer of appro
priation with her social and political message. And so the circle of
musical appropriation and dissemination continues .
The term "appropriation" often has a negative connotation o f taking
without right, even theft. But appropriation is a necessary and desirable
process for cultural advancement. Taking ownership of new cultural
identities to create new hybrid forms is integral to all music, creating a
universal experience of music that transcends borders.
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In May 1 978, amidst a period marked by high inflation and eco
nomic decline, the United States Commission on Civil Rights released a
report evaluating the adequacy of the Department of Labor' s unemploy
ment data on the Hispanic population. Previously, statistical data on the
1 1 . 3 million United States Hispanics had been scarce, making it difficult
for advocacy groups and policymakers to understand the social and eco
nomic reality of the nation ' s fastest growing ethnic group. Thus, pursuant
to Public Law 94-3 1 1 - which demanded improved collection and analy
sis of Hispanic unemployment data - the commission began to more
fully document the sobering economic reality Latino leaders and organi
zations were arguing required an adequate policy prescription. )
Specifically, the agency estimated that for most of the 1 970s, the
average Latino unemployment rate hovered around 1 0 percent, having
reached a high of 1 2 . 2 percent in 1 975 . 2 Among Hispanic sub-groups,
Puerto Ricans and Mexicans on average had higher unemployment rates
throughout the decade than Cubans, the third largest Latino group. But
by 1 977 , the differences generally were of marginal significance; at that
point all three groups had rates that hovered around 1 0 percent. Other
related indicators, the Commission noted, showed that only 40 percent of
Latinos twenty-five years old or older had completed high school, me
dian income stood at $ 1 0,200 (two-thirds of the median income of non
Latino whites at the time), and one quarter of Latino families lived below
the poverty Ievel, 3
) See us Commission report, 1 978, p. 1 .
2 "Improving Hispanic Unemployment Data: The Department of Labor' s Continuing
Obligation," May 1 978, US Commission on Civil Rights.
:-\ US Commission on Civil Rights. 1 978, also see Bureau of Census data ( 1 977).

41

ETHNIC STUDIES REVIEW

42

[Vol. 3 5 : 4 1

Meanwhile, the decade-old Congressional Black Caucus (CBC),
concerned over consistently high unemployment rates in the African
American community, already had been leading the way in addressing
the spiraling economy ' s disproportionate impact on h i stori c ally
marginalized groups. Inspired by an earlier ( 1 972) report by members of
the National Economic Association (NEA) (then the Caucus of Black
Economists) which called for sustained full employment as a fundamen
tal human right (Darity, Jf. 20 1 0), one of the CBC ' s founding members
(and representative of a predominantly low-income, black and Latino
C alifornia district), Congressman Augustus F. Hawkins, joined long-time
ally of organized labor Senator Hubert Humphrey (MN) to write the Full
Employment and Balanced Growth Act, popularly known as the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1 978. 4 After months of negotiations, a coali
tion of labor unions, clergy, advocacy groups, along with support from
the CBC and the newly formed Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC),
helped to better position the act on the legislative agenda. Subsequently,
it was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Carter on
October 27, 1 97 8 .
B ased o n the tradition o f Keynesian economics, the act empowered
the government to spend proactively in the private sector to increase con
sumer demand, with the primary goal of achieving full employment. The
act required all federal programs and policies to work toward achieving a
3 percent adult and 4 percent overall jobless rate within five years and
inflation rates of 3 percent by 1 983 and eliminating unemployment in its
entirety by 1 988 (Schantz, 1 979). But over time, the overriding political
concern with inflation became the primary bi-partisan focus, while the
struggle against unemployment evaporated as a priority (Ginsburg,
20 1 1 ) . This evaporation rendered invisible a lesser-known and most cru
cial provision of the act: that if the private sector failed to respond ade
quately in reducing unemployment, the public sector (read: federal
government) would be responsible for the direct creation of those miss
ing j obs.
Today, more than thirty-five years later, the United States suppos
edly lies at the edge of the "Great Recession," triggered largely by the
post-2006 mortgage-lending crisis. Despite claims of a modest economic
recovery, mass long-term unemployment remains high for the skilled and
unskilled alike, with a disproportionate impact on African Americans and
Latinos. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (November, 20 1 4),
while the overall United States unemployment rate stood most recently at

the

4

For instance. while the unemployment rate hovered between 1 2 and 1 4 percent during

mid 1 970s, by 1 978 rates widened between blacks and whites dramatically, with a "black

and other race" unemployment rate 2.4 times higher than the rate for whites. (Bureau of the
Census 1 979)
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5 . 8 percent, the black and Latino unemployment remained significantly
higher, estimated at 1 1 .9 percent and 6.6 percent respectively (compared
to the relatively lower 4.9 percent figure for whites). But this does not
provide the entire picture. The labor force participation rate (the percent
of both employed and unemployed sixteen and older in the labor force)
has declined dramatically since the "Great Recession," especially for
people of working ages 25-54 years old. In November of 20 1 4, the labor
force participation rate was calculated at 62. 8 percent, a marked decline
from the general average of 66 percent during 2007 and a figure only
marginally higher than the previous low of 62.7 percent during February
of 1 978, economic realities that served as impetus for the passing of the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act in the first place.s
To underscore our point further, these figures should also be viewed
alongside the before-and-after impact of the Great Recession on specific
metropolitan areas, which display dramatically higher unemployment
rates for blacks and Latinos compared against their groups ' respective
national averages. According to two separate studies published by the
Economic Policy Institute (20 1 0), thirty-one metro areas recorded unem
ployment rates reaching 20 percent for blacks in cities like Detroit, Mil
waukee, Las Vegas and Minneapolis, while a study of thirty-eight cities
yielded similarly high rates for Hispanics in cities including Providence,
Hartford and Fresno. These figures, the EPI aptly notes, rival the peak
national unemployment rate during the Great Depression of the 1 930s
(Austin, 20 1 1 ) .
However, w e must note that these disparities are not simply the ef
fect of the "Great Recession," nor are they recent stati stical patterns. In
deed, the overall unemployment rate for African-Americans historically
has been roughly double that of whites and for Latinos roughly 1 .5 times
greater than the white rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics 20 1 0) . Despite
these disparities, and the irony that black and Latino unemployment rates
are nearly at the same levels when the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1 97 8
was passed, only recently has discussion resumed over a basic right to
employment in Washington, D.C.
For close to forty years, the Full Employment and B alanced Growth
Act of 1 978 has existed, de facto, as an unfunded mandate. In 20 1 1 ,
United States Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI) introduced a bill
(HR- 1 000) entitled the Humphrey-Hawkins 2 1 st Century Full Employ
ment and Training Act to provide the financing and structure to fulfill the
full employment goal of the original legislation. Calling it a "2 1 st cen
tury New Deal," in which the federal government "plays a major role in
5 See Tables and excel documents provided b y the Bureau o f Labor Statistics, Depart
ment of Labor, available at: http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS I 1 300000 (December 1 0,
20 1 4) .
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getting Americans back to work," Conyers ' bill invokes the spirit and
intent of the 1 978 legislation by creating two complementary trust funds,
one that funds states and localities for specific job-creating activities, the
other directed toward job training programs for unskilled workers (Cony
ers, Jr. , 20 1 1 ) .
While there has been no mention of a federal jobs program b y Presi
dent Obama or his administration, the central premises behind Conyers'
act only recently have begun to gain traction amongst media and policy
makers . In his widely read article recently published in Rolling Stone
(January 3, 20 1 4) , Jesse Myerson argued that given the adverse impact of
the Great Recession on "new millennials," young people should support
a set of five economic reforms ; the first he listed is a federal j ob
guarantee.
After Myerson' s article drew criticism from political pundits and
social media users, the Huffington Post commissioned a scientific poll to
measure public opinion about a federal job guarantee. The poll found that
47 percent of 1 ,000 Americans sampled supported a law allowing the
government to provide jobs for Americans who could not find work in
the private sector, while 4 1 percent disagreed and 12 percent were un
sure. Overall, this suggests modest but general support for a federal j obs
guarantee. When broken down by ethnic group, the numbers are more
telling. Black support for such a measure polled the highest at 67 percent
( 1 4 percent against, 1 9 percent unsure), Latino support stood at 52 per
cent (35 percent against, 1 3 percent unsure) while non-Hispanic white
support was slightly weaker with 43 percent in support (45 percent
against, 1 2 percent unsure).
To date, Conyers, a long-time prominent member of the Congres
sional B lack Caucus (CBC), has received some support for the legisla
tion from members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC),
several of whom are co-sponsors of his bill. Meanwhile, according to his
office, the legislation is beginning to yield interest from Latino civil
rights and advocacy groups like the National Council of La Raza
(NCLR) . This is an important development considering the concerted en
ergies and focus by Hispanic groups on passing comprehensive immigra
tion reform while countering the dangerous culture of austerity
economics (spending cuts) in Washington.
Given the aforementioned support by African Americans and Lati
nos alike, we believe that a permanent, full-employment policy consis
tent with the ideals of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1 978 not only
would serve as a direct alternative to austerity economics (see Aj a, Bus
tillo, Darity, Jr. and Hamilton, 20 1 3), but also address longstanding pat
terns of racial and inter-group inequality. In short, a federal j ob guarantee
would remove the threat of unemployment and ensure that the opportu-
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nity to work for a livable wage and decent pay is a basic right of citizen
ship for all Americans (Darity, 20 1 0) . 6
If the National Investment Employment Corps were implemented,
pay would range from a minimum of $23 ,000 to a maximum of $80,000,
each job also providing benefits (including medical coverage and retire
ment support), opportunities for advancement, on-the-j ob training, and
professional development.? Much like Franklin Delano Roosevelt' s
Workers Progress Administration (WPA), a national program of job as
surance will provide meaningful employment in a variety of "public
works" projects. It could potentially serve as the stimulus for the types of
innovative, green technologies the president has touted frequently, neces
sary "green jobs" considering the adverse effects of climate change.
States and municipalities could develop inventories of needed jobs for all
who are able to work, matching skilled and unskilled laborers alike with
full employment opportunities . 8
In a recent March 20 1 3 report, the American Society of Civil Engi
neers (ASCE) gave the country a grade of D+ on its physical infrastruc
ture, only a slight improvement from a grade of a D in 2009.9 The report
indicated that a total investment of $ 3 . 6 trillion is required by 2020,
streams of funding necessary in order to deal with the backlog of overdue
maintenance across our infrastructure systems. Thus a federal job pro
gram would address physical and human infrastructure needs including
the building, repair, and maintenance of bridges , damns, roads, parks,
museums, mass transit systems , school facilities, health clinics, and child
care centers, giving priority to the most urgent projects to aid the most
distressed communities .
Under Representative Conyers ' bill, a federal j obs program would
be funded through a slight tax increase on the top percentile of earners, a
type of revenue transfer that citizens increasingly support. In New York
City, for example, Mayor Bill DeBlasio was elected in late 20 1 3 on an
anti-austerity , populist agenda that called for the expansion of universal
6 For previous examples of federal j ob guarantee programs. see Harvey (2000) and
Wray (2008).
7 This i s an updated analysis of the policy proposal as outlined in William Darity. Jr.
and Darrick Hamilton (20 1 2) . Also see for reference the following news article: hup:llbusi
ness.nbcnews .coml_news/20 I I I 1 1 12819067808-fed-lent -banks-near! y -8-tri Ilion-duri ng -crisis
report-shows ?chromedomain=investigations
8 Initial outline of the federal j obs guarantee, framed in the context of growing wealth
inequality and labor market discrimination, is described in Darity, Jr. (20 1 0) and Darity, Jr.
and Hamilton (20 1 2), also see Aj a, Bustillo, Darity, Jr. and Hamilton (20 1 3) for discussion of
the program as a necessary alternative to austerity politics.
9 In fact, the report maintains that bridges in urban areas are decaying more rapidly than
those in rural areas, while funding streams are not sufficient enough to maintain and improve
them. It also expressed concern for the aviation sectors and the country' s dams. See 20 1 3 :
Report for America ' s Infrastructure, ASCE, March 20 1 3 . Available at: http://www .infrastruc
turereportcard.org/aldocumentsl20 1 3 -Report-Card. pdf
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child care programs through a modest, minimal tax increase o n the
wealthiest residents of the state. Similarly - given the Obama-Romney
20 1 2 presidential campaign position difference on allowing the George
W. Bush presidential administration tax cuts to expire for those earning
above $250,000 - Obama' s election victory may serve as evidence of a
national voter sentiment of this type of revenue transfer. But a perma
nent, nation-wide NEIC would essentially pay for itself, given that the
income paid to the employees of the NIEC would not only restore tax
bases at the state and municipal levels, alleviating current budget crises.
Furthermore, we calculate that the cost of a National Investment
Employment Corps (NIEC) would be less than the first stimulus package
enacted by Congress and vastly less than the $ 1 0-30 trillion awarded by
the Federal Reserve to the very same investment banking community that
caused the economic crisis in the first place (see Aj a, Bustillo, Darity, Jr.
and Hamilton, 20 1 3 ) . A back of the envelope calculation indicates that if
1 5 million persons - the total unemployed at the trough of the Great
Recession - were employed at average cost of $50,000 per annum per
person (salaries, benefits, training, materials and equipment), a high esti
mate of the total expense of the program would be $750 billion (Darity,
Jr. and Hamilton, 20 1 2) . 1 0
Consider that in 20 1 1 alone, federal antipoverty programs (Medi
caid, unemployment insurance, etc.) cost approximately $746 billion
(Wasson 20 1 2) . A federal job guarantee would make it possible to reduce
drastically current antipoverty expenditures and is, by comparison, far
more productive in its deployment of both physical and human capital
development. Hence, the net expense of a job guarantee program could
also be minimal given the potential of cost savings from other social
programs. With the federal government serving as employer of last re
sort, unemployment compensation along with antipoverty program fund
ing for free and reduced lunch subsidies and food stamps could be
reduced since a job guarantee works to eliminate both working and j ob
less poverty simultaneously .
The NEIC also would be a better source of j ob creation than the
Keynesian-based indirect incentive effects of stimulus measures and tax
incentive strategies aimed at encouraging the private sector to provide
jobs. After all, a federal job guarantee serves as a direct mechanism for
job creation while also triggering a multiplier stimulus effect across a
wide panoply of activities that take place in the economy. The private
sector would benefit in a myriad of ways, not just by stabilizing con
sumption demand, but also through vertical linkages of sales of supplies
1 0 This is less than the first $787 billion stimulus package and also much less than the
first rOllnd of investment bank bailouts ($ 1 .3 trillion). See Aja, Bustillo, Darity, Jr. and Hamil
ton (20 1 4) and Aja, Bustillo, Darity, Jr. and Hamilton (20 1 3).
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and materials to the NIEC for public projects. This also could create
advantages for black and Latino-owned businesses, while leverage for
unions also would be created, since the jobs offered by the NIEC would
set an effective minimum floor on the quality of employment.
Furthermore, one might expect that the existence of an NIEC would
incentivize profit-seeking employers to demand less costly undocu
mented workers who would not qualify for a federal job guarantee.
While it is likely that employers would tend to pay them less than the
floor on wages provided by the job guarantee, over time, we would ex
pect the economy-wide rise in wages associated with the federal job
guarantee workers would even bid up wages -at least marginally - for
group whose labor market status is more vulnerable, such as undocu
mented immigrants. Furthermore, since permanent residents are gov
erned under the same labor laws as United States citizens, the same
protections of a federal right to work for decent pay granted by a federal
j ob guarantee would be extended to this group as well. This would have
additional positive impacts on the economic livelihoods of "mixed-sta
tus" Latino households (those who live in arrangements where one
household member may hold a legalized status while others are undocu
mented), given that permanent residents could apply for work under the
federal job guarantee. l J
Other benefits include the potential reduction or elimination of a
number of market interventions like minimum wage laws, financial regu
lation, and associated enforcement expenses. Minimum wage laws no
longer would be needed since the minimum salary offered by the NIEC
would set the floor on the wage standard. Concerns around strengthening
and constantly updating financial regulation to keep up with constantly
evolving economically and environmentally harmful private sector prod
ucts and practices aimed at eluding regulation would be reduced. The
presence of a job guarantee would mitigate the adverse effects of fluctua
tions in speculative investment markets on personal employment and in

come for the public at large.
To be clear, a federal job guarantee is not meant to act as a tempo
rary program contingent upon emergency conditions. Instead, it will
function as a permanent, automatic stabilizer. The number of persons put
to work in the NIEC will rise during downturns and fall during upswings.
Thus, like the cost of the program, it will expand and contract counter1 J We understand that the coalitional effort to pass comprehensive immigration reform is
of utmost urgency and importance, especially for the Latino community, but we believe that
there are no substantive policy specific reasons why such efforts and focus are not largely
independent of those needed to pass a federal job guarantee. We support a comprehensive
immigration reform package that includes pathways to citizenship for undocumented workers
currently residing in the United States. Clearly, such reform would disproportionately benefit
both Latino and black, albeit to a lesser extent than Latino, workers.
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cyclically. I n addition, i t would produce the structural change i n the
United States economy away from the generation of low wage j obs and
toward more moderate and high wage jobs.
The program would guarantee employment for members of stigma
tized populations subject to discriminatory employment exclusion.
Devah Pager' s audit study in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and in New York
City, for example, revealed that among males of comparable age and
employment qualification, white applicants received more employment
callbacks than their black counterparts. Even more alarming, the study
also found that whites with criminal records were slightly more likely to
get call backs than black males with no criminal record (Pager 2003 ) .
Indeed, even among white males alone, having a criminal record reduced
the odds of receiving an employment call back by half. It is notable that
one set of these audits took place in Wisconsin, a state that outlaws em
ployer use of criminal records as a criterion for employment in most
j obs.
In another example, using personnel data from a large United States
retail firm, Guiliano, Levine, and Leonard (2008) undertook an examina
tion of whether the race of the hiring manager affects the racial composi
tion of new hires, finding significant differences between the hiring
patterns of non-black managers and black managers, with non-black
managers hiring more whites and fewer blacks than black managers.
Also, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) indicates that among 1 8-25 year
olds, white high school dropouts had an unemployment rate lower than
blacks that have completed some college. The evidence suggests that
even when blacks are able to avoid incarceration and acquire education
they are employed at lower rates than their white formerly incarcerated
and lower educated counterparts.
Globally, programs similar to a federal j obs guarantee have proven
to be effective. Argentina' s Plan JeJe/as de Hogar Desocupados pro
gram, initiated in 2002, provides a payment of 1 50 pesos per month to a
head of household for a minimum of 4 hours of daily work in community
services, small construction, or maintenance services. The program pro
vided j obs to 2 million workers, with indigence rates among participating
households falling by nearly 25 percent and the unemployment rate drop
ping from 2 1 .5 percent in May 2002 to 1 5 .6 percent in May 2003
(Tcherneva and Wray 2005) , while the program' s multiplier effect con
servatively was estimated at 2.57 (Harvey 2007) .
I n another example, India' s National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme, which was implemented in 2006, guarantees rural households
the legal right to be employed up to 1 00 days a year. For individuals, the
program entitles them to receive wages if no work is made available to
them within two weeks of an application. Liu and Deiniger (20 1 0) esti-
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mate that the short-term effects of the Indian program on participating
households were positive and greater than program costs .
At present, non-white racial and ethnic groups, who chronically are
subjected to higher unemployment rates, suffer the most from austerity
policies and federal indifference toward full employment policy. To re
verse this, we need a renewed inter-group coalition, organized in the
spirit of the late 1 970s, reminding the President and Democratic mem
bers of Congress of the overwhelming support they received from Afri
can Americans and Latinos during the two previous elections. A federal
job guarantee not only would address long-standing unjust and discrimi
natory barriers that keep large segments of stigmatized populations out of
the labor force, but also would reverse the rising tide of inequality for
workers in general by strengthening their labor market bargaining power
and eliminating the threat of unemployment for all Americans. Finally,
the program would create productive physical and human capital invest
ment j obs that would reverse the trend of a crumbling and depreciating
public infrastructure, which would have a long-standing stimulus effect
similar to the benefits of the massive public investment undertaken dur
ing the Great Depression.
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NATIONAL FANTASIES , EXCLUSION, AND THE
MANY HOUSES ON MANGO S TREET

Lorna L. Perez
Buffalo State College

Thoreau poses a deceptively simply question when he asks, in
Walden: "What is a house?" Sandra Cisneros ' s The House on Mango
Street ( 1 985) revolves around this very question as the narrator, Esper
anza Cordero, consistently articulates a profound need to one day own a
home of her own. At the heart of Esperanza' s longings are foundational
questions about what it means to belong to a place, a question that is
heightened by Esperanza' s status as a poor child of immigrant and ethnic
parents. Given the specificities of Esperanza' s subj ect position, the ques
tion of what it means to belong to a place, and the symbolic association
of houses with belonging, takes on a more complicated meaning, as it
speaks directly to the foundational assumptions that underlie the house
and its relation to the American imaginary.
At the center of this consideration is the loaded and metaphorically
rich association of houses with American identity, and more particularly
the story of upward mobility that is most commonly referenced through
iconic representations of the post-World War II American Dream. While
it may be tempting to read Esperanza' s longing for a house of her own as
a gesture towards the immigrant-makes-good narrative that is associated
with the American Dream, I will contend that the meaning of the house
in this novel is, at best, an ambivalent one. The text is populated with
multiple houses-some real and some imagined- that, when taken in
conjunction with one another, provide a stark critique of gender, domes
ticity, and ultimately national inclusion . The House on Mango Street
does not reaffirm the comforting ethos of the American Dream rather it
uses its most profound symbol-the house-to reveal its unstable and
violent foundations. l
1 I understand the American Dream here as the particular narrative that emerges after
the second world war, when suburbanization, for a variety of complex reasons, began to take
hold in American culture. This particular narrative places emphasi s on rugged individualism
and hard work and manifests itself in the iconic suburban home, in many instances the hard
earned reward of soldiers returning from war. I am, however, also interpreting the American
Dream as the twentieth century manifestation of a much longer narrative of settlement, home
building, and home making and their relationship to the establishment of the American nation
state.
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The house is one o f the most foundational and profound symbols in
American literature. As Marilyn Chandler ( 1 99 1 ) has pointed out:
Our literature reiterates with remarkable consistency the
centrality of the house in American cultural life and im
agination. In many of our major novels a house stands at
stage center as a unifying symbolic structure that repre
sents and defines the relationships of the central charac
ters to one another, to themselves and to the world and
raises a wide range of questions . . . ( 1 )
I n attempting to answer what a house i s in the context of The House on
Mango Street, we must interrogate what it means to lay claim to space
and place, as doing so requires a radical reconfiguration of who can and
cannot "belong" to the nation itself. For a young, poor, non-white, wo
man to try and demand a space where she belongs outside of patriarchal,
racist, and classist culture requires radically rethinking and restructuring
what home and belonging mean. Reading the houses on Mango Street
critically allows us to begin to envision this difference, as the "real"
space of the novel constantly clashes with the imagined space away from
it, and the collision reveals the foundational violence of our national
narrative.
Overwhelmingly, when critics and scholars have analyzed The
House on Mango Street they have done so under the premise that there is
one primary house in the text. This is a fundamental error; the novel is
full of houses, including the house of the title, all of which draw attention
to the pervasive sense of loss, loneliness, and marginality that houses
themselves are meant to counter. Perhaps one of the great ironies of The
House on Mango Street is that the novel is not a text about being at home
in the world, or belonging to a place; rather it is about the ways that
poverty and violence raise specters of belonging, even as they deny the
materiality that should attach to such things .
Of all the houses that populate this text, the two most important are
the house the title of the text names, the sad, red, house on Mango Street,
and the dream house (she calls it a "real" house) to which the protagonist
Esperanza Cordero wants to escape. Between these two houses, are the
myriad other houses that dot the textual landscape; houses that are margi
nal, invisible, and filled with teeming and forgotten life. These are
houses that are spaces of shame and loss, structured around patriarchal
domesticity, and marginalized by racist, classist hegemony. The sad, red,
house on Mango Street is the symbolic locus of these haunted, broken
houses made visible, and is a profound critique of the way that poverty,
ethnicity, and gender merge together, desiccating the lives of the people
within them. While the sad, red, house on Mango Street is symbolic of
loss, the text also constructs, through Esperanza' s longing, an alternative
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space. The "real" house that Esperanza dreams of having-and the house
that she must leave Mango Street to achieve-is one that shelters other
kinds of possibilities: possibilities of feminist empowerment, possibilities
for escape and the promise of belonging. I argue that understanding the
sad, red house on Mango Street in light of Homi Bhabha' s notion of the
unhomely, and then similarly reading the house Esperanza imagines
away from Mango Street in Gaston B achelard' s terms of felicitous space
allows us to understand how the construction of one is occasioned
through the lack of the other. In dreaming up the house away from
Mango Street, Esperanza engages in a radical politics which reconfigures
the grounds of community, domesticity and belonging, though she can
only do this by exposing that which remains hidden and obscured by the
foundations of the sad, red house, here a derivative symbol of the Ameri
can Dream.
THE UNHOMELY HOUSE ON MANGO STREET
The text opens with the vignette entitled 'The House on Mango
Street." The first line signals important themes that will run throughout
the text: nomadism, homelessness, and un-belonging : "We didn't always
live on Mango Street. Before that we lived on Loomis on the third floor,
and before that we lived on Keeler. Before Keeler it was Paulina and
before that I can ' t remember. But what I remember most is moving a
lot. . . " (Cisneros 3) The unrelenting relocations immediately establish a
profound sense of dislocation that permeates the entirety of the text, as
Esperanza consistently articulates a sense of homelessness and lack. The
precariousness of her family ' s living conditions, and more specifically
their multiple relocations before buying the house on Mango Street, sug
gests instability and vulnerability, a sense that is further underscored by
their status as poor and Latino. Home-ownership-that cornerstone of the
American narrative-looms large and is a way of solidifying her fam
ily ' s belonging to a place.
The actuality of the sad, red, house, however, is a terribly inadequate fulfillment of that promise:
But the house on Mango Street is not the way they told it
at all. It' s small and red with tight steps in front and
windows so small you ' d think they were holding their
breath. Bricks are crumbling in places, and the front
door is so swollen you have to push hard to get in. There
is no front yard, only four little elms the city planted by
the curb. Out back is a small garage for the car we don' t
own yet and a small yard that looks smaller between the
two buildings on either side. There are stairs in our
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house, but they' re ordinary hallway stairs, and the house
has only one bathroom. (Ibid. , 4)
The house on Mango Street has no resemblance to the iconographic
house of the American Dream; it lacks every significant feature that
would signify its status as a representation of the family ' s belonging to a
place and instead is representative of one more step up the scale of pov
erty and disenfranchisement. The house, with its descriptions of lack
the swollen floors that barely allow entrance, the crumbling bricks, the
garage for the car they do not have-marks absence, not presence and,
moreover, invokes through its inadequacy the image of the house they do
not have, the house of middle-class material comfort. The house on
Mango Street reminds both the reader and Esperanza that owning the
house is not the same thing as belonging to a place. In fact, owning the
house on Mango Street does not create a sense of being at home, it in
stead creates a sense of being un-homed.
Romi Bhabha ( 1 992), borrowing from Freud describes being unhomed (and the un-homely) in the following way :
T o b e unhomed is not t o b e homeless, nor can the "un
homely" be easily accommodated in that familiar divi
sion of social life into the private and the public
spheres . . .In a feverish stillness, the intimate recesses of
the domestic space become sites for history ' s most intri
cate invasions . In that displacement the border between
home and world becomes confused; and, uncannily, the
private and the public become part of each other, forcing
upon us a vision that is as divided as it is disorienting.
(141)
The unhomely in this sense i s not as simple as a broken down house that
fails to meet up to the fantasy that is projected unto it. Rather, the un
homely in reference to Mango Street reveals the way that the house be
comes a site of deprivation and exclusion. The materiality of the house
its too tight steps, the windows holding their breath, the ordinary hallway
stairs-mark it as other. In this house the family has not succeeded in
achieving the American Dream, they have, instead, acquired a derivative
version of it that speaks to the intimate invasions of history. More spe
cifically, this house, situated in an impoverished and peripheral neigh
borhood, populated by poor people of color, and characterized by
violence and lack, creates an unhomely answer to the fantasy of national
inclusion.
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DOMESTICITY, CONFINEMENT, AND THE COMMUNAL GAZE:
THE MANY HOUSE ON MANGO STREET
Cisneros draws constant attention to the potential violence of home
space by interrogating the very foundations of homeliness-the domes
tic-as a site of confinement for women. Doreen Massey ( 1 994) has con
vincingly argued that our conceptions of space and domesticity are tied
into patriarchal modes of control. She writes :
One o f the most evident aspects o f this j oint control of
spatiality and identity has been in the West related to the
culturally specific distinction between public and pri
vate. The attempt to confine women to the domestic
sphere was both a specifically spatial control and,
through that, a social control on identity. ( 1 79)
In Cisneros ' s text this social control is determined by cultural and phal
locentric norms that confine women in prison-like homes, wherein iden
tity and s e l f- h o o d b e c o m e anni h i l at e d by d u a l re g i s ters o f
disenfranchisement: the women o f Mango Street are marginal a s women;
equally, they are marginal as members of a poor, and all but invisible,
"other" community. In interrogating the meaning- and the possibly vi
olent implications of domesticity-Cisneros' s text problematizes the
everyday notion of the public v. private by demonstrating the ways that
public space (the street, the neighborhood) constitute, and at times, in
vades domestic space. The unhomeliness of the house on Mango Street
does not magically end at the front door with the too-tight steps, rather
the unhomeliness of the home is, in part, created through navigating the
public space of urban, poor, neighborhoods, and the profound implica
tions this has for women.
Cisneros makes this clear by situating the reader' s gaze on the land
scape and the community that the house on Mango Street is situated
within. By making the focus of the text the external world of Mango
Street (as opposed to the internal world of the home), Cisneros creates a
community narrative that critiques structural systems of poverty, disen
franchisement, and marginality. Though the title of the text implies a
focus on domesticity by privileging the house, it is notable and important
that Esperanza' s storytelling does not center on the home as a site of
refuge, but rather upon the house as a readable aspect of a landscape that
constitutes it. Contrary to what the title might suggest, the stories that
make up The House on Mango Street are not the stories of the Cordero
family per se, nor are they the story of the internal life of the Cordero
home. Rather, in making The House on Mango Street the narrative of a
community and a public identity associated with place, the ground of the
narrative shifts away from models of individual American exceptional-
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ism, epitomized b y the singular house, and focuses instead o n the failures
of this ideology, as symbolized by the marginalization of the entire com
munity . Monika Kaup ( 1 997) characterizes Cisneros' s shift from the in
ternal home into the public street in the following way:
Cisneros . . . expand[s] the focus from a single, isolated
house to the street. In so doing she diminishes the status
of the individual and reintroduces the communal per
spective - bringing us back to Chicano nationalism' s
concerns with the collective. Through the street, Cis
neros reintroduces a collective Latino public space, the
urban equivalent of homeland. (390)
For Kaup, the street and the outward gaze create a collective space that
functions as a homeland, though even here the sense of the unhomely
haunts the space. Esperanza is neither "at home" in her house, nor is she
entirely "at home" in the collective space of the street. The street as
homeland becomes a fairly precarious position, since it first signifies
metaphoric homelessness, and secondly is infused with a sense of
(barely) contained danger; the street/public space is as much a site of
intimate violations as the house is, as vignettes like "The Family of Little
Feet" and "Red Clowns" make clear through their emphasis on sexual
violence and danger. The sense of the unhomely registers in terms of
both the private (house), and the public (the street), indicating that safety,
belonging, and acceptance are, in the best circumstances, only tangen
tially available to marginalized communities and their access to the na
tional fantasy of the American Dream. In this context, neither the world,
nor the home provides a refuge from the stigmas of poverty and violence.
The fact that the house located on Mango Street is only one of many
houses is important as it creates a community narrative as opposed to an
individual one. Moreover, using the community as the starting point for
the narrative moves the text away from discourses of individual success
or failure and points instead to the systemic violence of an ideology that
at its core seeks to create spaces of safety and acceptance precisely
through the exclusion of the poor and people of color. Indeed, as the
white flight of the middle of the twentieth century reminds us, urban
centers were abandoned in order to establish homogenous economic and
racial communities in the American suburbs. While suburbanization is
tied intimately in with the symbolic creation of the American Dream, it
assumes as one of its foundational premises the necessity of using physi
cal space as a weapon. Much in the same way as the house located on
Mango Street creates its own dream image, and that dream image-the
fantasized house-in turn conjures its shadow double in the Mango
Street house, so too do the suburbs conjure the abandoned inner city, and

20 1 2]

THE MANY HOUSES ON MANGO STREET

59

the inner city becomes the ghostly double, the hidden reminder, of subur
ban comfort.
This duality is further seen through the structure of the house itself
as a symbolic construct. The unhomeliness of Esperanza' s neighborhood
is dually constructed as a public and private entity, which themselves
constitute and construct one another. The house on Mango Street is both
a public entity- a readable aspect of the landscape- even as it is also a
private entity that erects a boundary between the internal life of its inhab
itants and the public space of the street. Esperanza' s charting of her
neighborhood, her mapping of space, obliterates these easy boundaries
by showing us that which remains hidden inside houses, and by equally
showing that which remains hidden even in public. By revealing the pri
vate-abuse, loss, imprisonment, abandonment, violence- she robs the
house of one of its main functions: to protect its inhabitants. In decon
structing the house in this way, Cisneros reveals a darker function of
houses in the barrio ; they contain and confine as opposed to protect or
shield, and as a result exposes the unhomeliness lurking in their
foundations.
Esperanza makes the domestic the site of public discourse by inter
rogating the implications of being a woman in a public space. The urban
homeland that is available to women, through the auspices of collective
cultural experience is hardly, as the stories of the women of Mango
Street remind us, a liberating space. As Annie O. Eysturoy ( 1 996) has
put it:
A common denominator uniting almost all the different
women Esperanza portrays is, not only their entrapment
in oppressive sociocultural circumstances, but their in
ternalization of a definition of self that is determined by
phallocentric cultural values . They are thus not only con
fined within their own house, but also confined by their
own minds, by the conditioned limitations of their own
self-perceptions. Their lives and actions, dominated by
fathers and husbands, are physically and psychologically
entrapped within oppressive patriarchal structures, and
they can envision themselves only in the seemingly ines
capable roles of future wives and mothers. ( 1 02)
E speranza' s articulation becomes an act of conjuring that connects her
story to the stories of the past, the stories of the voiceless women lost in
the anonymity of the domestic and to the transformative power of story
telling itself. The stories of the women of Mango Street serve as caution
ary tales for Esperanza, even as the act of telling their stories allows her
to articulate a future for herself removed from the phallocentric standards
of feminine possibility.

60

ETHNIC STUDIES REVIEW

[Vol. 3 5 : 5 3

CHICANA FEMINIST ARCHITECTURE: RENOVATING
THE AMERICAN DREAM
For many o f the women o f her community-confined b y the patri
archal norms of their culture and crippled by poverty and racism-there
is very little room for negotiating identities or spaces of agency. In ac
knowledging the limits of patriarchal domesticity, where in the best cir
cumstances women are thwarted and in the worst they disappear under a
constant barrage of violence, Esperanza articulates a need for a different
kind of life. Gloria Anzaldua ( 1 987) has described these limits and pos
sibilities as follows :
The culture expects women t o show greater acceptance
of, and commitment to, the value system than men. The
culture and the Church insist that women are subservient
to males. If a woman rebels she is a mujer mala. If a
woman does not renounce herself in favor of the male,
she is selfish. If a woman remains a virgen until she
marries, she is a good woman. For a woman of my cul
ture there used to be only three directions she could turn:
to the Church as a nun, to the streets as a prostitute, or to
the home as a mother. Today some of us have a fourth
choice: entering the world by way of education and ca
reer and becoming self-autonomous persons . A very few
of us. As a working class people our chief activity is to
put food in our mouths, a roof over our heads and
clothes on our backs. Educating our children is out of
reach for most of us. Educated or not, the onus is still on
woman to be a wife/mother - only the nun can escape
motherhood. Women are made to feel total failures is
they don ' t marry and have children. (39)
Esperanza, the young dreamer and artist, sees women all around her who
have not escaped from these roles . As a barely working-class Latina,
E speranza' s desire for a home of her own as well as her determination to

achieve these things through her books and her papers, signals the rare
path that Anzaldua articulates above. Given the rarity of her choices and
the difficulty of achieving them, it is important to turn to the symbolic
locus of this desire; the home of her own away from Mango Street.
The creation and projection of the house away from Mango Street
arises precisely in response to the unhomeliness of both the Mango Street
house and the marginal neighborhoods of Esperanza' s childhood. These
spaces signify a profound exclusion and lack: the lack of a house she can
point to, and a home that she can feel she belongs to, demarcate and
delimit the boundaries of her viable participation within the national nar-
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rative that i s invoked by the American Dream. The symbolic force of the
family' s purchase of their own home does not assuage this sense of inad
equacy and lack of belonging ; rather it has the inverse effect of heighten
ing it.
In response to her family' s inability to move beyond the material
confines of their poverty to provide Esperanza with a "real house", she
instead turns to a strategy that is both resilient and empowering: she
imagines a real house for herself away from Mango Street. Dream
houses, in fact, haunt this text as the specters of the promise that lie just
past the confines of the family ' s material conditions. The first of these
houses is the house that her parents promise her they would one day
have, and the second is the house that Esperanza herself is committed to
occupying. These two dream houses, when contrasted with one another,
combine to reveal the limitations of the national narrative- the idea that
hard work, self-sacrifice, frugality and self- sufficiency will ultimate earn
one a place within the nation, exemplified by home-ownership- as well
as the limitations of radical action configured outside the space of patri
archy. While the dream house of Mr. and Mrs . Cordero is brought into
stark contrast by the realities of the House on Mango Street, Esperanza' s
dream house is brought into similar contrast by the limitations of ideol
ogy in relation to lived experience.
The house that the Cordero family dreams of occupying-the house
they promise Esperanza that the Mango Street house so dismally fails to
compare with-is described as follows:
They always told us that one day we would move into a
house, a real house that would be ours for always so we
wouldn ' t have to move each year. And our house would
have running water and pipes that worked. And inside it
would have real stairs, not hallway stairs, but stairs in
side like the houses on T.V. And we' d have a basement
and at least three washrooms so when we took a bath we
wouldn't have to tell everybody. Our house would be
white with trees around it, a great big yard and grass
growing without a fence. This was the house Papa talked
about when he held a lottery ticket and this was the
house Mama dreamed up in the stories she told us before
we went to bed. (4)
The house that the family dreams up is the iconic suburban home; it
promises rootedness and permanence and acts as the symbolic manifesta
tion of acceptance into the space of the nation. For the Corderos, like
many immigrant families, the achievement of the home of one ' s own
signals an adherence to those typically "American" characteristics : hard
work, self-determination, and self-sufficiency.
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The Cordero ' s longing for the fantasy house and their dream o f be
ing able to attain it are seductive fictions . The replacement of the dream
house with the Mango Street house marks the limitations of a fantasy
which at its core relies on the historic and contemporary disenfranchise
ment of large groups of people - the poor, people of color, women- to
sustain it. It further demonstrates, through the contrast between the sad,
red house and its normal hallway stairs with the dream house and its
inside stairs, the limitations of upward mobility achieved through hard
work and sacrifice.
In response to the failures of the American Dream' s model of hard
work creating upward mobility, as well as the limitations of the patriar
chal house as retreat and safety, Esperanza declares that she has to have a
house of her own one day, one that she can point to. She feels the neces
sity of outrunning the shame of poverty, of marginality, and the drudgery
of endless labor for limited gain. She knows she has to create a different
alternative for the foundations of her life. She begins with the space of
her own dream house:
Not a flat. Not an apartment in back. Not a man ' s house.
Not a daddy ' s . A house all my own. With my porch and
my pillows, my pretty purple petunias. My books and
my stories . My two shoes waiting beside the bed. No
body to shake a stick at. Nobody ' s garbage to pick up
after. Only a house quite as snow, a space for myself to
go, clean as paper before the poem. (Ibid. , 1 08)
The house is, first and foremost, a feminine space that simultaneously
restructures and re-constitutes the domestic and the feminine; it is filled
with the markers of a quiet and thoughtful domesticity that nurtures crea
tive and intellectual activity and as such is removed from the confines of
domestic drudgery that patriarchal values demand. The repetition of "no
body" reinforces the solitude that the space of the dream house affords,
echoing the first lines of the vignette. The kind of belonging that Esper
anza longs for throughout the book is found by belonging, first and fore
most, to herself.
Whereas the house located on Mango Street is characterized by a
pervading sense of the unhomely, the House Away from Mango Street is
characterized by what Gaston B achelard ( 1 969) calls "felicitous space" :
Indeed, the images I want to examine are the quite sim
ple images of felicitous space. In this orientation, these
investigations would deserve to be called topophilia.
They seek to determine the human value of the sorts of
space that may be grasped, that may be defended against
adverse forces, the space we love. For diverse reasons,

20 1 2]

THE MANY HOUSES ON MANGO STREET

63

and with the differences entailed by poetic shadings, this
is eulogized space. Attached to its protective value
which can be a positive one, are also imagined values,
which soon become dominant. Space that has been
seized upon by the imagination cannot remain indiffer
ent space subj ect to the measures and estimates of the
surveyor. It has been lived in, not in its positivity, but
with all the partiality of the imagination. Particularly, it
nearly always exercises an attraction. For it concentrates
being within limits that protect. In the realm of images,
the play between the exterior and intimacy is not a bal
anced one. (xxxv-xxxvi)
In B achelard' s articulation of the house as obj ect of poetic consideration,
he points to the way that the lived experience of the house intersects with
the imagination. While his consideration of the house certainly focuses
on the house as a privileged site, he takes his subject to be one that is
shaded both by experiences and imagination. The house, particularly the
house of childhood, is not an entirely romanticized entity, insofar as it is
an entity that is always brought to mind through memory-hence its sta
tus as eulogized space.
While Cisneros and her critics have understood B achelard' s position
and treatment of the house through the lens of privilege, it is worth not
ing that B achelard himself is undertaking to examine an ontological im
age and its deep reverberations as a poetic entity, an enterprise which is
self-consciously aware of, and in many ways relies upon, the romantici
zation of space to maintain it. 2 B achelard is well aware that the house
carries its own contradiction within it, that private and public are impli
cated in one another beyond messy dialectical divisions, and that the
house of our dreams oft-times does not correspond to the houses of our
memory and imagination.

In some ways, this is the fact that allows for the division between
the house located on Mango Street-the house of the unhomely- and
the House Away from Mango Street- the house of felicitous space- to
implicate, contradict, and collapse into one another. For the protagonist
of Cisneros ' s text, memory and imagination are not sufficient to re-con
struct the house located on Mango Street into a house of felicitous space
where Esperanza can be and be. The j arring reality of the Mango Street
house is too real and discordant to allow for this. Instead, Esperanza must
create an entirely new house, one that is informed by her subject position
2 See Robin Ganz "Sandra Cisneros: Border Crossing and Beyond", as well Martha Satz
"Returning to One ' s House: An interview with Sandra Cisneros" for Cisneros ' s discussion of
Bachelard' s influence.
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and constructed, t o paraphrase Gloria Anzaldua, with her feminist
architecture.
While the solitude and feminine-centric construction of the house
away from Mango Street seems, at first glance, to create a space that by
its very nature excludes the public and the community, Esperanza' s
imagined House Away from Mango Street actually establishes a space
for the articulation of community outside traditional structures of kinship
and belonging, as she imagines the house as a space that can act as a
shelter for others who find themselves homeless, either literally or meta
phorically. The first example of this is when Esperanza imagines offer
ing S ally a safe space within her house of dreaming:
S ally, do you sometimes wish you didn ' t have to go
home? Do you wish your feet would one day keep walk
ing and take you far away from Mango Street, far away
and maybe your feet would stop in front of a house, a
nice one with flowers and big windows, and steps for
you to climb up two by two upstairs to where a room is
waiting for you. And if you opened the little window
latch and gave it a shove, the windows would swing
open, all the sky would come in. (82- 83)
Sally, in obvious and painful ways, suffers from the same kind of un
homeliness that characterizes Esperanza' s longing, and in response to
this, Esperanza offers her an imaginative place in the House Away From
Mango. By replacing Sally ' s geography, by literally transporting her
from her painful walk to her father' s home that she cannot come out of,
to the steps of a nice house, Esperanza places her within the context of
her own desire to one day just walk away from Mango.
More importantly, though, Esperanza replaces the unhomeliness
that marks Sally with an offer of felicitous space, a space that has the
potential to save her. As Sally arrives at Esperanza' s dream house and is
able to climb the stairs two by two, to a room where she can sleep and
dream in peace, she is climbing into the space of her own autonomous
life. Esperanza' s dream house offers a place of acceptance and love and
becomes an important, if only visionary, alternative to the male domi
nated home. The limits of this home, however, are immediately clear, as
Sally opts, not for her own house, or even the possible vision of a femi
nine space dictated by feminine-centric creativity and acceptance, but in
stead acts according to the only avenue she believes available to her
(marriage), frighteningly reaffirming the phallocentric values that Esper
anza' s bourgeoning feminist ethics reject.
Though Esperanza' s House Away from Mango Street registers as a
communal space, as Sally demonstrates, this communal status depends
on the ability or desire of the saved to move beyond the confines of their

20 1 2]

THE MANY HOUSES ON MANGO STREET

65

own ideological constructs- a requirement that is not always feasible.
The very nature of the ideologies that the House Away from Mango is
supposed to stand in opposition to is that they are totalizing, absolute,
and nearly inescapable. These are limitations that Esperanza cannot un
derstand, as her second articulation of communal space suggests.
The second vignette that suggests that Esperanza views the house
away from Mango Street as a communal space is "Bums in the Attic", a
short piece that articulates both the fragmentation that attends to class
and upward mobility as well as the limitations of Esperanza' s vision of
escape:
People who live on top of hills sleep so close to the stars
they forget those of us who live too much on earth. They
don' t look down at all except to be content to live on
hills . They have nothing to do with last week' s garbage
or fear of rats. Night comes. Nothing wakes them but the
wind. One day I ' ll own my own house, but I won' t for
get who I am or where I came from. Passing bums will
ask, Can I come in? I ' ll offer them the attic, ask them to
stay, because I know how it is to be without a house.
Some days, after dinner, guests and I will sit in front of a
fire. Floorboards will squeak upstairs. The attic grum
bles. Rats? They ' ll ask. B ums, I ' ll say, and I ' ll be happy.
(Ibid. , 86-87)
The geography of this vignette is important, as Esperanza describes a
topography in which some are closer to the heavens and have in their
service those who are too bound to the earth. The relevance of this geo
graphical hierarchy is important because it obviously mirrors class con
straints and additionally reveals Esperanza' s longing for ascent. She is
weary of the promise of moving "up" being tempered by the reality of
lateral movement-a slightly better flat, one with running water; a
slightly better house that still has plain, old, hallway stairs-a movement
up the metaphoric hill measured out in inches, not feet. Esperanza knows
it will take more than longing and more than promises to become one of
the people on the hill.
In this moment, Esperanza recognizes the truth of conquest and the
emptiness of the promise of the American Dream. The idea that hard
work alone will give one access to the house on the hill is underscored by
all of the people around her who work and nonetheless have little hope of
upward mobility. In "Papa who Wakes up Tired in the Dark", for exam
ple, we learn that Esperanza' s father wakes up tired, in the dark, to go to
work in the gardens of the house on the hill; he attends to the promise of
upward mobility, even as he is situated in its periphery. For those ex
cluded from the discourse of the nation - those who do not occupy the
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house o n the hill, but attend t o it- the American dream is tempered by
metaphoric or literal homelessness, rats, and last week' s garbage. The
working migrant' s access to the house on the hill, to the promise of the
nation, is limited and confined if one relies simply on the notion of hard
work to succeed. Hard work will get you to the edge of the property,
clinging to a lottery ticket. Something else is required to occupy the
master' s house.
While the first half of "Bums in the Attic" points to the limitations
of the discourse of the American Dream and reinforces, yet again, the
sense of longing, marginality, and homelessness that permeate the text,
the last half of the vignette speaks more directly to the vision Esperanza
has for the house she intends to own one day. The two descriptions of
the dream house, "A House of My Own" and "Bums in the Attic" tell us
that while she desires the space of quite dreaming, the B achelardian
house shielding the daydreamer, she also knows who and what she is;
she knows where she come from and in her words, "understands what it
means to be without a house." As Maria Antonia Oliver-Rotger (20 1 0)
has pointed out:
The middle class , feminist, aesthetic implications of Es
peranza' s words are ineludible, but they have to be con
sidered in relation to her incipient collective social
consciousness. Her freedom as a woman and as an artist
together with the social reality of those "who live too
much on earth" will be the constitutive elements of her
aesthetics . . . (290)
As a result, the home she imagines has to encompass contradictory im
pulses ; it needs to be both a space of solitary, creativity, with room
enough to dream and dream, even as it also has to be a house that can
shelter the marginal members of her own community.
The solution to this seeming contradiction lies in the foundations of
Esperanza' s bourgeoning feminist ethics. In asserting her refusal to share
her space with the requisite children and husband, she gives herself room
enough to take on another role. By allowing the bums to live in the attic,
Esperanza enacts a community-oriented ethic that begins the process of
redefining femininity. Seemingly, if Esperanza is not burdened with
housekeeping and child rearing, not only will she have time enough to
write (to be and be) she will also have the resources to better attend to
the marginal members of her community. Her house of writing is not a
solitary house, it is a house peopled by the less fortunate. This is an
important symbolic moment, as Esperanza seems to acknowledge that
education (books and papers) have the radical potential to reshape com
munities of color, assuming that the tools they provide are not used in
isolation. The upward mobility that education affords allows Esperanza
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to literally house her community and offer a counterweight to the pre
v ailing s e n s e of h o m e l e s s n e s s that a c c o m p an i e s p o v erty and
marginalization.
In re-shaping the idea of what a dream house is, and more impor
tantly what it does, Cisneros provides an important renovation to the
structure of the American Dream. By thinking of houses not as sites of
retreat, or the symbolic locus of heteronormative, phallocentric values,
but rather as spaces that have potential to house community, and moreo
ver as spaces that can help create discourse, she carves out a space of
belonging that is born of the unhomely. Cisneros brings that which is
hidden to light: she exposes what marginality, poverty, violence, racism,
and invisibility do to communities ; she exposes the potential for the
house to act as a prison rather than a refuge ; she destabilizes the division
between the house and the street, revealing the ways that each construct
and constitute one another. More than this though, by using the house as
a potential incubator of discourse, she refigures what feminine domestic
space can be. The House on Mango Street reveals that which remains
hidden in the American Dream, and in doing so, it stakes a claim for
itself. By giving voice to her community, and by offering to house it in
her dream space, Esperanza re-imagines what home can mean, and pro
vides alternative structures for attaining it.
CONCLUSION
The House on Mango Street is a novel that is full of houses : houses
that are sources of shame, houses that alienate and marginalize, houses
that act as prisons, and finally imaginative and anticipated houses that act
as a counter to these forces. By reading the House on Mango Street with
an eye towards these many houses, we can begin to see that which re
mains hidden: the unhomely within the foundation of the national fantasy
epitomized by the American Dream and its subsequent suburban fantasy ;

the marginality and invisibility o f impoverished and racially demarcated
communities ; the potential violence of domestic space; the implication of
the public and the private in the creation of spaces . Moreover, only when
considering the ways that the mUltiple houses conjure and connect with
one another can we begin to appreciate the radical potential that Esper
anza' s dream house away from Mango Street provides . She reshapes the
house on Mango Street and the House Away from Mango Street by rec
ognizing the home she has been denied and the one she will nonetheless
create. By imagining her dwelling in terms of femininity, privacy and
community, Esperanza sets up a space outside the traditional confines of
family, home, and even nation. If the house is metaphoric of the nation,
the nation Esperanza imagines is a performative one in which the margi
nal and vulnerable are housed and sustained outside traditional kinship or
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community networks. With her feminist architecture, Esperanza
imagines a radically revised dream that can accommodate difference and
ambiguity instead of totalizing or foreclosing on it.
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In November 2008, the United States elected its first African Amer
ican president. Preceding the election, pundits, academics , and the candi
dates themselves, debated whether B arack Obama (or any African
American for that matter) could potentially become the first B lack presi
dent of the United States. Central to these arguments was the role of race
in politics and society at large. If race remained a significant cleavage in
American society (many argued), it seemed unlikely that any member of
a racial minority group would be able to win in a majority white
America. In the days and weeks following the 2008 presidential elec
tion, it was frequently suggested that Obama' s success was some indica
tor that Martin Luther King Jr' s "dream" of a society that did not use
race as its dominant predictor of character was actualized (see Thern
strom 2008).
Since Obama' s election, both scholars and political pundits have
engaged in arguments over whether America has in fact moved toward a
point where race is no longer the defining cleavage in American society
(e . g . ; Piston

20 1 0;

Steele

2008 ;

Teasley and Ikard

20 1 0 ;

Thernstrom

2008) . On the one hand, events such as the election of President Obama
as well as that of Michael Steele as chair of the Republican National
Committee may very well indicate that Americans place less emphasis
on race when voting for their political leaders. However, there still re
mains evidence to suggest that we are not in a new phase of post-racial
politics and a post-racial America. During Obama' s first campaign there
was an emphasis on his race to designate distinction, deviancy, and fear.
For example, the image of Michelle and B arack Obama on the cover of
the New Yorker displayed, among other things, racism and xenophobia.
In this image not only was the fist-bump displayed, (that previously had
been denoted as "terrorist" by the McCain-Palin camp), but also a depic71
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tion of Michelle Obama donning an afro, an assault rifle and military
fatigues while presidential candidate B arack Obama was wearing Islamic
attire alluding to his suggested Islamic connections . Also, depicted in
the background of this image was a picture of Osama B in Laden and the
burning of the American flag in the fireplace. This insidious image was
in fact inherently racist and xenophobic. But images and racist depictions
of the Obama' s were not the only indication that racism is still prevalent.
After Obama' s election there were a number of racist incidents. In
Snellville, Ga an elementary school boy was told by his classmate that he
" . . . hopes Obama gets assassinated" (www.nbcnews .com) l . In the same
town, someone trashed a woman ' s lawn that featured Obama election
signs and placed feces in a pizza box on her front door. Similarly,
crosses were burned on people ' s front yards who were Obama support
ers, threatening letters were left on the cars of Obama supporters and
images of Obama were defaced and threatening messages were visible
(www.nbcnews.com) . 2 Given the confluence of these racially polarizing
events, we cannot conclude that we are living in a post-racial or "color
blind" society as some suggest.
One indicator that Americans are moving in the direction of post
racialism are the attitudes they adopt. That is to say, the less Americans
believe race defines differences among their fellow citizens (in politics,
attitudes and behavior) the closer we may become to a society in which
race is no longer a defining cleavage. Shifting attitudes on race may have
serious political, and policy-making implications. For instance, if Ameri
cans no longer believe race matters, they may be less inclined to recog
nize continuing discrimination or persistent racial inequalities . As a
result, support for policies aimed at curbing discrimination and ensuring
racial equality may weaken. More positively, a shift towards post-racial
attitudes (particularly among white Americans) may improve the pros
pects of minority candidates seeking public office, thus increasing minor
ity representation. Clearly, the potential implications of a shift towards
more post-racial thinking among Americans are significant. As such,
identifying and understanding these attitudes is critical.
In this article, we examine the prevalence and predictors of so called

"post-racial" attitudes, relying on data collected in 2007 by the Pew Re
search Center. In our examination, we find significant variation in the
presence of post-racial attitudes among respondents based on their race
and experiences. Specifically, we find that whites and those respondents
with diverse social groups are the most likely to express post-racial atti
tudes, controlling for other explanations. We conclude with a discussion
of the implications of our findings.
J http://www.nbcnews.com/idl2773 801 8/#.UxDJ-8go7IX
2 Ibid
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RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC OPINION: PREVIOUS LITERATURE
AND THEORY

The majority of research on racial attitudes in America has ex
amined attitudes related to race and discrimination as well as explicitly
and implicitly racial issues/policies among blacks and whites, with the
bulk of this research finding significant differences among black and
white Americans in this regard (e.g. ; Hutchings and Valentino 2004;
Kinder and Sanders 1 996). The existing research may be thought of as
falling into three major theoretical camps: "sociopsychological" theo
ries, "social structural" theories and "political" theories of racial attitudes
(Harris-Lacewell, 2003).
Included in the "sociopsychological" approach are studies of subtle
or ambivalent racism, aversive racism, covert racism, and the more popu
lar approaches of racial resentment or symbolic/modem racism (Devine
1 989; Gaertner and Dovidio 1 986; Kinder and Sears 1 98 1 ; Pettigrew and
Meertens 1 995 ; Sears, Hetts, Sidanius and Bobo 2000) . Symbolic ra
cism, often argued by Kinder and Sears ( 1 98 1 ), contends that "anti-Black
affect and traditional American values contributes to White resistance
toward affirmative action and other government sponsored remedies for
racial inequality" (Harris-Lacewell 2003, 225-226) . This theoretical
camp is often confirmed by observing opinion over time, which demon
strates that overt 'biological ' racial attitudes, such as beliefs that Blacks
are inferior, are no longer supported. Instead, this research typically finds
that contemporary whites' negative stereotypes of blacks' values and be
haviors, combined with their support for core American values of work
ethic and self-reliance, leads to a more subtle form of ' symbolic' or
'new' racism based largely on the perception that blacks violate tradi
tional American values (Sears, Hettts, Sidanius and B obo 2000) .
Symbolic or 'new ' racism is typically measured relying on several
questions tapping attitudes about the prevalence of discrimination, atti
tudes about the work ethic of blacks and whether they have received
undue advantages or government assistance (Kinder and Mendelberg
2000; Kinder and Sanders 1 996; Sears, Henry and Kosterman 2000; Tar
man and Sears 2005) . The symbolic racism literature has also clearly
demonstrated the impact of these orientations on whites' support for poli
cies which are both explicitly and implicitly related to race (e.g . ; welfare
and affirmative action), decreasing support for such policies (Kinder and
Mendelberg 2000; Tarman and Sears 2005) .
The second theoretical approach t o studying racial attitudes is the
"social structural" approach. This set of theories consists of social domi
nance theory, group threat, racial threat theory, realistic group conflict
theory, social identity theory and implicit stereotyping (Devine 1 989;
Dovidio et a1. 1 997 ; Fazio et a1. 1 995 ; Sidanius and Pratto 1 999; Tajfel
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and Turner 1 986) . This approach asserts that individuals identify with
groups that share their racial and/or ethnic identity. Whites ' opposition to
racial policies is then believed to be largely due to perceptions of conflict
with other racial and ethnic groups, namely blacks (Sears, Retts,
Sidanius, and Bobo 2000) . Sidanius and Pratto ( 1 999) suggest that
"group based social hierarchies are reproduced by interaction and rein
forcement of inequality by individuals or institutions of the dominant
group" (Harris-Lacewell 2003 , 226) .
Proponents of the social structural approach often situate racial atti
tudes derived from group interests in historical context, theorizing, for
example, that while white racial attitudes might have evolved from the
earlier form of 'biological' racism toward a newer form of 'laissez-faire'
racism, the desire among whites to maintain a dominant position in soci
ety remains the same (Bobo, Kluegel and Smith 1 997). As with the sym
bolic racism literature, scholars examining group threat have found
whites' racial attitudes to be strongly linked with their support (or lack
thereof) for policies linked to race (Bobo 2000).
The final approach to understanding racial attitudes is the political
(sometimes called the "politics-centered") approach which suggests that
"disagreements over racial policies are often about political rather than
racial attitudes" (Harris-Lacewell 2003, 226) . Proponents of this ap
proach assert that political orientations (particularly about the role of
government) and not racial attitudes, shape whites' support for racial pol
icies (Sniderman and Piazza 1 993 ; Sinderman and Carmines 1 997).
These scholars do not deny the existence of racial attitudes, however,
their research suggests that the role of these attitudes in determining pol
icy preferences is minimal. In other words, it is the policy and not
prej udices or racial resentment that causes political disagreements . To
support their claims regarding the current role of race in white opposition
to various policies, these scholars have found weak relationships between
racial attitudes and policy preferences, finding political orientations and
values much more powerfUl predictors of such policy support (e.g . ; Snid
erman, Crosby and Howell 2000).
Observing all of these theories, we can conclude that understanding
racial attitudes is important in political society. Racial attitudes do not
only manifest in policy decisions but also election and participation deci
sions for both African Americans and Caucasian Americans. The study
of racial attitudes in American politics continues to play a major role
during this era in which an African American has secured the political
position of the presidency and at a time in which there are contentious
campaign rallies. Furthermore, the variation described in the racial atti
tudes literature demonstrates how difficult it is to conclude on the "best"
measures of racism in American politics. Thus, we focus not on racism
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but on the idea of an elimination of racial categorization as a defining
factor in political and policy assessment. If what the pundits argue is
true, that we are moving towards a post racial society, we should observe
a decline in the support of typical racism predictors among all groups .
POST-RACIALISM

While numerous scholars have written about the possibility of a
post-racial society or the presence of post-racial candidates, attitudes ,
etc . , few have offered a clear definition and measurement schema of
post-racialism. Conventional research suggests that a post-racial society
is one in which defining cleavages do not fall along racial lines (Cho
2009 ; Edge 20 1 0; Gallagher 2003 ; Hutchings 2009 ; Steele 2008). For
instance, Cho argues that post-racialism is an ideology that asserts, be
cause of "significant racial progress that has been made, the state need
not engage in race-based decision making or adopt race-based remedies,
and that civil society should eschew race as a central organizing princi
ple . . . " (Cho, 2009 , 1 589). She also states that there are four central
features to post-racialism, "racial progress, race neutral universalism,
moral equivalence and distancing move" (Cho, 2009 1 600) . Other schol
ars ' discussion of post-racialism mirror many of Cho ' s assertions, dis
cussing post-racialism as the belief that race is no longer a significant
impediment for blacks seeking employment, higher education, or politi
cal office (Metzler 20 1 0) . Metzler (20 1 0) asserts, for example, that a
white person who has adopted post-racial attitudes is someone who,
. . . situates racism in the past; embraces formal equality ;
believes that America has done so much for B lacks and
yet Blacks never seem to think that it is enough; walks
on eggshells around Blacks for fear of saying something
offensive; believes in interracial dating so long as it is
not their son or daughter who is marrying B lack; does
not see themselves as racialized but basks in White priv
ilege; believes that Blacks use race as an excuse for fail
ure, that B lacks who are successful are the exception;
believes that pretending that race does not matter makes
it true; and still harbors and makes decisions based on
the powerful marker of race that is imbedded in Ameri
can racial reality. (Metzler 20 1 0, 402)
Thus, post-racialism requires a belief that racial equality essentially ex
ists and that race will have little impact on black American' s prospects.
While, we have observed many articulations of what post-racialism
looks like and how it is articulated, the quantitative evidence on post
racialism is minimal. Vincent Hutchings (2009), one of the few scholars
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who have attempted to empirically measure post-racism, primarily by
comparing support for racial policies from ANES data collected in 1 98 8
t o ANES data collected twenty years later i n 2008, finds little evidence
of a decline in a racial divide among Americans. He concludes that the
post-racial society that many allude to is not evident when observing
Black and White Americans' views on policy issues such as affirmative
action, governmental aid and fair job treatment (Hutchings 2009) .
T o add to this limited research o n post-racialism, w e explore the
presence and predictors of post-racial attitudes, focusing primarily on the
extent to which Americans (blacks and whites) believe race to be a sig
nificant challenge for African Americans (seeking political office, hous
ing, employment, education, etc), and the extent to which they believe
differences among whites and blacks have become smaller in recent
years.
DATA, METHODS , AND MEASURES

To examine the presence and consequences of post-racial attitudes
among Americans, we rely on survey data from the Pew Center' s 2007
"Racial Attitudes in America" Survey. We rely on this survey not only
due to the number of measures tapping attitudes towards race and polit
ics, but due to its oversample of racial and ethnic minorities. The initial
sample consisted of 1 ,500 non-Hispanic whites, 1 ,000 non-Hispanic
blacks and 500 Hispanics.3 Since this examination is primarily concerned
with attitudinal differences among Anglos and African Americans, His
panics were excluded from the analyses presented here.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES

To capture post racial attitudes, we rely on three measures. First, we
examine the extent to which Americans believe discrimination remains a
problem in the U . S . If Americans believe that race is not a defining
cleavage in American society, they may be less likely to expect that ra
cial discrimination occurs with great frequency. To examine attitudes
about discrimination, we rely on a scale based on responses to four ques
tions asking respondents how often they thought blacks were discrimi
nated against in employment, housing, education, and while shopping.
The responses to these questions are summed to create a post-racial re
sponses scale for all four questions.4
3 The "Racial Attitudes in America" survey was collected from September 5-0ctober 6,
2007 . The sample was drawn using random digit dialing (to ensure the overs ample of African
Americans and Hispanics, the survey disproportionately drew from area codes with higher
densities of racial and ethnic minorities) . The margin of error for Anglos is +/- 3 . 5 , and +/- 4
points for African Americans.
4 S ee Appendix I for a complete discussion of all the measures and coding used.
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Our second measure of post-racial attitudes is based on a question
asking respondents whether they thought then Senator Obama' s race
would help him, hurt him or make no difference to voters in the 2008
election. We expect that voters who hold post-racial views will believe
that Obama' s race would make no difference in the election. As such we
created a dichotomous variable based on this question ( 1 =Race will not
make a difference, O=Other). This categorization is based on the sociop
sychological studies that argue that Whites believe racial distinctions are
no longer relevant and instead values are the basis for advancement and
discrimination in this country (Kinder and Sears 1 98 1 , 1 996).
Finally, we expect that Americans holding post-racial attitudes will
be less likely to perceive race based differences among African Ameri
cans and Anglos . To capture these attitudes, we rely on a question asking
respondents whether they thought that the values of black and white peo
ple have become more similar or more different in the past 1 0 years . We
expect that those Americans possessing post-racial attitudes will believe
the values of these two groups are more similar. Sniderman and Hagan
( 1 985) argue that whites' believe that racial inequalities are no longer the
issue but instead racial attitudes should be observed in reference to an
adherence to values such as individualism. These scholars assert that
whites are more interested in values that promote egalitarianism. If
Whites believe that middle class Blacks possess these same values then
they will agree that middle class B lacks are more similar to them than
lower class B lacks who may not espouse or embrace the values of indi
vidualism and less government intervention.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

We anticipate that a number of respondents ' characteristics, includ
ing political orientations, identity, experiences, and resources, may shape
their post-racial attitudes. First, we examine the impact of Americans '
racial identity o n their post-racial attitudes. Throughout our analyses, we
anticipate that Anglos will more frequently express post-racial attitudes,
compared with African Americans. We base this expectation upon pre
vious research, which indicates that whites tend to less frequently per
ceive race as a significant challenge in society (compared with blacks) .
As Kinder and Sanders put it:
Whites tend to think that racial discrimination is no
longer a problem; that prej udice has withered away; that
the real worry these days is reverse discrimination, pe
nalizing innocent whites for the sins of the distant past.
Meanwhile, blacks see racial discrimination as ubiqui
tous; they think of prej udice as a plague; they say that
racial discrimination, not affirmative action, is still the
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rule in American society." (Kinder and Sanders, 1 996,
287)
Similarly, we anticipate that whites are more likely to believe discrimina
tion and race-based voting are a thing of the past, compared with their
African American peers. To test this hypothesis, we include a binary va
riable for race ( 1 = white, O-black) .
We further anticipate that attitudes towards African Americans and
social experiences will influence respondents' attitudes about the persis
tence of racism in the United States. First, we anticipate that negative
affect towards African Americans may be related to a belief about the
role of race in society. Affect towards blacks has been found in the past
to shape racial attitudes (Tarman and Sears 2005) and may exert a differ
ential impact on our post-racial attitudes here. On the one hand, respon
dents who report higher opinions of African Americans may be more
aware and/or sympathetic to the challenges African Americans face with
regard to discrimination. Conversely, positive affect towards African
Americans may result in fewer perceived disparities in white and black
values, and a belief that race won ' t make a difference for Obama in the
2008 election. Attitudes towards African Americans is measured relying
on a question asking respondents about their overall opinion of blacks
(O=Very unfavorable, 3=Very favorable.
Social integration may also impact respondents' willingness to ex
press post-racial attitudes. Again, these experiences may exert a differen
tial impact on post-racial attitudes. Contact with members of other racial
and ethnic groups may increase awareness of discrimination, while si
multaneously positively impacting the extent to which respondents be
lieve race is not a factor in political decision-making and whites and
blacks share similar values.
B ased on previous research, we further expect that political orienta
tions will significantly shape post-racial attitudes among respondents.
Political ideology and party attachment are frequently included in exami
nations of racial attitudes and have been found in the past (e.g . ; Sears,
Henry and Kosterman 2000) to shape racial attitudes among whites. We
attempt to capture political orientations, relying on two measures. The
analyses include measures of party attachment ( 1 =Republican, 2=Inde
pendent, 3=Democrat), and political ideology ( 1 =Very conservative,
2=Conservative, 3=Moderate, 4=Liberal, 5=Very Liberal).
Finally, a number of demographic characteristics often found to in
fluence racial attitudes (e.g. ; Hutchings 2009 ; Tarman and Sears 2005) ,
including age, education ( 1 =College education, O=No college), income
and gender( l =Female, O=Male), are included in the models . Income cap
tures family income ranging from less than $ 10 ,000 per year through
over $ 1 50,000 per year.
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RESULTS

First, we examine the presence of post-racial attitudes among An
glos and African Americans. Table 1 shows the distribution of the three
dependent variables and the differences among blacks and whites in their
support for these attitudes. First, we can see that the respondents ' mean
measure on the discrimination scale is 2.28, indicating that, on average,
respondents believed blacks were discriminated against 'hardly ever' or
'not too often' in over 2 of the 4 circumstances described (housing, edu
cation, employment, shopping) . Among our remaining measures of post
racialism, we can see that attitudes about whites and blacks' values be
coming more similar are the most prevalent, with 64% of respondents
agreeing. In contrast less than 50% of respondents believed Obama' s
race would not matter to voters if he were the Democratic nominee in
2008.
TABLE 1 : GROUP DIFFERENCES IN POST-RACIAL ATIITUDES
White and B lack

Race
Whites
B lacks

Social Integration
Diversity
No Diversity

Obama' s Race Won ' t

Values have become

Average score of

Make a Difference

more similar (percent

Discrimination Scaleab

(percent agreeing)"b

agreeing)"

2.86
1 .40

84%
61%

56%
36%

2.34
1 .9 1

76%
63%

48%
43%

a Differences among blacks and whites are statistical ly significant (p<. O I ) .
b Differences among respondents with racially diverse ti'iends and those without are
statistically significant (p< . O I )
Differences in groups means calculated using Analysis o f variance (ANOVA ) tests. All
p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
N

=

2540.

Next, we examine racial differences, finding a notable divide among
blacks and whites in their expression of post-racial attitudes . On a scale
of 0-4 (4=Most post racial response), we see whites' average score is
more than twice that of black respondents, demonstrating the significant
difference among members of these groups in the extent to which blacks
face continual discrimination in their daily lives. Turning to our next
measure of post-racialism- a question asking respondents whether they
believe Obama' s race would make a difference in the 2008 election, we
can see that over 50% of white respondents believed Obama' s race
would be of little consequence in the election, compared with
approximately 36% of blacks. Finally, the data indicates a significant
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divide among whites and blacks on our final measure of post-racialism
whether white and black values have become more similar over the last
10 years . 70% of whites answered in the affirmative for this question,
compared to 5 5 % of blacks . These descriptive statistics further
demonstrate the previous arguments that racial attitudes among blacks
and whites differ. Furthermore, these results also show whites are
asserting more post racial attitudes than blacks.
While these descriptive statistics give us some indicator of the
distribution of post-racial attitudes among Whites and Blacks, to examine
them controlling for other variables known to influence racial attitudes,
we turn now to our multivariate analyses .
MULTIVARIATE MODELS
We ran three models predicting our measures of post-racial atti
tudes. Models I and III (examining beliefs about the persistence of dis
crimination, and about whites' and blacks ' values becoming more
similar, respectively) rely on ordered logistic regression, while Model II
is a logistic regression predicting the likelihood that respondents believe
Obama' s race will not make a difference to voters during the 2008 elec
tion. Across the models, two sets of results are reported. The first col
umn in each model reports the logistic coefficients with the standard
errors in parenthesis and the second set of results reports the average
change across the dependent variable, given a fixed change in the inde
pendent variable from its minimum to its maximum value, holding all
other variables constant at their means (Long and Freese 2006).

The results reported throughout models I-III reveal that, controlling
for the other variables in the model, Americans' racial identity consist
ently influences the extent to which they hold post-racial attitudes. Spe
cifically, being white (rather than black) significantly and positively
increased respondents' likelihood of believing discrimination was rare,
that race would not make a difference in the 2008 presidential election,
and that the values of whites and blacks have become more similar.
These results indicate a clear division among blacks and whites in the
extent to which they believe race to be a defining cleavage in American
society, particularly in the extent to which they believe race to be a sig
nificant challenge blacks need overcome in seeking political office, edu
cation, housing, and employment. Whites further appear more likely to
believe that black-white differences in values have declined in recent
years . Thus, Whites believe William Wilson' s ( 1 978) assertions that
class not race is the most significant division within America. If indeed
class, not race is the defining cleavage in America, there must still be
consideration of the fact that class issues are often tied to racial issues.
Blacks today remain at a substantial disadvantage by most standard in-
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TABLE 2: MULTIVARIATE MODELS EXAMINING POST-RAcIAL ATTITUDES
Model ill : Ordered Logistic
Model I: Ordered Logistic

Model II: Logistic Regression:

Regression: White and Black

Reg ression: Discrimination is

Obama's Race Won't Make a

Values have become more

Rare

Difference

similar

Coefficients (S.E.)

Min-Max

Coefficients (S.E.)

Min-Max

Coefficients (S.E.)

Min-Max

.191
.25 1
-.084
.064
.02 3
- .08 6
.022
.093
.025

1 . 16(. 1 36)**
.001(.003)
.068(. 1 27)
.014(.026)
-.01 2(.087)
. 100(.058)
.060(. 1 15)
.465(. 1 60)**
.327(.087)**

. 158
.014
.008
.0 14
.003

1 .73( .1 1 0) * *

.1 62

.78 6( .1 24)**

Ag e

- .002( .002)

.0 1 9

. 0 12(.()()3)**

-.343(. 1 14)**
.032(.024)
-.046(.077)
-.087(.055)
.09 1 ( . 1 04)
.382(. 1 6 1 )*
.034(.082)

White
Education

- .064(.097)

.006

Income

.04 1 ( .020)

.032

Party Attachment

- .028( .065) * *

.055

Ideology

- .143 ( .046) * *

.056

Female

- .1 43 ( .090)

.0 1 4

Social Integration

.375( .132) * *

.037

Black Fav orability

- .081(.069)

.024

-

.052

.008
.066
. 141

�
tI1
tI1

>-<

o
c::
::0

�
Z
I:)

Constant
X

542 .1 9 * *

103.84**

N

1786

1 656

1 36.20**
1 68 1

Note: * p<.05, * * p<.O l . All p-values are bas ed on two-tailed tests
00
>-'
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dicators (Sears et al. 2000). Statistics show that compared with Whites,
Blacks suffer disproportionately from unemployment, poverty, inferior
educational opportunities, and poor health care (Shaw 1 993). All of
these are associated with class, but how can we separate class from race,
when most class issues disproportionately affect one race over another?
The situation of B lacks in America is complex, and there are no easy
answers . With these consistent differences, it is no surprise that Blacks
consistently perceive more discrimination and less equal opportunity
than do Whites (Sears et aI. , 2000) . Even when only considering issues
of class, racial concerns still arise. What we may be seeing is that it is
simply easier to take explicit racial concerns out of the equation, but due
to the connectedness of racial and class issues in America, it becomes
more and more difficult to escape cleavages based on race, even when
only considering class.
In addition to racial and ethnic identity, social integration exerts a
consistent and positive impact on all three measures of post-racialism.
Contrary to our expectations, those with more diverse groups of friends
less often express concern over discrimination. Initially, we reasoned
those with diverse friends would perceive more discrimination from the
experiences their friends would describe. However, we cannot conclude
this as accurate. We found that views of discrimination do not increase
because of an increase in a diverse group of friends. Furthermore, the
results indicate that respondents who socialize with a more racially di
verse group are more likely to believe that race will not make a differ
ence for Obama in the 2008 election, and that the values of whites and
blacks in America have become more similar. To further examine the
impact of these social experiences on post-racial attitudes, the differences
in the dependent variables among respondents with diverse and non-di
verse social groups were examined (results reported in Table 3 ) . Differ
ence of means tests reveal significant variation among these groups in
two out of the three variables (discrimination and black/white values).
TABLE 3: POST-RACIAL ATTITUDES

BY

SOCIAL GROUP DIVERSITY
White and B lack

Obama' s Race Won ' t

Values have become

Average score of

Make a Difference

more similar (percent

Discrimination Scale"

(percent agreeing)

agreeing)"

Diverse Social Group

2.34

48%

71%

Non-Diverse Social Group

1.91

43%

59%

"Differences among respondents with racially diverse friends a n d those without are statistically
significant (p<. O I )
Differences in groups means calculated using Analysis o f variance (ANOVA) tests . All p-values
are based on two-tailed tests.

20 1 2]

FREE YOUR MIND

83

The results presented in the first three models also indicate that
political orientations, namely party attachment and political ideology,
impact attitudes about discrimination . Democrats and liberals are less
likely to believe that discrimination is not a significant problem in the
United States. However, these orientations show no significant impact on
our other measures of post-racial attitudes. Several of the control
variables also exert a significant impact on post-racial feelings among
respondents . Age negatively impacts attitudes about the role of Obama' s
race in the 2008 election, and favorability towards blacks increases the
likelihood that respondents believe that black and white values have
become more similar. Finally, education negatively and significantly
impacts the likelihood that respondents ' believed Obama' s race would
make a difference in the 2008 election.
CONCLUSION

In 2008 it was realized that race relations in this country had im
proved, but had not moved toward the racial progression that was ex
pected due to the candidacy and election of an African American for the
office of President. The hope for this country was that it had moved on
to become the racial melting pot in which everyone was seen as being
equal and everyone could be afforded the same opportunity if they
worked as hard as their racial counterpart.
However, what has been revealed in the research since Obama be
came president and even during his candidacy is that maybe our racial
melting pot is not hot enough. Research reveals that as we move forward
in this country and make strides toward racial solidarity, the old adages
about race still linger in the hearts and minds of Americans across the
country, both white and black.
Currently, there still continues to be marked differences between the
opinions of Blacks and Whites . According to Hutchings and Valentino
(2004) differences in opinion between Blacks and White are not small.
In fact, differences of over 20% exist on policies, including nonracial
ones (general government spending on social services, education, and
assistance for the poor) . Surveys show that Black Americans disagree
with white Americans about whether the economic situation has im
proved for Blacks, whether there are more opportunities now, whether
competition for jobs is fairly handled, and whether racism in this country
has decreased (Shaw 1 993). More recently we have observed a division
in political attitudes among whites and Blacks in reference to the in
volvement of the government in the flooding of New Orleans during
Hurricane Katrina and the views that then Senator B arack Obama' s race
would not be a factor in his candidacy for president. Similarly, we find
that those who have a more diverse group of friends and those whose
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social interactions are multicultural are less likely to exhibit racist atti
tudes toward his or her white or black counterparts . Finally, more whites
think that they have more values in common with blacks than blacks
believe they have in common with whites. However, values is a broad
category so we are unable to draw specific conclusions from this com
ment other than to state that whites feel they share more similarities with
Blacks than in the past.
Current events have demonstrated that racial prej udice and discrimi
nation are not over. And, as the country continues on its path toward the
equalization of all races in this country, it cannot afford to continue to
think that the traditional ways of thinking about race will get them to the
end of the road because ultimately, it will continue to lead to a dead end.
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ApPENDIX 1 : V AR1ABLES & MEASURES
Dependent Variables:
•

•

"How often do you think blacks are discriminated
against when they [ Apply for a jobfTry to rent an apartment or find a
house to buy/Apply to a college or universitylEat at restaurants and shop
in retail stores] - almost always, frequently, not too often, or hardly
ever?" (1=Hardly ever or Not too often, O=frequently or=Almost always)
*Responses summed to create a scale in which 4 indicates a post-racial
response to all 4 questions .
Obama 's Race Won 't Make a Difference: If B arack is the Democratic
Party nominee for president, do you think his being African-American
will help him, hurt him, or won ' t it make a difference to voters ?
(1=Won' t make a difference, O=Race will help or hurt him) .
White and Black Values (past 10 years) : "Now thinking about people' s
V ALVES . B y values I mean things that people view as important, or
their general way of thinking. First, in the last ten years do you think the
values held by black people and the values held by white people have
become more similar or more different?" ( l =More similar, O=No change,
-1=More different) .
Discrimination Scale :

Independent Variables:
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

(1=White, O=Black)
"What is your age" (years)
Education: "What is the last grade or class that you completed in
school?" ( 1 =college graduate, 0= non-college graduate)
Income: "Last year, that is in 2006, what was your total family income
from all sources, before taxes? Just stop me when I get to the right cate
gory." (1= Less than $10,000, 2= 10 to under $20,000, 3= 20 to under
$30,000, 4= 30 to under $40,000, 5= 40 to under $50,000, 6= 50 to under
$75,000, 7= 75 to under $ 1 00,000, 8=100 to under $ 1 50,000, 9
=$ 1 50,000 or more."
White :

Age:

Party Attachment: "I n p oli ti cs TODAY, do you consider yourself

a

Re

publican, Democrat, or Independent?" (1=Republican, 2=Independent,
3 =Democrat) .
Ideology : "In general, would you describe your political views as
( 1 =Very conservative, 2=Conservative, 3=Moderate, 4=Liberal, 5=Very
liberal).
Femal e : ( l =Female, O=Male)
Social Integration: "Do you yourself know any person [of another race]
whom you consider a friend? " (0= no friends of a different race,
l =friend of a different race)
Black Favorability : "Is your overall opinion of B lacks very favorable,
mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?" (3= very
favorable, 2=mostly favorable, l =mostly unfavorable, 0 = very
unfavorable) .

IDA B . WELLS AND THE FORCES OF
DEMOCRATIZATION

Jane Duran
University of California at Santa Barbara

The work of Ida B . Wells is receiving increasingly close scrutiny
today, since her diaries and other writings have been published, making
an overall assessment of her accomplishments easier. We often think of
her as someone who wrote extensively on lynching, and the republication
of many of her pamphlets a decade or two ago has reminded us of how
much courage, fortitude and perseverance it took to be able to author the
works in the first place. But an important part of Wells ' s trajectory is her
sheer staying power; she was on the same path, so to speak, from her
teenage years, and she often felt the need to maintain a true course when
others around her were giving way to temptation. It is easy to say that
Wells believed in American democracy as a government for all; more
remarkable, perhaps, is the fact that Wells also felt the need to be a tire
less activist in the sense of being a community organizer. Indeed, it
could be argued that the most rewarding part of Wells' s lifework was
that done in Chicago that resulted in community halls, lending libraries
and cross-cultural effort lasting at least a generation or two. Here, as
Wells recounts, for instance, in Crusade for Justice, she is bent on doing
whatever the situation seems to require at whatever the cost. l
Although much of what Wells wrote-and a great deal of what she
accomplished-was in the direction of a general amelioration of condi
tions for the Black population, Wells had a special interest in one issue,
and this issue recurs again and again both in her writings and in her
work. Wells ' s general tone might be thought to be somewhat feminist
(or "womanist" in today ' s terminology) but she achieves what she does
for the Black population at least in part by striking a courageous note in
favor of young B lack men wherever she is able.2 In this sense, Wells
strikes a grand note for democracy.

I Ida B . Wells. Crusade for Justice, ed. Alfreda Duster, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1 98 8 .
2 Well s ' s body o f work is available a s a volume in the Schomburg series, Collected
Works of Ida B. Wells, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 998. Some of what she did fulfills,
in a sense, the desiderata set forth by David Walker in his Appeal.
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If the forces at work in America after the Civil War and throughout
Reconstruction could be deemed to be such as to have been deleterious to
the health of the young Black male, Wells was more than willing to take
a stand to do something about the situation. Wells knew that racism was
largely responsible for the attempts to pin charges of rape, or other
crimes , on Black men in order-in the eyes of whites-to justify lynch
ing, but she also knew that, in the cities, many Black men did not have
enough to do. She was particularly concerned about those who might
have recently come from the South and gone to the city, where they
might become engaged in less than productive behavior.
As was customary with Ida, she took matters directly into her own
hands. In Crusade, Wells tells about her work with men on the street in
Chicago, and her efforts to teach them a better way of life than what she
perceived as constant homelessness and drunkenness:
Very shortly we added a men' s lodging house upstairs
[at the Negro Fellowship League] where men could get a
bed for fifteen cents and a place partitioned off for
twenty-five cents. It was the first venture of the kind on
State Street and very liberally patronized. At the end of
our first year we had a registration average of forty or
fifty persons a day who came in to read or play checkers
or to hunt jobs.3
This sort of activity was a regular feature of Wells ' s work, added to
her writing ; she knew that voting could not be promoted without better
conditions for all. In addition to forming some of her own social sites,
including the use of local buildings and organizational structures , Wells
was also involved in a noteworthy activity for a woman of color of her
time-work with Jane Addams and the other residents of Hull House.
That this happened at all is a remarkable testament to the strength of will
of all of the parties, and from a philosophical perspective is indicative of
the extent to which Deweyan educational thought had begun to take hold
in Chicago. (In itself, this does, of course, represent a democratic stripe
of social activity.) During this era of nearly complete segregation, a few
Chicagoans were willing to meet to try to forge new movements toward
at least minimal integration. Addams herself was very much of the mind
that genuine pragmatism required new understandings of the roles played
by day to day interaction. Addams and Wells together worked at a level
that was more than simply a religious or pragmatic understanding-their
3

Wells, Crusade, p. 306.

20 1 2]

IDA B . WELLS AND THE FORCES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

91

goal was to leave a legacy that would allow the poverty-stricken to help
themselves. 4
Wells felt strongly about these issues because what she had seen in
the South-and what she reported in her anti-lynching writings-con
vinced her that Black men were particularly vulnerable to legal charges,
and that anything that could be done to better the situation constituted
important work. In addition to her special concerns, Wells had an overall
prompting about the forces of justice: both her "Southern Horrors" and
"Red Record" indicate that the additional problem of the sexual abuse of
Black women was seldom addressed. Indeed, it might be said with some
justification that what drove Wells was the notion that entire segments of
the population were either disenfranchised, or capable of voting but sim
ply not having the requisite social pull to make sure that what transpired
at the ballot box resulted in real change.s
The impetus behind Wells ' s lifelong accomplishments is, in a sense,
perhaps more startling than some of the accomplishments themselves.
At a time in America when most young women, Black or white, could
scarcely think beyond marriage and motherhood as a goal-and "goal"
may be an inappropriate word, since these were, at the time, life-defining
events-Wells had other plans. Her early diaries, recently published, de
pict an eighteen-year-old adolescent filled with a sprightly sense of self
and determined to do differently. 6 Remarkably, these diaries indicate a
desire never to marry (spelled out in full) alongside a desire to try to help
her race. Still more remarkably, Wells, at an early age, felt no hesitation
in castigating members of her race for their failure to act against what
she perceived as the manifest injustices perpetrated by whites, and she
was especially stringent in her comments against senior male Blacks in
positions of power within the Black community. Thus it is no exaggera
tion to say that Wells saw democracy as not only the idealized driver of
American society but, perhaps more important, as the hoped-for catalyst
of Black society-and she was just as hard on her own community in her
diaries as she is on the larger community surrounding it.
As Wells matured and traveled throughout the United States and
abroad, she has many more opportunities to take action on behalf of the
impoverished and to agitate for change. The older, experienced Wells
who works with Addams and others in Chicago is simply another version
of the young Wells of Memphis-each is determined to try to make the
changes that would allow for a fuller participation of Blacks in American
4 Jane Addams. "The Public School and the Immigrant Child," in The Jane Addams
Reader, ed. Jean Bethke Elshtain, New York: Basic Books, 2002, pp. 235-250.
S See various works cited in fll. 2.
6 Ida B. Wells, The Memphis Diary of Ida B. Wells, ed. Miriam DeCosta-Willis, Bos
ton: Beacon Press, 1 995,
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life. That participation does not simply mean voting or the standard ac
tivities of citizenship (in Illinois, there were already a few B lack legisla
tors) . It means meaningful participation in school life, church and home
and family. This can only be accomplished through a strengthening of
mind and will.
One might inquire as to what it was that gave the special focus to
Wells' s work-before a certain sequence of events she was simply a
strong-minded and unconventional young Black woman. After the se
quence, she became an intensely driven activist, and one who knew pre
cisely what she wanted to do, and was willing to do whatever was
necessary to accomplish her goals. As Wells writes in Crusade,
. . . there came the lynching in Memphis which changed the whole
course of my life."? When Wells suffered reprisals for having written
not only against lynching, but against the constant blaming of young
B lack men for sexual crimes, she understood that she needed to take
further action. Her newspaper office was burned down; fortunately, she
was not in Memphis at the time. In addition to editorializing against
lynching, Wells had taken the unusual, courageous and probably fool
hardy step of mentioning that many of the alleged sex crimes were prob
ably due to the existence of consensual relationships, at least some of
which were initiated by young white women. She must have known that
she would pay a heavy price for bringing this topic up in a newspaper,
and she did.
The thread that ties together the Wells of the early years with the
later Wells is that same thread of courage, lack of concern for opinion,
and plain fortitude that shows up in nearly all activists of all stripes.
Wells possessed these traits in abundance, and we can do little more than
wonder at the interesting mix of intellectual ability, activist skill, and
compassion for others that drove much of the effort in Wells' s life. B ut
perhaps most noteworthy is her sense that American democracy, during
her time, had not fulfilled its promise.
"

II
In her diaries, edited by Miriam DeCosta-Willis, Wells is more than
eager to share the notion that defying convention, refusing to attend par
ties and get-togethers (except on the rare occasion), and taking a stand
against compulsory marriage and motherhood are all important compo
nents of her personal make-up. Even here, in these comparatively un
guarded comments that are obviously intended only for her own personal
reflection, it is clear that a nascent notion of democracy is at work
Wells is thinking of herself as an American citizen of the nineteenth
7
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century, and part of the statement that she is making is that, as a citizen,
she would like to be able to make her own decisions about a number of
issues. In fact, we might go so far as to claim that a concept later articu
lated by Wells with respect to lynching, establishing public spaces for the
Black population, and so forth is at work here-Wells not only believes
in democracy in the largest possible sense, but also believes that democ
racy cannot be established or instantiated without effort. In a sense her
ideal encompasses a bit of that of the Aristotelian magnanimous
personality.
Wells ' s beginning efforts in her political work are mainly of a
piece-seemingly unbound by tradition, and unafraid of adverse com
mentary. Wells does remarkable things . At a time when many young
women of any color would be fearful of undertaking a long trip unac
companied, Wells takes a train through Colorado and to California (tak
ing notes on the way), and teaches for a brief period in Visalia,
California, to the children of the very small Black population there.8 We
are struck by the sheer statistical rarity of her accomplishments, and sur
prised again that, apparently, she herself does not find them so worthy of
comment.
In examining Wells' s early life, it is apparent that, in a sense, she
used herself as an exemplar of that force of democratization that she
espoused. In other words, if democratic procedures ideally enable all to
participate-as the Founders had envisioned for at least the propertied
white males-Wells was one of the first participants in many ventures to
be simultaneously Black and female. Of her, it may truly be said, that
Anna Julia Cooper' s remark "When and where I enter, the whole race
enters with me," applies .9 What Wells is guessing is that the very acts
that she so despises-the lynchings, blaming of B lacks for various
crimes, and general acts of disrespect-will fall dramatically if enough
B lack citizens are enfranchised. So writings such as "Southern Horrors"
are wake-up calls to everyone, Black and white alike, that at least one
individual has noticed what is going on and is willing to testify to it,
while her later works of community organization (which we have men
tioned at an earlier point) are the very kinds of hands-on activities that
are needed to keep the forces of access to the ballot box moving.
It might be argued that almost anyone could have tried to do what
Wells did, but the truth is that very few were courageous enough to make
the effort. In other words, trying to create a more open society was so
difficult-and time-consuming and frustrating-that Wells was during
8
9

Wells, Memphis, p. 1 05 .
This phrase, widely cited i n a number o f places, is the title o f Paula Gidding s ' s well
known work on the history of Black women in America. (Paula Giddings, When and Where I
Enter, New York: Morrow, 1 98 3 . )
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her early years pretty much alone in what she set out to do. What better
way to demonstrate, for example, that there should be no barriers to a
young Black woman traveling by herself than to set out on such a j our
ney? How better to demonstrate that a young woman need not marry
than to forswear marriage for years? (To be fair, Wells did eventually
marry. )
As the editor o f Wells' s Memphis diaries writes, Wells w a s a com
plex person who not only found others difficult, but who also struggled
to come to terms with what she knew about herself. Reading her work
can sometimes be perplexing since her take on what was needed to
achieve social justice was unremitting, and her personal writings are
often painful and confusing to peruse. DeCosta-Willis notes:
The summer of 1 8 86 is also a time for reflection and
deep introspection, a time for confronting, openly and
honestly, the complex woman whom she has become.
Although Wells writes enthusiastically about "enjoying
existence," she often feels lonely and isolated from
others . . . . [S]he describes her longing for the "might
have been" (the education she did not complete), [and]
her feelings of inadequacy. . .. 1 0
Wells notices that she seems a great deal more driven than many of
those around her, and although she often faults others-she expresses
frequent frustration at the acquiescence of many B lacks to their lot-she
also finds fault with herself. To give Wells credit, she seems to know
that if she is to achieve what she wants, which is a greater measure of
justice for the Black population, she must work on herself as well as
everyone around her. It is an irony that, in the attempt to try to make
America more democratic so that another young Black woman or man
can have some of the same opportunities that she has pushed herself to
create, she also has to move back, as it were, and ask herself if, in creat
ing these opportunities, she has sometimes gone too far. The relentless
pursuit of a goal that characterizes Wells ' s life leads to these reflections .
As soon as Wells began to write for publication-and this was at an
early point, when she was in her early twenties and had the equivalent of
what today would be considered a secondary school education-she
started to publish pieces that castigated her fellow citizens of color for
their failure to live up to larger expectations and, again, to instantiate a
set of democratic practices, even with respect to their own people. In an
early article titled "Functions of Leadership," Wells is explicit about
what she views as the failures of leaders around her:
10
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I look around among those I know, and read up the his
tories of those I do not know, and it seems to me the
interest ceases after self has been provided for. . . . I
would like very much for [the author of a letter to the
editor of the Cleveland Plaindealer] to tell me what ma
terial benefit is a "leader" if he does not, to some extent,
devote his time, talent and wealth to the alleviation of
the poverty and misery, and elevation of his people?l l
Once again, Wells took a chance in publishing this material, in
tended for a Black audience, in a local Black church venue in Memphis,
The Living Way. One might be tempted to say that Wells gives new
meaning to the phrase "democratic voice" when she, as a young woman
and a comparatively unknown person in her community, attempts to cas
tigate others who are very much her senior and have much more prestige
and power. Although contemporary political philosophy, in a Rawlsian
vein, invites us to think of a society in which we do not originally know
our place, and then to hypothesize about its requirements, few would
imagine themselves as a young woman of color in a society that had only
recently abolished slavery. And yet, if one were to hypothesize along
these lines, the activity level of someone like Ida would be a goal at
which to aim.
III
It might prove instructive to compare Wells ' s work and thought to
that of another prominent nineteenth-century B lack thinker, Anna Julia
Cooper. Although there is no question that Cooper' s work was progres
sive, it is probably a mistake to think of Cooper as someone who out
shines Wells, or who puts Wells in her shadow. Cooper wrote on a
number of topics, and is the author of essays such as "What We are
Worth, " and "Woman v s . the Indian, " which at least some contemporary

authors find radical. 1 2 But there is a strain in Cooper that is elitist, class
bound, and not always friendly to the poverty-stricken B lack woman
who, at least toward the end of the century, was most likely to be a
sharecropper in the deep South. Cooper frequently writes as if most of
her audience (and statistically speaking, this may well have been the
case) were upper-middle class Blacks whose main concern was which
school their daughter could attend, and whether she could receive an edu
cation on a par with that of the better-off young Black men of her time.
In the essays to be found in A Voice From the South, she uses such
11
12
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phrases as "I ask the men and women . . . that they give the girls a
chance ! " and "The three R ' s , a little music and a good deal of danc
ing . . . are quite enough generally to render charming any woman . . . " 1 3
These comments were made at a time when, as Cooper well knew, most
young B lack women were not able to go to school at all.
.

Wells experienced no such influence of class. Because of the fact
that Wells came from a background that was itself a poverty-stricken
one, Wells had no difficulty identifying with sharecroppers, small-time
farmers or laborers. Indeed, Wells had herself experienced interrupted
schooling when she cared for her younger brothers and sisters for several
years after the death of her parents, and slavery was still in force at the
time that Wells was born. An idea of democracy, then, can be instanti
ated in many ways-or one can attempt to do work toward its instantia
tion following a variety of paths. Anna Julia Cooper took the unusual
route of recommending for young Black women what many of the white
suffragists were attempting to recommend for young white women inso
far as formal education was concerned; what she had in mind was a cur
riculum that paralleled that available to young men (to be sure, not many
young B lack men did themselves have access to such levels of education,
although a few did) . Wells, however, took a different path. She tried to
work with members of the community who, statistically speaking, repre
sented the bulk of the group, and she tried to assist them in obtaining the
services, goods, and education that they could reasonably expect to
achieve at that time. Ironically, in some circles Cooper' s name presently
has greater resonance-but that may well be because we have difficulty
understanding what America was like in the nineteenth century . It is
Wells ' s work, after all , that represents the Deweyan force of
democratization.
In addition to her writings on lynching and her work in Chicago, Ida
B . Wells also authored some other material that sheds light on the com
plexity of her thought. In a piece titled "lola on Discrimination," she
wrote: "Consciously and unconsciously we do as much to widen the
breach already existing and to keep prej Udice alive as the other race. " 1 4

What Wells meant was that every time members of the B lack population
requested special accommodation-even if it was largely to avoid har
assment from the white population-they fed into the underlying belief
systems, and forwarded ideas that meant, ultimately, further lack of pro
gress. Wells had noticed that this sort of mindset took place in Visalia,
where the small Black population itself was at least partly responsible for
1 3 Anna Julia Cooper,
pp. 72, 7 5 .
14
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the separate school, and she saw it under many other sets of
circumstances.
Clearly, when comparing Wells to Cooper, or examining Wells ' s
overall work with an eye toward her main goal, one can see that Wells
always championed the downtrodden and, indeed, often failed to identify
with the small group of better-off Blacks. If democratization as a pro
cess means that more and more individuals are eventually enfranchised,
Wells was able to retain this as a goal, and she did not lose sight of its
importance. At a time when Blacks in the North could vote-and many
did-Wells would not have been particularly interested in the questions
of education and class posed by Cooper, since it is clear that they had
little to do with the reality of life for many Blacks throughout the nation.
Thus it is paradoxical that Cooper has been seen by some as more of a
champion of her people than Wells, because although both women wrote
extensively, much of Cooper' s writing does not really address the needs
of the vast majority of Blacks. The children of Vi salia were in some
sense lucky to attend school at all-and that is a fact of which Ida B .
Wells would not have been unaware.
In sum, Wells envisaged an America where the changes wrought by
the Civil War and the various constitutional amendments that accompa
nied it genuinely amounted to something, and one of her primary con
cerns had to do with voting and civil rights for the B lack populace.
Although Wells was well aware of the Jim Crow laws, such as poll taxes ,
that prevented Blacks from voting i n the South, her concerns had t o do
with those who could vote in the North, and whether or not they were
aware of their rights and were able to exercise them. In this, Wells
showed herself to be an ardent Constitutionalist, and, as we have said, a
virtuous spirit whose tireless work for others brings to mind many of the
characterizations of the ancients about the best sorts of personalities. In
sofar as young women were concerned, Wells was very much ahead of
her time, because although she was not primarily interested in women' s
suffrage (perceived as a movement led largely by whites), she was aware
of the strains placed on young women by the concerns of marriage and
childbearing. Finally, in the spirit of both Addams and Dewey, Wells
was community-oriented, and determined to make good on the various
pledges that might be thought to spring from any community organiza
tion-to help others, render assistance, make stress more tolerable, and
so forth. As has been argued here, this determination showed up early in
Wells , and can be seen throughout her writings in the newly-published
and edited Memphis Diary. 1 5 It is, of course, the case that Wells remains
well-known for her strong writings against lynching, and it was the fear
1 5 At times the reader is tempted to take issue with Wells, who seems almost too outspo
ken for her own good.
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of lynching and various physical attacks that kept many B lacks from us
ing the few rights that they did have, meager though they might have
been at that time. Ida B . Wells tried to make a decided change in these
matters.
IV
I have been arguing that Ida B . Wells was a sharp observer of what
was constitutive of democracy in her time, and that she took a special
effort to try to extend that democracy to the Black population. In addi
tion, I have argued that, more than for most, this tendency to respond to
those left out of the various forms of social activity and greatly in need
was an intrinsic part of her personality that manifested itself at an early
point, as is shown in the diaries she wrote from the age of eighteen on.
Finally, and especially pertinent from the standpoint of philosophy, I
have argued that Wells ' s work embodied the spirit of both Addams and
Dewey, and that it was an attempt to give B lack voice to that spirit.
When we remember the various hands-on tasks accomplished by
Jane Addams, and for which she is famous, we can see still another ver
sion of that spirit in Ida. Ironically, Ida disliked teaching, probably be
cause she was all too aware of the defects of classroom instruction as
pointed out by Dewey in The School and Society. We can recall the
passages in which Dewey displayed bewilderment at the students sitting
in rows of desks; this same feature is most likely what drove Ida out of
the classroom. But what she did outside of her teaching activities is what
she is most noted for, and her attempts not only to write effectively but to
organize the lives of young men in particular, especially in Chicago,
were quite remarkable. Those who worked with Addams remember her
lack of condescension; Ida B. Wells was another such person. 16 We can
gues s that commentary made about her work after her life had ended
would be similar to rather glowing commentary left about Addams.
Why be concerned about the work of Ida B . Wells today? After all,
it could be argued, the goals for which she worked were met years ago,
and she is simply too far back in time for her trajectory to speak to u s
now. Although it is accurate to say that the bulk of what Ida worked for
was accomplished in the 1 960' s-the Civil Rights Act and the Voting
Rights Act, to name two pieces of legislation that are related to her
work-it is more the spirit of what Ida did that is relevant. Ida B. Wells
was an unstoppable force, and she refused to quit even when she was
presented with what would appear to an outside as overwhelming obsta
cles. Her newspaper office was burned down shortly after she wrote the
16 Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Pragmatism
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 996.
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editorial that blamed many Black/white relationships on white women,
but Wells kept on working, although she moved to the East Coast and
then to Chicago. Many of her efforts in Chicago did not at first bear
fruit, and her tendency to be a "do-gooder," particularly where individu
als ' daily lives were concerned, led to ridicule and condemnation in
many instances . We can only hazard a guess, for example, as to how
many young Black men did not want to be saved from the pool hall, and
would have preferred to be left to their own devices.
But the beliefs that led to her early writings, such as "lola on Dis
crimination," held in good stead throughout her life, and she never wa
vered from them. For Wells, the forces of democratization could not be
tapped or put into place unless enormous effort was made, and she was
willing to make the effort. Time spent away from the pool hall might be
spent reading or leafletting-Wells had plans for the young individuals
whose lives she hoped to alter. She knew that only a committed and
determined citizenry could make a difference at the ballot box, even
when voting became the norm. Those democratic ideals are more than
useful to us today.

THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF CHAMORRO
CULTURAL PRESERVATION IN GUAM , U.S.A.

Maria-Elena D. Diaz
University of Oklahoma

The island of Guam shares with many Pacific islands, and other
areas with indigenous people, a history of foreign encroachment, popula
tion devastation and renewal as well as political, economic, and cultural
transformations in the context of the development of the capitalist global
economy in the modern-world system (e.g. Carrano and Sanchez 1 965 ;
Sanchez 1 98 8 ; Kame' eleihiwa 1 992 ; Rogers 1 995 ; Trask 1 999; Waller
stein 2004) . Guam is about 209 square miles, 33 miles long, and 1 2
miles at its widest point (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009). The nearness
of Asia gives this American territory a strong Eastern influence through
the people and products that make their way to this small, but geopoliti
cally important location almost eight hours from Hawaii and three hours
from the Philippines by air travel. Surviving near annihilation under
Spanish rule, brutal Japanese occupation during World War II, and
American liberation that further devastated then modernized the island,
the Chamorro people (the descendants of the indigenous inhabitants of
the island who also identify as Guamanian) l have been largely patriotic
to the United States since before the United States Congress passed the
Organic Act in 1 950, which granted island residents American citizen
ship. The largest and most southern of the Mariana Islands in the west
ern Pacific Ocean, Guam serves as the commercial and military hub of
Micronesia today, one of three cultural regions along with Polynesia and
Melanesia that comprise Oceania (Carrano and Sanchez 1 965 ; Rogers
1 995; Warheit 20 1 0) .
I n the last quarter o f the twentieth century, Chamorros lost their
majority status in the island, as non-Chamorros residents began to out
number Chamorros. Moreover, a large diaspora, outnumbering Chamor
ros in Guam, lives in the United States mainland today (Bureau of
Statistics and Plans 20 1 2b) . Under American rule, immigration from Mi
cronesia and Asia has brought together people from many diverse cul
tures that now make their home in Guam. Some arrive with financial
resources, American cultural capital-including English skills and higher
education; others arrive with very little, including limited or no English
1 For the sake of clarity, "Guamanian" will be used in this paper to refer to residents of
Guam, while "Chamorro" will be used to refer to descendants of the indigenous island people.
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skills . In addition to the impact on the local infrastructure and economy,
this influx of peoples brings multiple cultural orientations simultaneously
into the island community. A major military build-up has begun to ac
commodate the eventual removal of United States military troops from
Okinawa (Conerly 20 1 4) . While Chamorros are generally supportive of
United States military needs, many are concerned about the ramifications
of these activities to the indigenous culture and people (Harden 20 1 0 ;
Warheit 20 1 0 ; Weaver 20 1 Oa,b) . Outside o f Guam and some United
States military families, most Americans continue to be unaware of this
homeland of the Chamorro people due to its small size and relative isola
tion up until World War II. Since then, Guam has become an increas
ingly important United States military strategic location that provides
access to Asia, and is often referred to as "the tip of the spear" (Sanchez
1 98 8 ; Department of Interior 20 1 4) . United States foreign policy, in
cluding the current development of Guam as a forward base in the Pa
cific, greatly impacts island residents and constrains efforts toward
Chamorro self-determination and cultural preservation. This article pro
vides a case study of Guam through a broad survey of historical influ
ences on the indigenous Chamorro culture, a description of the island' s
contemporary multicultural diversity, and a consideration of some of the
current geopolitical and socioeconomic challenges to Chamorro culture
in the place "where America' s day begins." 2
HISTORICAL INFLUENCES ON CHAMORRO CULTURE IN GUAM3

Indigenous Chamorros

Ancient Chamorros, the indigenous people of Guam, are believed to
be descended from seafaring people from Southeast Asia who migrated
to the islands perhaps as far back as 1 500 B .C . In the pre-European con
tact era, the local economy was self-sustaining through farming and fish
ing, and Chamorros lived abundantly off the land and sea. Ancient
Chamorros practiced communal systems of land tenure, worshiped the
spirits of their ancestors, and revered the natural environment. Ancient
Chamorro society was matrilineal, with kinship ties and land ownership
traced through women, and afforded women a prominent role in their
families and communities . Indigenous women were attributed with pro
tecting the culture, perpetuating the language, and preserving a
Chamorro identity through the centuries (Carrano and Sanchez 1 965 ;
Sanchez 1 98 8 ; Rogers 1 995 ; Political Status Education Coordinating
Commission [PSECC] 1 996).
2 Refers to Guam ' s location as the most western point of the United States, situated on
the western side of the International Date Line.
3 Detailed histories of Guam include: Thompson 1 947; Carrano and Sanchez 1 964;
Sanchez 1 98 8 ; Rogers 1 995 .
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The basic unit of social organization was families or clans. Island
ers lived in villages, several of which constituted a district. Each district
was administered by a council of village leaders. Within a gendered di
vision of labor, women played a dominant role in the home, and high
ranking women participated in governing district councils . Thus, high
ranking women wielded power and were treated with deference and re
spect (Carrano and Sanchez 1 965 ; Sanchez 1 98 8 ; Rogers 1 995 ; PSECC
1 996).

Central to Chamorro culture during this era was a set of values that
constituted inaJa 'maolek, a way of living that continues to inform con
temporary Chamorro culture (Sanchez 1 98 8 ; PSECC 1 996; Pacific Daily
News December 25, 20 1 1 ) . Integral to inaJa 'maolek is the belief that
people need to be good to each other to live happily and in harmony.
Therefore, showing respect to each other, elders, and leaders is highly
valued, along with respect for ancestors and nature. Chamorros are ex
pected to be generous with each other and visitors, and to provide assis
tance, or chenchule ', during celebrations and times of crises (Sanchez
1 988). To be greedy is considered to be tai mahmah ' lao, or without
shame, and indicates a poor upbringing (PSECC 1 996). Kostumbren
Chamorro (Chamorro cultural practices) permitted Chamorros in the Ma
riana Islands to live in relative harmony. The occasional clan or village
conflict that led to violence ended after the loss of just a few fighters
(Carrano and Sanchez 1 965 ) .
Spanish Influence

More than 200 years before European landings in the better known
Polynesian Islands, such as the Hawaiian Islands, Spanish explorer Fer
dinand Magellan landed in Guam in 1 52 1 . The arrival of Magellan
marked the first European encounter with the Pacific Islands, followed
by foreign domination in every island society in Oceania over the next
several centuries. Cultural conflict marked encounters between Wes
terners and Pacific Islanders. For example, as part of inaJa 'maolek and
chenchule ' , Chamorros shared food and possessions freely, and expected
the same from visitors. When Chamorros helped themselves to pieces of
iron and a row boat from Magellan' s ship, perhaps perceived as reciproc
ity by the islanders who provided abundantly for the sickly crew upon
their arrival, an angry Magellan burned many huts and killed several
men. Afterwards, Magellan named the Mariana Islands, Islas de los
Ladrones, Islands of Thieves (Sanchez 1 98 8 ; Rogers 1 995).
Guam endured over 3 00 years of Spanish rule from 1 5 65 to 1 898
(Carrano and Sanchez 1 965 ; Rogers 1 995). As the largest of the Mariana
Islands chain, Guam was the center of Spanish colonization in the Pa
cific. More than a century would past after laying claim to Guam before
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Spanish administrators began to actively colonize the island (Sanchez
1 98 8 ) . Lying along the trade route between Mexico and the Philippines,
the island initially was a source of provisions for occasional Spanish
traders, and then later European whalers and other ships passing through
the Pacific Ocean (Carrano and Sanchez 1 965 ; Rogers 1 995). Occasion
ally, Carolinians, another Micronesian people, also visited Guam' s
shores for trade, as they did in the pre-contact era. Nonetheless, these
were rare events and Guam remained relatively isolated under Spanish
rule.
Early Spanish and other European visitors to the island provided
accounts of early Chamorros . The portrayal of the indigenous people
varied, depending on the observers and the type of relationship they en
tered into with Chamorros. Some witnesses described them as sociable,
proud, clever, loving, hardworking, playful, and peaceful, with strong
physiques and a pleasing appearance (Carrano and Sanchez 1 965 ;
Thompson in Sanchez 1 9 8 8 ; Rogers 1 995). They were observed to raise
their children gently-even scolding with loving words, to care for sick
family members and neighbors, and to communally build and repair
homes. Chamorros enjoyed gathering in their villages for celebrations
and feasts, and welcomed those from other villages. Other traders , who
believed themselves stuck with the short end of a deal, described them as
deceitful. When angered, Chamorros could become vengeful and willing
to fight.
The Spanish influence on the Chamorro people was pervasive. The
indigenous people learned the Spanish language and incorporated Span
ish foods and customs into the Chamorro culture. Another maj or influ
ence was the introduction of Roman Catholicism (Carrano and Sanchez
1 965 ; S anchez 1 98 8 ; Rogers 1 995 ; PSECC 1 996) . In the age of Euro
pean exploration, missionaries frequently traveled to unknown lands to
convert people to Christianity. In Guam, Jesuit priests, under the leader
ship of Padre San Vitores, started the first permanent mission in 1 668.
As efforts increased to convert Chamorros to Christianity and to change
more of their customs, Chamorros rebelled. After several decades of
fighting to remove the Spanish from Guam, and even longer exposure to
Western diseases, Chamorros, especially the men, were nearly annihi
lated by the end of the seventeenth century. A people of over 50,000
earlier in the century had been reduced to less than 4,000 by 1 700 (Car
rano and Sanchez 1 965 ; Sanchez 1 988).
The Catholic Church gained a prominent role in the religious and
cultural practices of Chamorros, providing opportunities for education,
language preservation, social cohesion, and the perpetuation of core
Chamorro values ; an influence which continues today (Sanchez 1 98 8 ;
Rogers 1 995). Although limiting the pastoral participation o f women,
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the Church promoted family and culture, including the Chamorro lan
guage, which may explain its continued influence. Despite not being
able to serve as priests, women played prominent leadership roles in
church organizations and activities.
During the Spanish era, island women were credited with the pres
ervation of the Chamorro culture and language. High levels of intermar
riage with Spaniards, Filipinos, and Mexicans after the Chamorro
Spanish wars allowed the Chamorro population to increase overtime and
preserve a Chamorro identity-a central component of cultural preserva
tion. Changes to Chamorro culture continued, such as replacing the mat
rilineal system with the practice of male primogeniture inheritance and
assigning children the last names of their fathers. Nonetheless, women
remained the primary influence in the home, where the Chamorro lan
guage continued to be spoken. Guam' s relative isolation from the rest of
the world slowed island development, and likely facilitated the preserva
tion of Chamorro culture in the midst of the turbulent transformation to
Catholicism and adaptation to Spanish rule. Once the Spanish won the
religious battle, Chamorros were generally free to go about their lives of
raising their families and tending to their farms (Sanchez 1 98 8 ; Rogers
1 995 ) .
American Influence

At the end of the Spanish-American War in the late nineteenth cen
tury, the possession of Guam was peacefully passed to the United States
in the Treaty of Paris of 1 89 8 . This meant another culture shock to is
landers. United States Naval administrations implemented the Ameri
canization and modernization of the island. English replaced Spanish as
the language for official business and education, and improvements were
made in healthcare, sanitation, education, and criminal justice (Carrano
and Sanchez 1 965 ) . Since Guam was not an open port, foreign influence
was limited (Rogers 1 995 ) . The early years of American rule were a
time of cultural adaptation and relative isolation from the larger world
community.
Guam' s isolation ended with the onset of World War II. Japanese
forces in the Pacific invaded Guam on December 8, 1 94 1 , and a brutal
Japanese occupation ensued for almost three years. In addition to forcing
the Japanese language and mandatory labor on the island' s residents, the
Japanese military established a savage police force whose abusive prac
tices inflicted mental and physical harm, including the wanton murder of
islanders, especially near the end of the occupation (Sanchez 1 9 8 8 ; Rog
ers 1 995). A devastating invasion by American forces on July 2 1 , 1 944,
removed the Japanese military and led to the eventual end of the war in
the Pacific region. To support the end of the war, the United States Na-
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val Administration on Guam built up the island infrastructure and initi
ated a new era in Guam.
Major changes occurred in a short time period. The post-war mod
ern age brought in aviation and regular mail service to the island, and the
agrarian sustenance economy transformed into a wage economy almost
overnight, with office jobs becoming more available and desirable. In
island politics, Guam' s residents elected thirty-six members to the First
Guam Congress in 1 946, including Rose T. Aguigui, a Merizo Elemen
tary School teacher (Sanchez 1 988). Two years later, she was j oined by
Mariana L.G. Luj an, another educator, in the Second Guam Congress.
B y 1 950, after several petitions, Guamanians were granted American cit
izenship, and limited self-governance under the administration of the
United States Department of the Interior. The long-standing requirement
for a security clearance to travel to Guam was lifted in 1 962 by Execu
tive Order in the Kennedy Administration, which opened the island to
visitors and business investors. Responding to the repeated requests of
Chamorro leaders, the United States permitted the first locally elected
governor in 1 970; however the island government continued to exercise
limited power (Sanchez 1 98 8 ; Rogers 1 995).
The United States federal government and Japanese tourism and
business investors boosted the island economy throughout the second
half of the twentieth century. Business activity increased through the
entrepreneurial activities of Chamorros, Americans, and Japanese. This
fueled an explosion in growth and development, peaking in the late
1 980s, followed by a worldwide recession in the early 1 990s, and recur
ring fiscal problems into the new century influenced in part by global and
American economic conditions. These dynamics transformed island life
in one generation from predominantly rural villages with a strong bar
tering system into a cash-oriented and debt-burdened society with a
strong island culture (Sanchez 1 98 8 ; Rogers 1 995).
Politics and Cultural Preservation

Chamorros have continually requested an improvement in their po
litical relationship with the United States throughout American rule, de
siring increased self-governance and an equal role in determining the
future of the island (Sanchez 1 98 8 ; Rogers 1 995). In 1 960, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and People (Resolution 1 5 1 4 [XV] )
that stated that all people and all nations have the equal right to self
determination. Guam is one of sixteen non self-governing territories re
maining on the United Nations list, and thus remains a colony, subject to
the wishes of the United States (Tolentino 2009b). Consequently, there
is a sense among many Chamorros that Guamanians are second-class
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American citizens, since they don ' t have an equal voice in the American
polity compared to state governments or even compared to other Micro
nesian islands (Warheit 20 1 0 ; Harden 20 l l ) .
During the era o f liberation movements i n the United States i n the
1 970s, Chamorro rights activists expressed their concern about the op
pression of Chamorro culture and loss of political power and land (Rog
ers 1 995 ; Tolentino 2009a) . In the 1 980s, activists succeeded in bringing
the question of Guam ' s political status to the attention of Chamorro re
sidents. Starting in 1 988, island leaders submitted the Guam Common
wealth Act to Congress multiple times, and ended up being denied each
time. Ironically, an earlier 1 975 United States federal inter-agency task
force report recommended this political status for the island, which the
Department of Interior kept hidden from island leaders (Willens and Bal
lendorf 2008). However, several issues, such as control of the land, im
migration, and military expansion, blocked progress in negotiations on
commonwealth status, as did federal concerns over allowing only
Chamorros to vote on the island' s political status (Quimby 2009). For
Chamorros, this was an obvious affront to their right to self-determina
tion, as articulated by the 1 960 United Nations resolution on decoloniza
tion, in order to protect United States military interests in the region.
Federal authority in Guam' s political aspirations is a clear indicator of
the island' s continued colonial status.
Control of land is another contentious issue that continually
resurfaces in politics, especially since the federal government controls
almost a third of the land (Warheit 20 1 0; Weaver 20 1 Oa,b) . Moreover,
as a United States territory whose value is in national defense, the mili
tary can claim additional land in the interests of national security through
eminent domain. Today, this is one of many concerns as the residents of
Guam, and Chamorros in particular, undergo a United States military
build-up. Contemporary geopolitics suggests that the needs of the
United States military will continue to dictate the outcome of land dis
putes, and dominate the outcome of any renegotiation in political status.
Chamorros recognize that in addition to land, language provides a
strong foundation for cultural preservation (Perez 2005) . Yet, English
replaced Chamorro as the main language in the majority of island homes
by 1 970 (Rogers 1 995). Taking steps to counteract the decline of
Chamorro language usage, the Government of Guam (GovGuam) made
both English and Chamorro the official languages of the island in 1 972.
Further, a Chamorro language and cultural studies program was intro
duced into the public education system in the 1 970s, championed by Dr.
Katherine B . Aguon, Guam' s first Chamorro woman to earn a Ph.D. and
serve as director of education and vice-speaker of the Guam Legislature
(Sanchez 1 98 8 ; "GovGuam News" 2007). Yet only 43 percent of
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Chamorros, five years o f age and older indicate i n the 20 1 0 Census that
they speak Chamorro in the home (Bureau of Statistics and Plans 20 1 2a) .
Consequently, recent legislation requires the extension of public school
education in Chamorro studies through the tenth grade by the 20 1 4-20 1 5
academic year (Public Law 3 1 -45 , Substitute B ill 95-3 1 ) .
CONTEMPORARY MULTICULTURAL DIVERSITY

From the pre-World War II period to the end of the twentieth cen
tury, Guam' s population grew exponentially. The Chamorro population
increased over 300 percent, from about 20,000 to over 65 ,000 (Chamor
ros alone and more than one race) . In the same period, the total Gaum
population grew seven-fold from over 22,000 to almost 1 55 ,000 people.
Consequently, by 1 980 Chamorros no longer represented the maj ority of
island residents, but continued to be the largest ethno-racial group. The
breakdown of the population by Chamorros and non-Chamorros from
1 940-20 1 0 is provided in the following table.
TABLE 1 . POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS FOR GUAM FROM 1 940-20 1 0
C hamorros ( alone or in combo)

Total Population

1940

20,177 (91%)

22,290

1960

34,762 (52%)

67,044

1970*

47,598 (56%)

84,996

1980

47, 845 (45%)

105,979

1990

57,648 (43 %)

133 ,154

2000* *

65,243 (42%)

154,805

2010* * *

69,09 8 (43 %)

159,358

Source: Table 2 : Population of Guam, 1 940- 1 990 (Rogers 1 995 : 27 3 ) .
* From Sanchez 1 98 8 : 369. * * From Table DP-OI Profile o f General Demographic
Characteristics for Guam (Guam Department of Commerce 2002). Total represents 57,297
Chamorro alone and 7,946 Chamorro and other combinations. * * * From Table GU8 : Ethnic
Origin or Race (Bureau of Statistics and Plans 20 1 2a) . Total represents 59,3 8 1 Chamorros
alone and 9,7 1 7 Chamorros and other combinations.

Asian immigrants, predominantly from the Philippines but also
from Korea, China, and Japan, added to the island population throughout
the second half of the twentieth century. Many arrived with families to
pursue economic opportunities. Part of the growth in population was
also due to the signing of the Compacts of Free Association between the
United States and the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the
Marshalls, and the Republic of Palau in 1 986. The Compacts permitted
residents of these island-nations free entry to Guam, and many immi
grated with their families from these economically depressed island com
munities (Rogers 1 995).
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While Chamorros continue to have a significant island presence, the
tremendous changes throughout the twentieth century have led to the de
velopment of a multicultural, ethnically diverse society. Among those
who reported membership in a single group in the 20 1 0 United States
Census, the largest ethno-racial groups in the island population, in de
creasing order, are Chamorros (59,3 8 1 ), Filipinos (4 1 ,944), and Whites
( 1 1 ,3 1 2) (Bureau of Statistics and Plans 20 l 2a) . Other Pacific Islanders,
predominantly Micronesians from Chuuk ( 1 1 ,230), Palau (2,563), and
Pohnpei (2,248), collectively constitute a larger number than Whites;
while other Asians-predominantly Koreans (3,437), Chinese (2,368),
and Japanese (2,368)-are just slightly smaller in number. The follow
ing table shows the population distributions by maj or racial and ethnic
groups.
TABLE 2 : POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS FOR MAJOR ETHNIC
AND RACIAL GROUPS, GUAM 20 1 0
Other
Chamorros

Total

Pacific

Other

Filipinos

Whites

Islanders

Asians

4 1 ,944

1 1 ,3 2 1

1 9,20 1

9,437

26

7

12

6

59,3 8 1
(69,098
alone and
in combo)

%

of total

population

37

(43)

Sources: Table GU8 Ethnic Origin or Race (Bureau of Statistics and Plans 20 l 2a) .
Note: Total population is 1 59,358

One indicator of relative ethno-racial harmony in the island is the
number of residents who identify as having more than one race. In the
20 1 0 Census, 9 percent of Guamanians identify as having more than one
race, compared to the national rate of just 3 percent (Bureau of Statistics
and Plans 20 1 2a). Among this subpopulation, 65 percent identify as
Chamorro and some other race, and over half identify as Asian and some
other race; among Chamorros, the rate is 1 4 percent (U. S . Census Bureau
20 1 2) . A final measure of the island' s multiculturalism is language us
age in the home. Among those five years of age and older, the majority
of all ethno-racial groups, with the exception of Whites and Chamorros
(45 percent), speak a language other than English in the home. Thus,
Guam' s ethno-racial diversity exists in a social context of multicultural
ism, where Chamorro and American cultures are the predominant influ
ences and Chamorros remain the largest ethno-racial group.
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CHALLENGES FACING CHAMORROS

In the twenty-first century, Chamorros face several challenges that
are likely to influence the Chamorro way of life. These include continu
ing economic instability, the ramifications from immigration due to the
Compacts of Free Association, and the United States military build-up.
How these challenges are addressed may be critical for Chamorro cul
tural preservation.
Economic Instability

Many forces influence the economy of Guam, including macro fac
tors-such as globalization, the strength of the American economy, and
American foreign policy-and local factors, especially fiscal manage
ment practices and commitment to education quality. While island lead
ers have little control over macro factors, like the global recession of
2008 (International Monetary Fund 2009), there are issues that island
leaders can address to reduce government debt and booster Guam' s
economy.
As a United States trust territory and strategic military location,
Guam' s economy has benefitted from infusions of federal monies and
proj ects to maintain a level of military readiness. With most government
revenue the result of federal aid and tourism industries (Rogers 1 995 ;
B ureau of Labor Statistics 2009), GovGuam has been the largest em
ployer of the civilian population in the modern era. Although the propor
tion of government has slightly declined in recent decades: In 1 980,
GovGuam employed 27 percent (9,056) of the civilian workforce (Rog
ers 1 99 5 ) ; in the 20 1 0 Census, this ratio dropped to 24 percent (Bureau
of Statistics and Plans 20 1 2a) .
I n addition t o employing a significant proportion o f the island popu
lation, GovGuam has frequently been accused of living beyond its
means. Many island residents have called for an end to chronic govern
ment overspending and increased efficiency in the management of re
sources (e.g. Limtiaco 20 1 1 a; Pacific Daily News July 26, 20 1 1 , January
29, 20 1 4) . For example, although the current administration claims to
have fixed an over $300 million deficit, budget problems were addressed
with bond-borrowing, which becomes a burden for future generations
(Pacific Daily News 20 1 4a) . In the meantime, island residents complain
about critical shortages in the provision of public services, such as educa
tion, healthcare, and public safety, while payments to vendors and even
government agencies are often delayed (Daleno 20 1 4 ; Pacific Daily
News 20 1 4a,b) . Despite these financial challenges, politicians recently
passed pay raises for GovGuam employees during an election year; a
political tactic used successfully by another administration in the 1 980s
(Pac�fic Daily News 20 1 4b).

20 1 2]

C HAM ORRO CULTURAL PRESERVATION IN GUAM, U.S .A.

III

Ethno-racial stratification in a dual lahar market

In addition to being perceived as a political bribe - a consequence
of across-the-board raises- is an increase in inequality in an already
bifurcated economy. The dual labor market divides Guam' s workers into
the haves and have-nots, with primary sector workers earning good sala
ries with benefits, and workers in the secondary sector making low
wages and struggling to make ends meet. Comparing socioeconomic
outcomes across ethno-racial groups reveals an ethno-racial hierarchy of
income and educational attainment. On average, Chamorros, Whites,
and Filipinos experience higher levels of socioeconomic attainment,
while Micronesians have the lowest levels. In the 20 1 0 U . S . Census
Guam Cross-Tabulations, the median household income in Guam is
$48,274. This increases to $49,327 for Filipinos, $50,362 for Chamorros
alone, $62,389 for Whites . All other major ethnoracial groups are below
the median, and in decreasing order include other Asians ($46,250),
Koreans ($34,955), other Pacific Islanders ($32,994), and Chuukese
($2 1 ,427) .
Human capital models o f income attainment generally apply t o is
land patterns of socioeconomic integration: Higher education and En
glish skills are correlated with higher income. Among those 1 8 years of
age and older in the 20 1 0 U . S . Census, 79 percent of Guamanians have
high school degrees and 1 8 percent have a bachelor' s degree. Whites
have the highest rate of educational attainment: 97 percent have a high
school degree and 34 percent have a bachelor' s degree. Among Filipinos,
82 percent are high school graduates and 25 percent have a bachelor' s
degree, while 7 5 percent of Chamorros are high school graduates and 1 1
percent have a bachelor' s degree. For Koreans and other Asians the
comparable rates for a high school degree are 84 percent and 80 percent,
respectively, and 20 percent and 25 percent for a bachelor' s degree.
While the educational attainment rates for other Pacific Islanders drops
to 69 percent for a high school degree and 5 percent for a bachelor' s
degree, only 54 percent of Chuukese have a high school degree, and 2
percent have a bachelor' s degree.
The higher than average educational and income attainment rate of
Whites is likely due to migration from the continental United States to
pursue professional opportunities in the island economy. In addition,
Whites constitute 6 percent of the GovGuam workforce and 1 8 percent
of the local federal workforce, both of which provide on average higher
pay than private sector jobs (Daleno 20 1 4a). Although Chamorros have
education rates lower than Whites, Filipinos, Koreans, and other Asians,
they have the second highest household income levels, right behind
Whites. Their higher household income levels are likely due to the
higher proportion of Chamorros in GovGuam j obs (64 percent of

1 12

ETHNIC STUDIES REVIEW

[Vol. 35 : 1 0 1

GovGuam employees) and federal j obs (42 percent o f federal employ
ees) . Filipinos, with their above average income and educational attain
ment rates are also well-represented in government j obs, with 2 1 percent
of GovGuam positions and 2 1 percent of federal j obs. Among Asians,
many likely arrive to the island to fill shortages in professional positions,
and with more financial resources than most Pacific Islander immigrants .
For both Asians and other Pacific Islanders, limited English skills likely
lower household incomes.
Ironically, Chamorros are also well-represented among those at the
lower end of the socioeconomic hierarchy . In the 20 l O U . S . Census, the
poverty rate for all individuals in Guam is 23 percent, and for Chamorros
alone is 24 percent. The only ethnoracial groups with higher poverty
rates are other Pacific islanders at 4 1 percent and Chuukese at 63 per
cent. Whites have the lowest poverty rate (8 percent) , followed by other
Asians ( 1 2 percent), Filipinos ( 1 4 percent), and Koreans (20 percent) .
Among those sixteen years of age and older, the island unemployment
rate for those seeking work in the civilian labor force is 8 percent in the
20 l O Census. Among Chamorros, the unemployment rate is l O percent,
while 23 percent of Chuukese and 1 3 percent of other Pacific Islanders
are also unemployed at rates higher than the island average. Ethno-racial
groups with unemployment rates below the island average include Filipi
nos and Whites at 5 percent, Koreans at 4 percent, and other Asians at 3
percent. In part, the higher than average poverty and unemployment
rates for Chamorros may be due to slightly below average levels of edu
cational attainment and a higher reservation wage, the lowest w age a
worker would be willing to accept for a particular j ob . Some Chamorros
may prefer to live off the land than work in the secondary sector, and
many can rely on extensive family networks to help alleviate some of the
'
most difficult consequences of poverty and unemployment. Nonetheless,
clearly not all Guamanians are economically well-off, with some sub
populations experiencing comparatively high rates of poverty and unem
ployment. This creates a situation whereby some island residents may
desire economic growth, whatever the cost, which can pose a challenge
to cultural preservation.

Opportunities for Economic Development
Into the foreseeable future, the largest sources of revenue for the
island economy may continue to be federal expenditures and tourism.
Federal assistance to the island is likely to continue at high levels, espe
cially in light of the current United States military build-up. Tourism,
predominantly from Japan, continues to be promoted with the goal of
increasing annual visitors from 1 . 3 million to 2 million annually in the
next six years (Daleno 20 1 4b). While this contributes to the economy,
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most new jobs will be in the low-paying service sector. Beyond this,
political leaders are also promoting the island as a good place for inves
tors to many of its neighbors in Asia (Thompson 20 1 1 ) .
Entrepreneurship i s a viable option that could b e more fully ex
ploited. Ideally, GovGuam ' s economic stimulus efforts will also include
increasing support for small business development programs, with the
provision of financial resources and expertise to island residents who can
than pursue local business niches, and perhaps even participate in the
global market. The potential for increased local entrepreneurship and
exports can be supported by the University of Guam and Guam Commu
nity College, who play key roles in providing educational instruction to
prepare students to be successful in the workforce.
Economic growth and diversification are important to economic
health, and players in the today ' s global economy are well-educated.
Continuing commitment to higher education and partnerships with the
private sector will provide opportunities for Guam ' s residents to obtain
the skills and knowledge to pursue economic opportunities in the private
sector. In order for residents to be prepared to take advantage of eco
nomic opportunities, the island community must insist that quality public
education-from pre-school through postsecondary education-is avail
able to all capable residents. Education budgets cannot be allowed to
become victims of budget deficits.
Impact from Compacts of Free Association

In the midst of economic challenges in Guam, immigration from
Micronesia and Asia is likely to continue, since Guam is the core econ
omy in Micronesia and a gateway to the United States from Asia. The
Compacts of Free Association (CFA) signed in 1 986 between the United
States and other Micronesian nation-states-the Republic of the Marshall
Islands (FAS), the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of
Palau-fuels immigration to Guam. The number of Micronesian immi
grants nearly doubled between 2003 and 2008, from 9,83 1 to 1 8,305
(Limtiaco 20 1 1 b). In the 20 1 0 Census, other Micronesians are 1 0 per
cent of the local population, and make up one-fourth of the foreign-born
population on Guam (Bureau of Statistics and Plans 20 1 2a. ) .
Some come t o Guam t o pursue a n education, and all hope t o im
prove their lives. However, islanders often arrive with little human or
financial capital, or transferable skills . Over 70 percent of Micronesians
report speaking a language other than English at home (Bureau of Statis
tic and Plans 20 1 2a) . Consequently, growth in this population has in
creased the burden on already strained public services, including
education, health care, public safety and social services (Sobeck 20 1 3) .
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Although Guam i s the most common destination for Micronesian
immigrants (Bureau of Statistics and Plans 20 1 2b), federal impact reim
bursement for costs from Micronesian immigration has been a fraction of
reported expenses. From 2004-20 1 2, the Governor of Guam reported
$559 million in expenses on services for compact immigrants. Only a
fraction of the costs through 20 1 1 , about $ 1 1 9 million of $44 1 million,
has been paid (Sobek 20 1 3) . During Congressional discussions of the
Compact agreements, concerns about their impact on receiving islands
were raised. Consequently, reimbursement at higher rates may be forth
coming as the national economy improves. Some of these infrastructure
issues may also be addressed through the military build-up, as local lead
ers work to mitigate negative or unintended consequences from an in
creased military presence.
Shortchanging island residents can influence community relations
with Micronesian immigrants if these Pacific Islanders are perceived as a
burden or a threat, and are marginalized instead of socially integrated in
productive ways (Aguirre and Turner 2007) . Relatively harmonious
ethno-racial relations can shift into ethno-racial conflict in the competi
tion over scarce resources in times of economic uncertainty and rela
tively high levels of immigration (Olzak 1 992). When subpopulations
are treated as social outsiders, this contributes to a myriad of social dys
functions, including ethno-racial conflict, which affect the entire island
community (Allport 1 979 [ 1 954] ) .
United States Military Build-up

The Obama Administration ' s has stated the importance of the Pa
cific in American foreign policy and its commitment to the Guam mili
tary build-up (Feller 20 1 1 ; Pacific Daily News 20 1 1 b ; Thompson 20 1 2) .
This will inject cash into the local economy, increase the island popula
tion, and present additional challenges to the people of Guam and the
preservation of the Chamorro culture (Harden 20 1 0; Warheit 20 1 0 ;
Weaver 20 1 0a,b) .

Although the initial agreement between the United

States. and Japan to transfer troops out of Okinawa was scheduled to be
completed in 20 1 4, the build-up has proceeded more slowly due to a
recovering United States economy and local concerns about the build
up ' s impact on the island community (Daleno 20 1 4c) . Now scheduled to
be completed by 20 1 8, the military build-up on Guam will bring about
5 ,000 Marines and their families, and tens of thousands of workers to the
island during infrastructure development (Harden 20 1 0; Weaver 20 1 Oa,b ;
Conerly 20 1 4 ; Daleno 20 1 4c) . Population pressures from an influx of
people may create social problems if the growth is not properly and sen
sitively managed (Harden 20 1 0) . Even beyond the social dysfunctions
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that may emerge from a population surge, there are other concerns asso
ciated with an increased military presence.
Chief among these concerns include the potential for an increase in
crime from a larger military population, especially those of a domestic or
sexual nature, but also an increase in property crime from increasing
levels of inequality and higher rates of poverty (Lutz and Cristobal 2007 ;
Kirk 2008; Lutz 20 1 0) . There are also environmental and health impacts
from military activities to consider (Kirk 2008; Lutz 20 1 0 ; Women for
Genuine Security 20 1 0) ; including the likelihood that Guam becomes a
more attractive military target in the case of warfare. Further, imagined
or real threats to Chamorro culture from a larger military presence could
easily translate into ethno-racial conflicts without attention to the needs
and concerns of island residents (Lutz and Cristobal 2007 ; Women for
Genuine Security 20 1 0) . Federal, military, and local leaders need to be
intentional in creating harmonious relations between military families,
personnel, and island residents.
Other considerations include an increasing strain on the island' s al
ready overburdened infrastructure. These include the costs of improving
the delivery of electricity and water, and the disposal of wastes for a
much larger population; as well as the capacity to provide education,
healthcare, and public safety with declining budget shortages and in
creasing government debt (Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
2008; Pincus 2009 ; Lutz 20 1 0) . An increase in the general cost of living,
as well as in land prices and housing, will likely be additional outcomes
of military expansion (Lutz 20 1 0) . On the other hand, an infusion of
money through military projects, jobs to support the build-up (although
most will be temporary), and the settling in of military families up
through 20 1 8 are likely to create opportunities for local residents and
funds for government coffers, as some local leaders assert. It is also
likely that most of the permanent jobs created by this expansion will be
in the lower-paying service sector, which would increase income ine

quality in the dual labor market of the island, and local elites will benefit
the most from military expansion (Lutz 20 1 0) . The slowdown may pro
vide island leaders with an opportunity to more thoroughly consider all
the likely consequences of becoming a forward base in United States
foreign policy and respond accordingly.
CHAMORRO CULTURE IN THE TWENTy-FIRST CENTURY

Despite these multiple challenges, Chamorros have created an infra
structure to promote cultural preservation through island institutions,
commitment of resources, and cultural participation. Local institutions
play a major role in preserving Chamorro culture in the face of pervasive
American influence and high levels of multiculturalism. For example, as
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i n the past, the Catholic Church continues to play an important role in
cultural preservation, with 85 percent of islanders ide ntifie d as Roman
Catholics (Central Intelligence Agency 1 999) . The i sland' s year-round
village fiestas in honor of patron saints are a good e x ample of how
Chamorro cultural values of bringing people to ge ther and being good to
each other are preserved through the Catholic Church (gu amp edi a .co mJ
fiestas/) .
Cultural participation and commitment of resources to maintaining a
Chamorro culture are critical to cultural preservation. Within G ov G uam
is a Department of Chamorro Affairs, whose mission i s the preservation,
development and promotion of the Chamorro Heritage of Guam
(dca.guam.gov) . Some of the divisions of this departme nt include The
Chamorro Village, a gathering place for local entrepreneurs and prod
ucts, including food, crafts, and entertainment representing the Chamorro
and other cultures-as well as the Guam Museum, Guam Public Library,
and the Guam Council on the Arts and Humanities.
To make information about Guam and Chamorro culture available
to island residents and the larger global community, grants from the Na
tional Endowment for the Humanities, Guam Preservation Trust, the
B ank of Guam, the United States Department of the Interior, Gannett
Foundation, Guam Council on the Arts and Humanities Agency and
other sources led to the creation of the Guampedia Foundation, Inc . , in
2009. The foundation provides a n on-line source of information about
Guam and Chamorro culture, with over a thousand e ntries from scholars
and community leaders (guampedia.comJ) .
In addition, the island hosts many fe s tiv als and other events to spot
light Chamorro culture, as well as other Asia P acific cultures. For exam 
ple, there is the annual Gupot Fanha 'aniyan Pulan Chamoru, also known
as the Chamorro Lunar Festival , which showcases Chamorro cultural tra
ditions related to farming and fishing by the cycles of the moon (Aoki
20 1 4) . Many of the indigenous peoples of Oceania also come together to
-

support indigenous cultural preservation efforts. An example of this is
the Festival of the Pacific Arts, which Guam will be hosting in 20 1 7 .
This multicultural event, with rotating host locations throughout the re
gion, is offered every four years to support the preservation of traditional
Pacific cultures (Pacific News Center 20 1 1 ) .
Further, i n United States communities where large numbers of
Chamorros settle, such as Hawaii, California, Washington, and Texas,
Pacific Islanders hold fiestas and festivals to celebrate Chamorro holi
days and share island traditions. The Internet, and sites like Facebook,
along with the ease of telecommunication, also makes it possible for the
Chamorro diaspora to maintain connections to Guam. These social
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structures within Guam, in the region, and in the continental United
States support cultural preservation.
The Chamorro culture has survived through history because of the
adaptability of the people during times of transformation initiated by for
eign powers. To accommodate change, Chamorros have integrated ele
ments of other cultures , while adhering to core indigenous values. All
Guamanians can play a role in perpetuating inafa 'maolek in Guam' s in
stitutions and families and contributing to the Chamorro way of life.
Through intentional efforts to teach and preserve their culture through
programs and participation, Chamorros may safeguard their unique cul
tural identity in the continuing age of American hegemony. This case
study of Chamorro cultural transformation and current challenges to cul
tural preservation contributes to limited research in Chamorro studies
and on Pacific Islander Americans. It also informs extant research in
indigenous cultural preservation, ethnic studies, ethnic stratification, and
contemporary colonialism.
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ETHNICITY AND IMPRES SIONS OF
PERS ONALITY USING THE FIVE-FACTOR
MODEL : STEREOTYPING OR
CULTURAL SENSITIVITY?

Andrea Kay Cooper
San Juan College
Da vid Chin Evans
University of Washington

This research begins to answer the question: why do we, as humans,
consistently draw conclusions about others based on generalized infor
mation? If we move away from the assumption that all stereotypes are
inaccurate and harmful, then we can begin to understand this behavior.
Lee et al. (20 1 3) suggest that people stereotype others and generalize
information to all the members of a specific group when there is an ab
sence of "relevant individuating information" (pg. 478). In other words,
people make conclusions based on the evidence that is available. Lee et
aI . describe these generalizations as weak and provide evidence that peo
ple reject these stereotypes when better evidence is available. We view
this as a refinement of conclusions, rather than weak or inaccurate.
Human beings are able to gather the best possible information and evalu
ate it. When more accurate information is available, then we are able to
refine our conclusions. There is little evidence to suggest that people
cling to stereotypes without thought or evaluation, and in fact, we readily
reject generalizations when more information is available (Lee et aI. ,
20 1 3) .
Neuberg and Sng (20 13 ) describe a framework for understanding
stereotyping behavior and contribute additional support showing that ste
reotypes can be utilized as a way to gather useful information about
others. The authors approach the discussion with an evolutionary per
spective, specifically Life History Theory, and argue that the complexity
of our social systems necessitates making generalizations in order to pro
tect one' s self or find a mate. Not only is the ability to draw conclusions
about those around us important to navigate the social world, but it may
actually provide fitness benefits . Those who are also able to refine gen
eralizations when more information is available will be even more suc
cessful navigating our complex social systems.
121
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Social scientists have for some time sensed the need to shift their
conception of stereotypes from the perspective of prejudice theory,
which focuses on negative predispositions and discrimination toward
out-groups, to the perspective of interpersonal perception theory, which
focuses on the mutual impressions formed by members of distinct human
groups . The 1 995 publication of Stereotype Accuracy, an edited volume
by Lee, Jussim, and McCauley arising from a conference of the Ameri
can Psychological Association Science Directorate, serves as well as any
other as a signpost for this shift. This volume argued that many of the
features that might distinguish stereotypes from group impressions are
either logically untenable (e.g. that they are all-or-none beliefs, illogi
cally resistant to contradictions, and factually wrong for reasons of hear
say) or have received little empirical support (e.g. that they lead people
to ignore individual differences, stem from negative attitudes, and imply
genetic essentialism) . Perhaps more importantly, the volume pointed out
that two key features of stereotypes as group impressions remain virtu
ally unmeasured: their specific content and their degree of accuracy or
falsehood. More recently several researchers have continued investigat
ing the utility of stereotyping behavior and call for researchers to look
beyond the traditional view of stereotypes (Koenig & Early, 20 1 4 ; Jus
sim, 2005 , 20 1 2 ; Jussim et aI. , 2009 ; Lee et aI. , 20 1 3) .
Given the abundant research o n stereotypes i n recent years, why i s
there so little data about what people think o f various racial and ethnic
groups and whether they are right? Many scholars (Ottati & Lee, 1 995 ;
Stangor & Schaller, 1 996; Zebrowitz, 1 996) have noted that even basic
research on what personality traits are ascribed to racial groups, which is
the focus of the present paper, has progressed little since the 1 933
Princeton studies by Katz & Braly. Scholarly work has instead focused
on the formation, maintenance, and activation of stereotypes as cognitive
representations, thus more often measuring reaction times, error rates ,
and variability rather than semantic content o r trait-level beliefs . As Ot
tati and Lee ( 1 995, p. 32) remarked, and others agree (Ryan & B ogar,
200 1 ; Zebrowitz, 1 996), "recent research has focused almost exclusively
on the cognitive process of stereotyping. This focus on process, which is
by no means without value, has failed to address the question of whether
stereotypes possess accurate content in real-world contexts."
Perhaps more fundamentally, because this field began in the socio
political context of WWII and the Civil Rights era, "stereotypes" origi
nally referred to absurd propaganda images and Jim Crow portrayals
(Lippman, 1 965 ; Fixico, 20 1 1 ) . As such, any serious consideration of
their accuracy was antithetical almost by definition and continues to be at
odds with the human rights advocacy that motivates much of the schol
arly interest in this area. The term "stereotype accuracy" is as uninviting
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for many researchers today as "communist liberty" would have been in
the 1 950s or "segregationist equality" in the 1 960s. Lee, McCauley, &
Jussim ( 1 995) report one incident in which a reviewer of one of their
stereotype accuracy manuscripts asked them "What should we be doing?
Articles with titles like 'Are Blacks really lazy?' and 'Are Jews really
cheap?' ?" (p. 3 1 0) . Cronbach called for more research on the influence
of stereotypes on impression accuracy in 1 955 and Lee et al. repeated the
call in Stereotype Accuracy in 1 995. Perhaps to understand why there is
still too little data on key questions in this area, we need look no further
than the title of their volume.
But by approaching stereotypes as group impressions consistent
with interpersonal perception theory (Brunswick, 1 956; Cronbach, 1 95 5 ;
Funder, 1 999 ; Kenny, 1 994, 2004), and unburdening i t o f the presump
tion of prejudice as Lee et al. ( 1 995, 2009, 20 1 3) recommend, a better
alignment is achieved with the current global context of group beliefs in
a way that does not impede much needed research. Many theorists have
long rejected the view that stereotypes are fixed, negative, all-or-none
"pictures in the head" (Lippman, 1 965) but are instead probabilistic ex
pectations that people hold about the characteristics of groups, which
may be positive or negative, accurate or inaccurate (LeVine & Campbell,
1 972; McCauley & Stitt, 1 97 8 ; Jussim 2009). People may utilize visible
cues about others ' race and ethnicity to form impressions about their per
sonalities (Brunswick, 1 956) in the same way they utilize dress, smiling,
hairstyle (Zebrowitz & Collins, 1 994) and facial symmetry (Noor & Ev
ans, 2003) .
Specifically, this study provides insight into whether impressions
based on ethnicity help or hinder the ability to form impressions that
agree with the self-views of the target groups or members, and does
group membership have "cue validity?" Cue validity, also called "agree
ment, " may only be determined by comparing beliefs against some crite

rion, that is, some data about the stereotyped target group. How is this
accomplished? First, we must first shift from studying stereotypes of
"races" (e.g. Native Americans) to stereotypes of "ethnic groups," (e.g.
Native American people on a particular college campus). It is necessary
to define the stereotyped target group in a way that represents a real
population, rather than an abstract concept, from which a generalizable
criterion sample may be drawn. Ethnicity is tightly connected to particu
lar cultural traits that identify a group of people. While biological differ
ences between populations do exist, these differences do not support the
existence of distinct racial groups based on any suite of genetic traits and
hold little potential for understanding each other. Cultural traits are better
able to help us understand each other, so ethnicity is an important cue to
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utilize when forming impressions. Knowing someone' s skin color, how
ever, provides little insight into a person' s behavior or personality.
Second, we must choose our criterion variable. Since we are study
ing personality impressions, the options include self-impressions, peer
ratings, or behavioral personality indicators. Since peer-ratings may
themselves be influenced by stereotypes, and behavioral personality in
dicators are not perfectly established and impractical to gather, we fo
cused on self-impressions. Thus we are not testing the "accuracy" of the
stereotypes, but whether "people see others as they see themselves," a
nontrivial aspect of intergroup dynamics. If ethnic group impressions
show high cue validity, using them may be a form of cultural sensitivity ;
if however they show low cue validity, using them may lead to stereo
typic inaccuracy.
In this article, the term impression will be used (with modifiers)
rather than the term stereotype, but in all cases refers to impressions of
personality on the Five Factor domains (see Kenny, 1 994) . A self- im
pression is a perceiver' s impression of his or her own personality, and an
other- impression is a perceiver' s impression of another individual' s per
sonality. A group-impression is a perceiver' s impression of an entire
group of people, abstract or real, and may be either an in-group-impres
sion if the perceiver is a member of the group or an out-group-impres
sion if the perceiver is not a member of the group. All of the above may
be aggregated across theoretically significant groups of perceivers. To
this point, aggregated self-impressions of, for example, German or Japa
nese citizens (Allport, 1 954) are quite distinct from in-group-impressions
given by German or Japanese citizens, as the former impressions are of
individuals (selves) and the latter are of groups (in-groups). Comparing
these various impressions provides one means of assessing their accu
racy, but we will return to that point later.
INTRODUCTION

Among an interacting population, we hypothesize that impressions
on the Five Factor domains will vary systematically depending on the
stated ethnic group membership (H I ) .
TABLE 1 : FIVE FACTOR CHARACTERISTICS DEFINITIONS
Neuroticism

Tendency to experience psychological distres s like anxiety or
depression

Extraversion

Active, sociability, experience of positive emotions, excitement

Open

Open to new experiences, artistic, behaviorally flexible

seeking

Agreeabl e

Trusting, sympathetic, cooperative

Conscientiousness

Well-organized, structured, compUlsive
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We also hypothesize that group-impressions will be similar to aggregated
self-impressions, but group-impressions will be exaggerated across all
domains (H2) . Lastly, we expect that In-group impressions will agree
more with aggregated self-impressions than will Out-group impressions
(H3).
PARTICIPANTS
Students attending a northern New Mexico College participated in
the research. The population mainly consists of White, Native American,
and Hispanic/Latino residents. The College has a high percentage of Na
tive American students, many of whom are Dine (Navajo) given the
close proximity of the Navajo Nation. This population presented a
unique research location and provided insight into ethnic impressions in
a community that interacts daily. The sample included 477 participants
( 1 8 or older) representing the ethnic make-up of the college (Table 2) .
White and Native American groups are in the maj ority while Hispanic/
Latino groups remain the minority in the study sample and the popula
tion. The sample included 35 1 (74%) women and 1 26 (26%) men.
TABLE 2 : ETHNIC

GROUP DEMOGRAPHICS

White/European
Study Sample
College
Demographics

American

Native American

Hispanic/Latino

44%

36%

14%

56%

23%

1 3%

Studying ethnicity ultimately allows us to understand people better
as individuals rather than products of perceptions formed by others, yet
systematic analysis requires asking research participants to put them
selves in a distinct ethnic category (i . e . White, Native American, His

panic/Latino) . We know that these categories do not fully represent the
diversity among all people. To ask someone to identify herself as Native
American does not take into account her particular subculture. For ex
ample, Navajo culture differs substantially from Puebloan cultures.
However, given the requirements of statistical analysis, ethnicity catego
ries must be created. We did ask respondents to identify their ethnicity
as they define it, which produced interesting qualitative data. Many re
spondents used the same terms used in data analysis, but many of the
responses tended to be more specific or far more general than our created
categories. For instance, some identified their ethnicity as "Dine,"
"Seminole/Navajo," and "Anglo Southwestern American." More general
responses included, "human," "mix of everything," and "American."
Perhaps outside the scope of this paper and not usable in analysis, their
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answers are no less important in understanding how individuals identify
themselves.
METHODS

Participants were asked to complete a twenty-one item survey from
the B ig Five Inventory (BFI-K Form S ; John 2005) on a five point scale
that was used to calculate their Five-Factor personality traits or self-im
pression as well as a group-impression of a randomly selected ethnic
group. Participants were only presented with one ethnic group to reduce
possible bias caused by comparisons between groups .
The survey specifically asked participants to think o f groups a t the
college, providing data about · the interactions between real people and
ethnic groups rather than in the abstract. Five Factor personality profiles
were created for self-impressions of individuals and for impressions of
White, Native American, and HispaniclLatino ethnic groups.
RESULTS

Self-impressions were broken down by ethnic group, focusing on
the numerically largest groups in the population : WhitelEuropean Ameri
can, Native American, and Hispanic/Latino groups on campus. The self
impression curves resemble the norming curve across all ethnicities . Us
ing a B onferroni corrected critical value of p=.002 (unless otherwise
noted), an initial investigation revealed that people assume significantly
different self-impressions of personality across ethnicities (F(8, 1 772) =
2 . 576, p = .009).
ANOVAs (with a Bonferroni corrected critical value of p=.002)
were then calculated across specific ethnic group combinations and per
sonality domains . Self-impressions of personality were similar across
ethnicity for Openness and Neuroticism. A between subj ects ANOVA
revealed significant differences between HispaniclLatino and Native
American students in Extraversion (F= 1 4. 1 2 1 ; p=.OO). Agreeableness
was nearly significant between White and Native American respondents
(F=5 .209 ; p=.02) . Lastly, Hispanic/Latino and Native American partici
pants varied significantly in Conscientiousness (F=5 .624; p=.0 1 ) See Fig.
I c and Table 3 .

tv
o
,.....

TABLE 3 : MEANS AND STANDARD ERRORS (SE)

�
Ingroup-Impressions
(Fig s . 1 b & 2a-c)

Outgroup-Impressions
(Figs . 1a & 2a-c)
Domain
Neuroticism

Extraversion

Openness

Self-Impressions
(Figs. 1c & 2a-c)

N

Mean

SE

N

Mean

SE

N

Mean

SE

59

3.013

0 . 077

52

2 . 942

0 . 1 04

208

2 . 894

0 . 06 1

LatinolHispanic

1 09

2 . 823

0 . 05 7

19

2 . 803

0. 1 7 1

69

2.786

0 . 1 06

Native American

1 30

2 . 992

0.052

76

3 .092

0.086

1 69

2 . 857

0 .067

59

3 . 5 64

0.088

52

3 .490

0 . 1 00

208

3 . 262

0.054

LatinolHispanic

1 09

3 . 268

0 . 065

19

3 . 908

0 . 1 65

69

3 . 5 00

0 . 094
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Native American

1 30

2.388

0.059

76

2 .760

0.082

1 69

3 . 1 23

0 . 060

(1
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59

3 . 549

0.078

52

3 . 5 27

0.099

208

3 . 864

0 . 042

1 09

3 .328

0 . 05 8

19

3 . 5 89

0 . 1 65

69

3.861

0. 074

Target Label
WhitelEuro-American

WhitelEuro-American

WhitelEuro-American
LatinolHispanic

1 30

3 . 500

0.053

76

3 . 600

0.082

1 69

3 . 775

0.047

59

2.69 1

0. 097

52

2 . 822

0. 1 1 0

208

3 . 392

0.058

LatinolHispanic

1 09

2 . 8 97

0.07 1

19

3 . 1 45

0 . 1 82

69

3 . 543

0 . 1 00

Native American

1 30

2 . 608

0.065

76

2.599

0.09 1

1 69

3 . 590

0.064

59

3 .453

0. 1 0 1

52

3 .486

0.097

208

3 . 94 1

0 . 047

Latino/Hispanic

1 09

3 . 3 74

0.074

19

3 . 895

0. 1 6 1

69

4 .029

0.08 1

Native American

1 30

3 .008

0 . 068

76

3 . 1 28

0.080

1 69

3 . 808

0.052
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GROUP IMPRESSIONS

The impressions formed of entire ethnic groups also vary signifi
cantly, showing that different ethnic groups are perceived to have differ
ent personalities (ANOVA: F(8 , 1 756) = 2 1 . 3 5 , p < .00 1 ) . Viewing
combinations of ethnic groups and personality traits show no significant
differences in any of the personality domains between White and His
panic/Latino group impressions. Native American and Hispanic/Latino
participants difference significantly across domains (Neuroticism:
ANOVA F=7 .584, p=.OO; Extraversion: F= 1 04.927 , p=.OO; Openness:
F=5 . l 47 , p=.02; Agreeableness: F= 1 2. l 54, p=.OO; Conscientiousness :
F=22.989, p=.OO) . White and Native American group impressions differ
significantly only in Conscientiousness (AN OVA F= l 9 . 1 86, p=.OO) and
Extraversion (ANOVA F= l 47 . 630, p=OO) . See Fig. l a, l b , and Table 3 .
FIGURE 1 . ( A ) OUTGROUP- , (B) INGROUP- , AND ( C ) AGGREGATED SELF
IMPRESSIONS OF WHITElEURO-AMERICAN, LATINO/HISPANIC, AND
NATIVE AMERICAN PEOPLE AT SAN JUAN COLLEGE.

-o-Whlte/Euro-Ameritan
-a-latino/HIspanic
-<>- Natlve Ameritan

I (bl lngroup-lmpress!ons !
N

.E

O

A

C

N

E

0

A

C

I It) Self-ImpressIons
N

E

0

A

C

SELF/GROUP IMPRESSION COMPARISON

Native Americans have significantly lower means for Conscien
tiousness (p=.OO) and Extraversion (p=.OO) in both the self-impression
and the group-impression of Native Americans. This suggests some
agreement between how Native Americans see themselves and how
others see Native Americans as a group. Similarly, White and Hispanic/
Latino respondents were rated as higher in Conscientiousness and Extra
version. Group-impressions of Conscientiousness and Extraversion are
notably lower than self-ratings, but are both in a similar direction.
Ratings of Agreeableness showed considerable disagreement be
tween self-impressions and impressions formed by others. Self-impres
sions across all ethnicities show high Agreeableness, yet all groups rate

20 1 2]

STEREOTYPING OR CULTURAL SENSITIVITY ?

1 29

other groups as low in Agreeableness. More generally, self-impressions
are much higher than the impressions formed of ethnic groups across all
domains. Despite this difference, the general trend of significant differ
ences across personality traits is similar in the aggregated self- and
group-impressions .
IN-GROUP/OUT-GROUP IMPRESSIONS

Given the study design, individuals of a particular ethnicity were
periodically asked to form an impression of their own ethnic group. This
created an In-group impression. Out-group impressions were formed by
those of a different ethnicity than their own. Impressions of the In-group
are expected to agree more with self-impressions . The initial analysis of
the interaction between ethnicity, in/out group, and personality domain
showed no significant differences (ANaYA: F(S , 1 75 6)= 1 .46S, p=. l 64).
Despite no initial findings, the sample was analyzed by each ethnic
group. 52 White participants provided personality impressions of Whites
as a group, while 1 1 0 Hispanic/Latino and Native American participants
provided the Out-group impressions for White students. The In-group
and Out-group impressions were quite similar and show no significant
differences (ANaYA: F(4,436) = .399, P = . S l O) . See Figure 2b and
Table 3 .
FIGURE 2 . OUTGROUP- , INGROUP-, AND AGGREGATED SELF

IMPRESSIONS OF (A ) NATIVE AMERICAN (B) WHITEIEURO-AMERICAN ,
AND (C) LATINO/HISPANIC PEOPLE AT SAN JUAN COLLEGE.
4.5

...,c".. Outgroup Impressions
-{ !-Ingroup .Impressions
-f.J- Aggregated Self.lmpressions
p
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Seventy-six Native American respondents provided personality impres
sions of Native American students, and 243 Hispanic/Latino and White
students rated Native American students as the Out-group. Similar to the
White results, In-group and Out-group impressions of Native American
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students are very similar and show n o significant differences in value or
pattern (ANOY A: F(4,8 1 6) = 1 .993, p = .094) See Figure 2a and Table 3 .
Nineteen Hispanic/Latino participants provided In-group impres
sions, and 263 participants provided Out-group impressions of Hispanic/
Latino students . The curves contrast with the trends seen among White
and Native American students and indicate disagreement across all do
mains (ANOY A: F(4,S04) = 3 . 046, P = .0 1 7) . Specifically, In and Out
group impressions of Hispanic/Latinos revealed significant differences in
Conscientiousness (ANOYA: F ( 1 .408) = 1 0.768, p=.OO l ) and Extraver
sion (ANOY A: F( l A2S) = l S . S 89, p=.OOO) (See Fig. 2c and Table 3 )
CONCLUSION

In this population, aggregated self-impressions show agreement
with the impressions that others hold in traits, Conscientiousness and Ex
traversion. Disagreement exists in Agreeableness between self-impres
sions and the impressions of others. Lastly, in-group and out-group
ratings showed similar patterns (although not significant) for the two ma
j ority groups (White and Native American students) while showed a dis
similar pattern for the minority group (Hispanic/Latino students). These
results indicate that cultural characteristics of Native Americans and
Whites in this population are conveyed in a manner that allows cross
cultural understanding. Hispanic/Latino students do not appear to be
seen as they see themselves in this population. The low sample size must
be noted, which can make interpretation more difficult.
This research expands the study of stereotyping by establishing that
people use ethnicity as a cue to understand others and that the use of
ethnicity sometimes demonstrates cultural sensitivity rather than stereo
types based on inaccurate perceptions. The present study also explores
stereotyping behavior in a population with a large Native American pop
ulation. As Donald L. Fixico acknowledges, many people do not have
much knowledge of Native American groups and he calls for more re
search and exposure (20 1 3). He proposes exactly what our study demon
strates , n amely that once interacting populations have enough contact

with each other, they are likely to be understood by each other.
DISCUSSION

Our data suggest that individuals do utilize stereotypes and create
exemplars of an entire culture as a way of navigating a complex social
world. These exemplars serve to help predict social interactions with
people whom we do not know. Cultural exemplars will hold varying de
grees of accuracy but are created in the human mind as a strategy to help
categorize and organize interpersonal interactions.
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We might consider the use of ethnicity as a cue to personality re
flective of real, observable cultural differences . Cultural differences cer
tainly exist and many conflicts between groups of people are based on
cultural misunderstandings. If ethnicity is a cultural construct, as we
know it is, and then it follows that ethnicity is a good clue to use when
trying to understand and interact with the people around us. This research
presents evidence that the use of ethnicity to form impressions of others
is based on cultural awareness and sensitivity rather than misunderstand
ing and bias . Impressions of others seem to be moving beyond inaccurate
prejudice to a more useful form of cultural awareness. Of course, impres
sions of an entire group of people based on only a few characteristics,
ethnicity or otherwise, will be generalized and fail to capture individuals
completely. We argue that ethnicity can be used as a valid predictor of
personality if we are aware of each other and our varying cultures.
Our results could also indicate that societal roles do exist in terms of
minority and majority group status. Minority groups are bound to be less
understood than majority groups due to the presence of bias but also
because majority culture will be prevalent in all realms of society drown
ing out much of minority culture. Our results indicate that minority and
majority groups can achieve a level of understanding and cultural aware
ness. Hispanic/Latino groups, the numerical minority in this population,
seem to be misunderstood and reveal that personality impressions can be
misleading and inaccurate when understanding is lacking.
LIMIT AnONS

All data is self-reported and given the sensitivity of discussions of
ethnicity, respondents may be inclined to answer less truthfully. Obser
vational and other forms of data would supplement this study and should
be considered for future research in this area. The data also aggregate
individuals based on ethnicity and do not allow for subcultural or indi
vidual differences. Future research should also include dyadic en
counters between individuals to further understand how we use ethnicity
to understand others on all levels of analyses. We hope this research
spurs more research using the Five Factor model of personality.
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DIRTY JEW-DIRTY MEXICAN : DENVER ' S 1 949
LAKE JUNIOR HIGH S CHOOL GANG B ATTLE
AND JEWIS H RACIAL IDENTITY
IN COLORADO
Michael Lee
University of Colorado at Boulder

On the morning of Saturday, October 1 , 1 949 Denver' s Jewish and
Mexican-American parents woke up, ate breakfast, and read in their
newspapers that dozens of their children had been engaged in a race
based gang battle just the day before. Though historians have largely
ignored this event, the Jewish response to it, especially through the local
chapter of the Anti-Defamation League of B ' nai B ' rith and its involve
ment in an interracial neighborhood council, demonstrated how Jewish
racial identity was in part informed by the curious racial geography of
the West-a racial geography that was too often shaped by contrast with
Mexicans. l This episode as well as a few notable instances of anti-Semi
tism, including the 1 905 lynching of Jacob Weisskind, suggest a more
nuanced story than the received wisdom about Jews being "at home" in
Denver. 2 Indeed, some historians who have written on Jews in the West
1 This event was briefly mentioned by lawyer and historian Tom I . Romero in "Our
Selma is Here: The Political and Legal Struggle for Educational Equality in Denver, Colorado,
and Multiracial Conundrums in American Jurisprudence," Seattle Journal for Social Justice
(FalllWinter 2004), 7 8 . However, Romero was primarily interested in the Chicano perspective,
and did not view the incident from the perspective of Jew s ' racial identity. Whenever practica
ble or to make a broader historical point, I do not alter the terms by which historical actors in
the sources refer to themselves or to other ethnic groups . This also shows an evolution in how
ethnic groups perceive themselves and others. However, for material outside of quotes, and for
the sake of continuity and clarity, I refer to Jewish Americans mainly as "Jews"; those of
Mexican heritage living in the United States as "Mexicans," "Chicanos," or "Mexican Ameri
cans"; and Gentile whites as "Anglos."
2 The quoted phrase i s from Deborah Dash Moore, A t Home in America: Second Gener
ation New York Jews (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 98 1 ) . For optimistic accounts
of Jews in Denver and Colorado that portray a confident Jewish population see Jeanne
Abrams, Dr. Charles Spivak: A Jewish Immigrant and the American Tuberculosis Movement
(University Press of Colorado, 2009); Allen duPont Breck, The Centennial History of the Jews
of Colorado, 1 859- 1 959 (Denver: The Hirschfield Press, 1 960) ; and Ida Uchill, Pioneers, Ped
dlers, and Tsadikim (Denver: Sage Books, 1 95 7 ; reprint, Boulder: University Press of Colo
rado, 2000). Page citations are to the reprint edition. To be fair, however, Uchill does have a
nine-page chapter in her over three hundred page book that does at least describe anti-Semi
tism in Denver. But it is antiquarian in nature and a detour in a larger narrative of progress,
success and eventual acceptance. Moreover, Uchill asserts that social anti-Semitism was of no
concern to most Jews in the city and totally omits the racial strife between Jews and Mexicans
on the West Side of Denver.
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have argued that one of the primary reasons why the region was different
from the East was because anti-Semitism was relatively absent and sub
dued.3 Although this might hold true for some western cities, this was
not the case in Denver, where it was present and at times extremely
overt. Furthermore, anti-Semitism, coupled with a pronounced anti-Mex
ican sentiment among the broader Anglo community, proved impOltant
in the formation of Jewish racial identity.
More broadly, however, such a case study is worthy of careful
scholarly consideration precisely because it does focus on Jewish-Mexi
can interaction, rather than Jewish-black interaction. Without a doubt, the
literature regarding Jewish-black interaction is rich, with many decades
of fruitful and careful scholarship behind it. 4 On the other hand, the study
of Jewish-Mexican interaction in the West, and on a more general level,
Jewish-Latino interactions in the United States, has received compara
tively little attention from professional historians. In fact, the only nota
ble exception to this trend has been George J. Sanchez' s optimistic
treatment of the Boyle Heights neighborhood of Los Angeles during the
Cold War. In this article length study titled, '' 'What' s Good for B oyle
Heights is Good for the Jews ' : Creating Multiculturalism on the Eastside
During the 1 950s," Sanchez examined the social and political collabora
tion between a small group of Jews and Mexican Americans, and the
positive impact that relationship had on "civil rights" and "radical mul
ticulturalism" in the neighborhood.5 Indeed, it has only been in recent
years that trailblazing historians like Ellen Eisenberg have begun to write
book length studies on the often complex and contradictory relationships
between Jews and other racial groups in the West. 6 More to the point,
3 John Livingston, "Introduction," in Jews of the American West, eds . John Livingston
and Moses Rischin (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1 99 1 ), 2 1 ; Jeanne Abrams, Jewish
Women Pioneering the Frontier Trail (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 1 1 .
4 See Cheryl Lynn Greenberg, Troubling the Waters: Black·Jewish Relations in the
American Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Eric J. Sundquest, Strangers
in the Land: Blacks, Jews, Post Holocaust America (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2005) ; Jack Saltzman and Cornel West, eds. , Struggles in the Prom
ised Land: Toward a History of Black-Jewish Relations in the United States (New York: Ox
ford University Press, 1 997); and Murray Friedman, What Went Wrong ? The Creation and
Collapse of the Black-Jewish Alliance (New York: The Free Press, 1 995).
5 George J. Sanchez, '' 'What ' s Good for Boyle Heights is Good for the Jews ' : Creating
Multiculturalism on the Eastside During the 1 950s," American Quarterly 56: 3 (September
2004), 634. Studies diverging from the black-Jewish paradigm and focusing on a multiethnic
approach to the West include Allison Varzally, Making a Non-White America: Californians
Coloring Outside Ethnic Lines, 1 925- 1 950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008);
Mark Wild, Street Meeting: Multiethnic Neighborhoods in Early Twentieth - Century Lo s Ange
les (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005) ; and Shana Bernstein, "Building Bridges
at Home in a Time of Global Conflict: Interracial Cooperation and the Fight for Civil Rights in
Los Angeles, 1933- 1 954," Ph.D dis s . , Stanford University, 2003 .
6 Ellen Eisenberg, The First to Cry Down Injustice ? Western Jews and Japanese Re
moval During WWIl (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008) .
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however, the story of Jewish-Mexican interaction is significant and wor
thy of study because it is a story that can only be best told and under
stood in the context of the American West; simply put, place does matter,
especially when it comes to American Jewish history.
THE GEOGRAPHY OF ETHNICITY ON DENVER' S WEST S IDE
Following Colfax Avenue due west toward the majestic Rocky
Mountains, Denver' s Jewish West Side once stretched from the banks of
the South Platte River to Jefferson County ' s border. For decades, syna
gogues, Jewish agencies, and businesses were common in this section of
the city and catered to a population that was predominantly eastern Euro
pean in heritage. In fact, by the early 1 950s-the height of Jewish cul
tural influence in this area-institutions like the Hebrew Educational
Alliance, Beth Israel Home and Hospital, the Jewish Consumptives Re
lief Society (later renamed the American Medical Center), and the
Guldman Community Center stood as unquestionable proof of just how
Jewish this part of Denver had become.
The nucleus of this community was established in the late nine
teenth century from the remnants of a failed agricultural colony in
Cotopaxi, Colorado. Fleeing pogroms, boycotts and the draconian dic
tates of Czar Alexander III, over two million Jews left the Russian Em
pire for a better life somewhere else. Most of these refugees found their
way to the eastern shores of the United States. However, urban centers
like New York City soon became breeding grounds for diseases that in
cluded tuberculosis-otherwise known as the "white plague." Due to this
and other reasons, Jewish relief agencies like the Hebrew Immigrant Aid
Society (HIAS) endeavored to resettle a number of these Russian Jews in
less crowded and seemingly more healthful parts of the country. One of
these alternatives was the small mining town of Cotopaxi.7
Situated in a valley near the banks of the Arkansas River, Cotopaxi

was an excellent location for mining, but not for agriculture; in fact, poor
soils, freezing temperatures and flooding characterized the nature of the
region. Unaware of this at the time, and deceived by smooth-talking pro
moters, officials at the HIAS rejected fertile alternatives such as Oregon
and California, and instead chose to settle Russian Jews at Cotopaxi. Ac
cording to historian Allen duPont Breck, twenty Russian families were
sent by rail to the colony in 1 882. Upon arrival to the settlement, they
were shocked to see dilapidated housing and a hostile environment not
conducive to productive farming. More importantly, however, the men
and women who were brought over to work this land were more accus
tomed to richer soils and in some cases had no experience in the practice
7

Breck,

Centennial History,

80; Uchill,

Pioneers,

173- 1 74.
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of agriculture. After a particularly tough winter in 1 882, some of the
colonists began to abandon the colony for Denver, and by June of 1 884,
the Jewish agricultural experiment near the Arkansas River had officially
ended. Nevertheless, from this failure emerged the seeds of Jewish settle
ment in the West Side of Denver along Colfax Avenue. 8
In the decades that followed, coreligionists from Russia, Romania,
Poland, Lithuania and Hungary augmented the Cotopaxians who had re
settled around Denver' s main street, Colfax Avenue. These additional
waves of settlement added to the vibrancy and complexity of the commu
nity and pushed Jewish settlement further west along the Colfax corridor.
B ut Jews were not the only group building a community on the West
Side, for closer to the core of the city lay an ethnic enclave that was
slowly taking shape and would eventually come to dominate the makeup
of the area into the late twentieth century and beyond.
During the 1 920s and 1 930s, growing numbers of Mexicans, mainly
out of economic necessity, migrated from the coalfields of the south and
the beet fields of the north to Denver. The late 1 920s heralded the end of
the halcyon days when coal was king in Colorado. Mine operators in
southern Colorado towns like Walsenburg were hiring fewer men due to
the increasing use of petroleum as a way to heat homes up and down the
Front Range. Moreover, the ensuing Great Depression of the 1 930s
forced hardworking farm workers to abandon the beet field colonies of
Weld and Larimer counties and look elsewhere for work. Some of these
individuals eventually settled in the Auraria, B aker, and Lincoln sections
of West Denver, and by the 1 960s and early 1 970s supplanted the older
Jewish population further west. The permanent Mexican-American popu
lation for all of Denver exceeded 1 2,000 by 1 940, an impressive increase
from 2,500 in the early 1 920s . More importantly, however, the West
Denver population of Mexican Americans for Baker, Auraria, and Lin
coln was nearly 1 0,000 by 1 970. To put this in some perspective, the
entire Jewish population for Colorado was estimated to be a little over
1 9,000 in 1 95 8 .9
Without question, the heart of the Mexican-American West Side
was Auraria. One of the oldest sections of the city, Auraria was first
home to Irish and German immigrants. Indeed, flourmills and breweries
with their accompanying smells and sounds were common in this area. In
8 Breck, Centennial History, 74-80, Uchill, Pioneers, 1 73- l 74 .
9 Richard Gould, The Life and Times of Richard Castro (Denver: Colorado Historical
Society, 2007), 65-66; Carl Abbot, Stephen J. Leonard, and Thomas J. Noel, Colorado: A
History of the Centennial State, 4th ed. (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2005), 357;
George Rivera, Jr., Aileen F. Lucero, and Richard Castro, "Internal Colonialism in Colorado:
The Westside Coalition and Barrio Control," in La Gente: Hispano History and Life in Colo
rado, ed.Vincent C. Debaca (Denver: Colorado Historical Society, 1 998), 206; Breck, Centen
nial History, 3 2 1 .
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1 866, for example, a German immigrant by the name of Moritz Sigi
founded the Colorado Brewery. By the turn of the century, John Good
had purchased the brewery and renamed it after the Tivoli Gardens in
Copenhagen, Denmark. The Tivoli would remain an important landmark
in the neighborhood for decades to come, wetting the whistles of many
Westsiders . 1o
Although breweries were important to the character of the neighbor
hood, so were its churches. In 1 887, the Germans built St. Elizabeth' s
Catholic Church and School. That same year, the Irish, not to be outdone
by the Germans, constructed St. Leo ' s Catholic Church. During this early
period, there was even a small Orthodox congregation, Shearith Israel,
which catered to Jewish businessmen working in the downtown area. 1 1
By the first two decades of the twentieth century, these immigrants
and their children began to move out of Auraria, renting their homes to a
small but increasing stream of working-class Hispanics from Mexico,
New Mexico, and the northern and southern regions of Colorado. In
1 922, this population began to hold services in Spanish in the basement
of St. Leo ' s Catholic Church. However, as it grew larger, this arrange
ment became untenable. Acutely aware of this a well-to-do Irish Catholic
family, the Mullens, donated land and money to help found a new parish
in the area. On March 2 1 , 1 926, St. Cajetan' s Catholic Church officially
opened. Built in the Spanish Colonial style, it soon became the center of
Mexican-American life on the West Side, providing a school, clinic, and
credit union. Moreover, mutual aid societies such as the Sociedad Mutu
alista Mexico and the Sociedad Protectora Hispana Americana began to
form. 1 2
In the 1 940s, Mexican Americans began to settle in other parts of
Denver closer in proximity to Jewish neighborhoods along the West Col
fax corridor. West Side public schools such as Lake Junior High School,
which had once enj oyed overwhelming Jewish majorities throughout the
1 920s and 1 930s, now had to deal with a growing Mexican-American
population. With this demographic shift came ethnic tension and out
breaks of violence in the streets and schools of the West Side. 1 3

1 0 Jodi Michelle Summers, "Auraria: From Ncighborhood to Campus" (Masters ' s thesis,
University of Colorado, Denver, 2003) , 32-39.
1 1 Summers, "Auraria," 32-39; Jeanne Abrams, Jewish Denver, 1 859- 1 940 (Charleston:
Arcadia Press, 2007), 69.
1 2 Summers, "Auraria," 3 2 - 3 9 : Abbot, Leonard, and Noel, Colorado, 3 5 7 .
1 3 Abbot, Leonard and Noel, Colorado, 3 5 7 ; Michael J. Zelinger, West Side Story R e 
lived (Denver: J. Wandell Press, 1 98 7), 1 5 8 .
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CONTRASTS : JEWS , MEXICANS , RACIAL IDENTITY, AND THE FORMATION
OF THE LAKE JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL HUMAN RELATIONS
COUNCIL

On Friday, September 30, 1 949, three Denver Police Department
squad cars sped toward West Sixteenth Avenue and Newton Street, near
Lake Junior High School. A "gang battle," reportedly between thirty
"Spanish-American" and "Jewish" students had broken out with an esti
mated crowd of three hundred spectators watching the melee. Before the
police arrived, however, a quick thinking housewife with a garden hose
had broken it up-literally dowsing the flames of racial discontent. No
one was hurt, but it made for an eye-catching story in the Rocky Moun
tain News. 14

Fights between Jews and Mexican Americans were familiar sites
along the West Side. However, the key difference this time was the scale
and reaction that this particular one engendered from within Denver' s
Jewish and Mexican-American communities. Most likely born of the
News 's September 30 article, questions began to be raised, especially by
the local Jewish press, as to how things had gotten so out of hand and
what could be done about it. For example, the Intermountain Jewish
News reported that in the wake of the schoolyard fight "complete Jewish
cooperation" and "inter-racial friendship" was being sought in order to
identify and remedy the underlying cause of the situation. The Anti-Def
amation League of B ' nai B ' rith (ADL), a well-respected Jewish advo
cacy and intergroup relations organization, even intervened in order to
make sense of the circumstances. And while the Jewish community was
attempting to comprehend what had occurred near Lake, Mexican-Amer
ican families living in the area were beginning their own initial explora
tion into what exactly went wrong and what could be done about it. 1 S
The first meeting held by Lake ' s Mexican-American residents took
place on October 3. Sponsored by the Rude Community Center, it assem
bled teachers, students, and community leaders from the Spanish speak
ing population to discuss the incident. People with names like Del Toro,
Guzman, Rodriguez, Borrego, Ulibarri, Mendez, and Maes sat in the au14
15

Rocky Mountain News, October I , 1 949, 22.
Although no other instance of violence between Jews and Mexican Amcricans on the
West Side of Denver received the press coverage that the "gang fight" at Lake did, reports
from Lake Junior High School officials and the Anti-Defamation League suggest that they
were common enough. Moreover, the unidentified woman in the October I , 1 949 article in the
Rocky Mountain News stated, 'The trouble . . . [between Jewish and Mexican-American] stu
dents has been going on for a long time," suggesting a pattern. For examples of additional
conflicts between Jews and Mexican Americans on the West Side see Nathan Perlmutter to
L.E. Sidman, October 4, 1 949, box 2, Commission on Community Relations, Denver Public
Library, Western History Collection (hereafter cited as CCR) and Principal' s Report and Rec
ommendations to the Lake Human Relations Council, March 2, 1 950, box 2, CCR; Intermoun 
tain Jewish News, October 6, 1 949, 1 .
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dience. No Jews attended. The stated purpose o f the meeting was as fol
lows: to make sure the assembled community leaders knew all the
"facts" of the incident; that the incident was strictly a school issue; and to
determine whether or not there was systemic ill-will between Jews and
Mexican Americans in the West Side neighborhood "and, if so, it is the
j ob of the persons concerned . . . to plan jointly for and to work on such
activities as will eradicate undesirable attitudes between [the] groupS." 1 6
With regard to the first purpose, Tom Borrego, a Mexican-Ameri
can teacher at Lake, informed those in attendance that on the day before
the fight a Jewish boy was getting a drink of water when he was snapped
with a rubber band. The boy allegedly snapped back by calling a Mexi
can-American boy near him a "dirty Mexican." B orrego reasoned that
this might have been a cause of the September 30 incident. Furthermore,
by the time the fight was about to occur, older brothers, probably from
nearby North High School, came to help settle the score between the two
middle schoolers. Finally, Chicano students who were at the meeting
confirmed that no weapons had been used, and that there was not a
crowd of hundreds watching the fist fight as the News had reported. 1 7
Indeed, participants at the gathering fumed with anger at how Den
ver' s oldest newspaper had portrayed the incident to the greater Denver
community. For example, why did the News even have to reveal the
ethnicities of the two groups ? Moreover, the paper reported that "Span
ish-American boys" were "chasing Jewish boys," making Mexican
Americans appear to be hoodlums in the eyes of other Denverites. 1 8
Statements such a s these suggest that this was an occasion when the
vulnerable social condition of the Mexican-American community came
into play. Discrimination against Mexican Americans was widespread in
Colorado, affecting every sector of life, including health care, recreation,
schooling, law enforcement, and employment. Furthermore, it was not
until the 1 950s that Mexican-American organizations such as the OJ Fo
rum, the League of Latin American Citizens, the Colorado Latin Ameri
can Conference, and the Latin American Education Foundation, began to
draw much needed attention to these serious social inequities. Perhaps
more tellingly, however, Mexican Americans living in Colorado and the
rest of the country would have to wait until 1 975 for the United States

16

Report of Meeting Held Concerning "Lake Junior High Incident" reported in Rocky
October 3, 1 949, box 2, CCR.
1 7 Report of Meeting Held Concerning "Lake Junior High Incident" reported in Rocky
Mountain News, October 3, 1 949, box 2, CCR.
1 8 Report of Meeting Held Concerning "Lake Junior High Incident" reported in Rocky
Mountain News, October 3, 1 949, box 2, CCR. More than just "chasing" Jewish boys, the
News portrayed a situation where Jewish students were "running home from school" in panic.
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Congress to extend the Voting Rights Act of 1 965 to them and other
Latinos. 19
As discussion in the meeting moved away from concerns about the
News 's portrayal of the fight, the issue of day-to-day interactions with
Jews arose. Everyone unanimously agreed that the tension between the
two groups had been building for some time. For example, a mmor had
been circulating among Mexican-American students at Lake that one of
their own had left the neighborhood and "joined the 'Jewish religion' and
the other boys did not like him for that and intended to get him for his
' High Hattedness' [snobbishness] ." In addition, Mrs. Fernandez, the cur
rent president of the Parent-Teacher Association for Lake (PTA), re
marked : "Many Spanish-American parents felt that the Jewish children
think Lake belongs to them." And Mrs. Guzman, a former Lake PTA
president, expressed that Jews initially made Mexican Americans feel
unwelcome and uncomfortable when they went to PTA meetings. On the
other hand, Guzman was more evenhanded when she articulated that
there was undoubtedly prej udice on both sides and that there needed to
be more self-examination between the two groups. The next issue for
debate was the presence of law enforcement in the neighborhood. 20
For many Mexican Americans at the meeting, Jews were to blame
for the police patrols in the area. In turn, this amplified Mexican-Ameri
can feelings of uneasiness and mistmst toward Jews. Were Mexican
Americans being accused of something? Were the squad cars present be
cause the Jewish community had the economic and political pull to get
them assigned there, acting as bodyguards to "protect Jewish children
from Spanish-American children[?]" This anxiety filled language ap
pears to point toward something more deep-seated, specifically, an acute
class-divide within the West Side community itself. 2 1
Jews in the area were upwardly mobile, owned their own businesses
and homes, participated in significant numbers in the professions, and
had an active civic life. Mexican Americans, on the other hand, were
solidly working class, in many cases economically disadvantaged, and
politically disenfranchised. This, perhaps, helps to explain the feeling
among Mexican Americans that Jews were snobs who preyed on eco
nomically vulnerable Chicanos. Reminiscing about life in Auraria, Rus
sel DeLeon, a Mexican American, recounted that a Jew owned "the
corner store, and he had high prices on his stuff." DeLeon' s sentiment is
19

Abbot. Leonard. and Noel,

F. Arturo Rosales, Chicano! The History of
(Houston: Arte Publico Press of the University

Colorado, 3 5 8 ;

the Mexican American Civil RiRhts Movement

of Houston, 1 996), 2 8 2 .
20 Report of Meeting Held Concerning "Lake JUrUor High Incident" reported in Rocky
Mountain News, October 3, 1 949, box 2, CCR.
2 1 Report of Meeting Held Concerning "Lake Junior High Incident" reported in Rocky
Mountain News, October 3, 1 949, box 2, CCR.
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indicative of a middleman minority dynamic, where, according to soci
ologists Adalberto Aguire, Jr. and Jonathan H . Turner, the "clients of
middleman minorities , especially those in the lower social classes . . .
tend to exhibit hostility toward the petitie bourgeoisie, who are viewed as
mercenary and exploitive." Consequently, it did not matter whether Jews
were in truth economically exploitive of Mexican Americans ; what mat
tered was that Mexican Americans firmly believed that Jews were, which
greatly intensified racial tension on the West Side. 22
At the conclusion of the meeting, the group recommended that local
churches and organizations combat prejudicial attitudes toward Jews dur
ing sermons and social activities, and that all parents make a better effort
at being involved in the lives of their children. It is likely that these
recommendations fell flat, however, for they excluded the Jewish com
munity from the dialogue and lacked any apparent follow through. On
the other hand, this proved to be a crucial moment of self-introspection
for the Mexican-American community on the West Side. It started to
come to terms with the unsettling reality that there was a serious problem
between Jews and Mexican Americans in the area. Meanwhile, the Jew
ish community and one of its preeminent intergroup agencies, the ADL,
was busy investigating and documenting what had supposedly happened
near Lake and what lay at the root of it. 23
On the morning of October 1 , the same day that the News broke the
story of the September 30 disorder near Lake, the ADL dispatched Na
than Perlmutter, a representative of the organization to investigate. Over
the course of two days, Perlmutter interviewed five eyewitnesses to the
fight and compiled a detailed report based upon his findings. More than
just a dry recounting of the September 30 melee, this report provides a
rare, but admittedly limited glimpse into the attitudes of Denver' s Jews
toward Mexican Americans. More importantly, however, it suggests that
Jews living on the West Side were adopting a regional definition of
whitenes s . 24

In his influential study, The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and
American Identity, historian Eric L. Goldstein found that geography
played an important role in how Jews constructed their racial identities.
Moreover, it was "how Jews negotiated their place in a complex racial
world" that mattered more than the cumbersome question of how Jews
22 Magdelena Gallegos,

A u raria Remembered: An Oral History by Fonner Residents of

Denve r 's Westside neighbor Compiled by the Community College of Denver Staff and Honors

(Denver: Community College of Denver, 1 9 9 1 ) , 1 3 ; Adalberto Aguirre, Jr.
and Jonathan H. Turner, American Ethnicity: The Dynamics and Consequences of Discrimina
tion, 5th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hil l , 2007 ) , 3 8 - 3 9 .
23 Report of Meeting Held Concerning "Lake Junior High Incident" reported in Rocky
Mountain News, October 3, 1 949, box 2, CCR.
24 Nathan Perlmutter to L.E. Sidman, October 4, 1 949, box 2 CCR; Uchi1, Pioneers, 3 1 8 .
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became white, which was unsuccessfully answered by anthropologist
Karen Brodkin. Indeed, Ellen Eisenberg, building on Goldstein' s astute
observation of "a complex racial world," demonstrated that Jews living
in California, Oregon and Washington State "reflected the peculiarities
of a western ethnic landscape in which . . . [they] were part of an ' Anglo '
world that was defined, in part, by contrast with Japanese Americans, the
region ' s most conspicuous non-white group. "25
In a similar way, the racial peculiarities of the Rocky Mountain
West most likely meant that some Jews were laying claim to an Anglo
identity by contrasting themselves with Mexican Americans-one of the
region' s most loathed and obvious ethnoracial groups. Moreover, in a
state like Colorado, which had a recent history of anti-Mexican senti
ment, this may have been one of the best ways for Jews to assert mem
bership in the broader pan-ethnic white community and distance
themselves from Mexicans. Indeed, during the Great Depression, Gover
nor Edwin Johnson declared martial law along the border with New
Mexico and deployed the Colorado National Guard there to keep Mexi
cans out of the state. In similar acts of illegality and xenophobia, he de
manded the expulsion of Mexican beet workers and deported Mexican
American citizens from Colorado Springs. Statewide, relief agencies and
county commissioners routinely lamented seeing Spanish surnamed indi
viduals on their roles. In Colorado ' s schools children of Mexican heri
tage dealt with racially inflected taunts from Anglo children, ranging
from "dirty Mexican" to "greaser. " And as one previously demonstrated,
Jewish school children were not above using identical racial epitaphs
against Mexican-American classmates. Thus, whenever Jews in Denver
engaged in discriminatory acts against Mexican Americans, they were
likely laying claim to a decidedly white identity.26
However, affirming such an identity held special significance in a
city like Denver where there was a history of anti-Semitism. In fact, even
well established pioneer Jewish families were not immune from the phe
nomenon. Amy S alomon, for example, remembered her classmates heav
ing rocks at her and calling her a Christ killer. 2 7 Moreover, in 1 903 , a
p o pular Unitarian minister in the city declared, "It' s the Jewish race, not
the Jewish church that is disliked. If free intermarriage with us [Anglos]
25 Eric L. Goldstein, The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, a n d American Identity
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 5, 52-5 5 ; Karen Brodkin, How Jews Be
came White Folks and What that Says about Race in America (New Brunswick: Rutgers Uni
versity Press, 1 99 8 ) ; Eisenberg, The First to Cry Down, 3 1 .
2 6 Sarah Deutsch, No Separate Refuge: Culture, Class, and Gender on an Anglo-His
panic Frontier in the American Southwest, 1 880- 1 940 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1 987), 1 65- 1 67, 1 40 .
27 Stephen J. Leonard and Thomas J. Noel, Denver: Mining Camp t o Metropolis (Niwot,
CO: University Press of Colorado), 1 94 .
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should be adopted the race hatred would vanish in three generations." 2 8
Although disturbing, these were not the worst forms of anti-Semitism
that the Mile-High City had to offer.
On Christmas day in 1 905-the very same year hundreds of Jews
were being massacred in the Russian Empire-a Gentile mob success
fully lynched Jacob Weisskind and severely injured Mendel Slotkin. 2 9
According to the Aspen Democrat, "The only excuse for the attack is that
the two Jews were working, loading a car with scrap iron instead of rest
ing in observance of the Christmas holiday ."30 Philip Lynd and Philip
Keiser, two Germans, orchestrated the rampage. The mob beat Weiss
kind and Slotkin with stones, bricks and iron, slashing their faces and
breaking their bones; in fact, they "crushed" Weisskind' s skull. While
doing this, Lynd and Keiser reportedly yelled out that they were
"aveng [ing] the blood of Christ by shedding the blood of . . . Christkil
lers."3 1 The story made national news two days later when the Los Ange
les Times remarked that the situation in Denver "seemed just like
Russia. "3 2 Slotkin recovered from his wounds, but Weisskind died from
complications stemming from his head injury on February 1 4.33 The
Jewish Outlook, Denver' s only Jewish weekly at the time, later reported
on the trial and conviction of Lynd and Keiser, contrasting in black and
white the impassioned pleas of the prosecutor, Greely Whitford, for a
verdict of murder in the first degree with the jury ' s shocking verdicts of
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. 34 The sentences, four to six
years for Lynd and seven months fourteen days for Keiser, were "alto
gether too light for the grave crime."35 A third ringleader, an Irishman by
2 8 Jewish Outlook, December 4, 1 903, 8 . This statement is typical of Progressive era
eugenics-based anti-Semitism that advocated Jews' racial distinctiveness and inferiority. See
Christine Rosen, Preaching Eugenics: Religious Leaders and the American Eugenics Move
ment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 85- 11 1.
29 According to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, in
order for a lynching to have occurred the following criteria must be met: "There must be
evidence that someone was killed; the killing must have occurred illegally; three or more
persons must have taken part in the killing; and the killers must have been serving justice or
tradition. Cited at Project HAL: Historical American Lynching Data Collection Project, peo
ple.uncw.edulhineseIHALlHAL%20Web%20Page.htm. The best-known instance of a Jew be
ing lynched in American history is that of Leo Frank. Frank, a northern Jew and pencil factory
manager, was accused of murdering a teenaged employee, Mary Phagan, in 1 9 1 3 . After his
death sentence was commuted by the Governor of Georgia, Frank was dragged from his prison
cell and hung. See Leonard Dinnerstein, The Leo Frank Case (New York: Columbia Univer
sity Press, 1 968).
3 0 A�pen Democrat, December 27, 1 905, 1

31
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Jewish Outlook,

May 4, 1 906, 6.
December 27, 1 905, I I .

Los Anfieles Times,
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the name o f Sonny B ohanna, jumped bail shortly after the lynching.3 6 In
1 907 , two more Russian Jews, Michael Weisblye and Tevyah B okser,
were "brutally murdered" on West Colfax. Their assailants, Harold
McKnaw and Wilbur F. Gilmer received similarly light sentences.37 In
contrast to these laughable punishments for murder, a Jewish youth by
the name of Nathan Goldstein was sentenced to five to ten years in the
state penitentiary for petty larceny in 1 909. To add insult to inj ury, the
presiding j udge claimed that he was being lenient on Goldstein, who was
also suffering from a severe case of tuberculosis.38
In the 1 920s, Denver' s Jews had more reason to feel insecure with
the ascendency of the Ku Klux Klan. By 1 925 the mayor of Denver, the
state governor, and one U.S. senator were known to be Klansmen.
Keenly aware of who wielded power in the Mile-High City, most Jews
remained studiously silent in an effort to not incur the wrath of the bla
tantly anti-Semitic organization. However, this silence did not stop the
Klan from boycotting Jewish businesses and parading through the Jewish
West Side as they were on their way to burn a cross on Table Mountain
above the city of Golden.39 More tellingly, however, Denver' s most
prominent and respected Reform rabbi, William S. Friedman, urged all
of his congregants at Temple Emanuel-the city ' s largest and oldest syn
agogue-not to bring attention to themselves while the Klan ruled the
city.40 Furthermore, Friedman opposed a plan by local attorney Charles
Ginsberg to take out an advertisement in the Denver Post condemning
the Klan ' s corruption of the judiciary. 4 1 On the other hand, there was
good reason to remain silent and inconspicuous when it came to the In
visible Empire. Indeed, William W. Clawson had cold bloodedly mur
dered Joseph Zuckerman and been acquitted by a jury of his peers .
Reporting on the verdict in 1 920, the Denver Jewish News declared that
it was a "miscarriage of justice." In the same article, attorney Joseph F.
Jaffa remarked: "The season for the ruthless mauling and slaying of Jew
ish horse and cattle traders and peddlers seems to be an open one in
Denver. At least as far back as I can recall it has never been closed." 42
More than four decades after the trial, however, Ginsberg disclosed that
36

1 8 , 1 906, 6 . For additional detail s on the lynching of Weisskind
December 26, 10: Aspen Democrat, January 4 , 1 906, I . The
News 's account of the assault on Weisskind and Slotkin numbered the mob at fifteen to twenty
men.
37 Jewish Outlook, Febmary I S , 1 907, 1 ; Jewish Outlook, May 10, 1 907, 1 .
38 Denver Times, March 6, 1 909, 2 .
39 Charles Ginsberg, interview by James Harlan Davis, tape recording, May 5 , 1 96 3,
Denver Public Library, Western History Collection.
40 Phil Goodstein, In the Shadow of the Klan: When the KKK Ruled Denver, 1 920- 1 926
(Denver: New Social Publications, 2006), 74-77 .
4 1 Charles Ginsberg interview.
42 Denver Jewish News, May 5 , 1 920, 1 .
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the not guilty verdict was attributable to the hooded nature of the judge,
jury, and the defendant.43
But in more recent memory, Jews were routinely denied member
ship in many of the elite men ' s clubs, including the Denver Club, Uni
versity Club, and Denver Athletic Club. Furthermore, the News explicitly
linked Jewish children with Mexican children, conjoining them in print
and in the minds of thousands of readers. On the other hand, Jews had
achieved a great deal of success in the city as prominent businessmen
and civic leaders. For example, Edward Monash, David May, and Leo
pold Guldman had owned extremely successful department stores; Louis
Anfenger had made his fortune in banking; and Wolfe Londoner had
even been elected mayor of the Mile-High City in 1 8 89 . Despite this
economic and political success, however, living in close proximity to
Mexican Americans, in addition to a conspicuous history of anti-Semi
tism in the city, must have engendered anxious feelings in Jews, compel
ling them to wonder where they actually stood in the racial hierarchy of
Denver. 44
Therefore, it is not surprising that in Perlmutter' s report initial ru
mors about the fight within the Jewish community were circulated with
erroneous and inflammatory details of Mexican-American youths knifing
Jewish school children-mimicking an Anglo attitude of Mexicans as
violent and sinister. In a similar fashion, interviewees in Perlmutter' s re
port also imagined Mexican-American youths with menacing weapons.
For example, the Gamzey children, Allan B oxer, and Mrs. ZeIlinger (the
unidentified women in the News article who hosed down the combatants)
consistently accused Mexican-American students of carrying and using
knives, even though no such weapons were actually used or seen during
the September 30 melee. In addition to frightening "killing knives," Perl
mutter detailed how Jewish children associated other brutish weapons
with overly aggressive Mexican-American youths. "Spanish-American
children," he wrote, "fought with taps on their shoes, chains, boards and
buckled belts." But did this mean, as Perlmutter concluded, that Jewish
boys systemically feared their Mexican American peers? If that was the
case, then Jewish boys would have most likely avoided physical confron
tations with well-armed Mexican-American boys. On the other hand, a
43
44

Charles Ginsberg interview.
Pearl Alperstein, interview by Anna Dean Kepper, tape recording, July 1 3 , 1 97 8 , Ira
M. B eck Memorial Archives, University of Denver; Sheldon Steinhauser, interview by
Michael Lee, digital recording, September 1 1 , 2009 ; Vchill, Pioneers, 94, 1 44 ; Breck, Centen
nial HistOlY, 1 20. Londoner, however, was only Jewish by descent. In actuality, he was a
member of the Episcopalian Church and rarely associated with Denver ' s Jewish community.
Moreover, he was goaded by a local newspaper for his Jewish past during the 1 8 89 election.
Finally, Londoner was forced to resign from his office in March 1 89 1 due to acquisitions that
the election was fraudulent. See Vchill, Pioneers, 1 46- 1 4 7 .
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more likely explanation might be that Jewish boys actively sought out
fights with their Mexican-American counterparts in order to assert Jew
ish, and by extension Anglo dominance over the neighborhood. Had not
their fathers achieved similar ends through their busi n e ss e s and profe s 
sions , engendering a feeling-although probably u nju st ified - a m o ng
Mexican Americans that Jews unfairly overcharged fo r g o od s and ser
vices in the neighborhood? Moreover, Perlmutter found in a phone inter
view with Mrs. ZeIlinger that Jewish boys routinely objected to
suggestions of extra police patrols in the area because it might refl ect
upon them as "sissies." Allan Boxer, for e xample, recounted a fight
where his mettle as a budding white Jewish male was tested against no
less than " 1 5 or 20" Mexican-American boys who ruffed him up in the
presence of two girls he was walking home. With regard to the Lake
incident itself, it was a Jewish student, Clifton Katz, who had "passed the
rumor around the school that Sam Handler [a Jewish b o y ] had 'beat up'
Pete Pedilla [a Mexican-American boy] ," igniting the series of events
that led to the confrontation near Lake. However, this important detail
was relayed to Perlmutter with a qualification-that Katz h ad been or
dered by Pedilla to spread the rumor in the first place. So how can thi s
inconsistency be properly reconciled?45
It appears that Perlmutter gathered thi s important piece of i nforma
tion from S aul Gayton, a Mexican-American boy who was friends with
Jews in the neighborhood. Gayton characterized himself in the interview
as being "on the side of the Jewish boys." Moreover, Gayto n went to
great lengths to articulate to Perlmutter the moral depr a vi ty of his own
Mexican-American peers by stating that they "drink intoxicants whereas
the Jewish friends of his do not." Furthermore, the Jewish boys, accord
ing to Gayton, grouped together for protection, not necess aril y to attack
Mexican-American students. Simply put, Gayton mo st like ly fabricated
the detail about Pedilla ordering Katz to spread the gossip in order to
shift responsibility onto the Mex ic an - Ameri can pmticipants and away
from his Jewish friends, thereby absolving them of any blame. It worked,
for Perlmutter underlined this detail in his report and recommended that
the League use Gayton "in any school program decided upon by the
ADL and the school au th ori ti e s ." Unsurprisingly, Gayton "impressed"
Perlmutter as "an unusually fine young man " ; however, this was not be
cause of Gayton' s apparent honesty or decorum, but because he recapitu
lated a c uri ou sly Anglo attitude of defective Mexican morality that was
familiar to Perlmutter and other ADL officials. This is by no means a
45

Nathan Perlmutter to L.E. Sidman, October 4, 1 949, box 2, CCR; Mauricio Maz6n,

The Zoot-Suit Riots: The Psychology of Symbolic Annihilation (Aust i n : Uni versity of Texas
Press, 1 984), 8 1 -82; Arnoldo De Le6n, They Called Them Greasers: A nglo A ttitudes Toward
Mexicans in Texas, 1 82 1 - 1 900 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1 983), 87.
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suggestion that Gayton wanted to be white, but that his attitudes toward
other Mexican Americans closely resembled those of the Jews with
whom he associated and called friends. On the other hand, understanding
Gayton' s mentality is beyond the scope of this study, and speaks more to
the state of Mexican-American identity in the postwar period more than
anything else. Moreover, Perlmutter might have found Gayton "unusual"
simply because he expressed sympathetic attitudes toward Jews .46
Although Perlmutter was veiled in his attitudes toward Mexican
Americans, other ADL officials in Denver were not. For example, in a
confidential letter to his personal files J. Peter Brunswick remarked:
As a reaction to the treatment and position of the
Jewish child, [better socioeconomic status] the Spanish
American child manifests an aggression complex, which
is the result of his subconscious feeling of inferiority . . . .
It is obvious that the low academic quotient is a result of
a lack of appreciation of education and school. It may be
safely assumed that few of the Spanish-American chil
dren are being kept home to study, by their parents, who
in most cases, are even less educated than their
children.47
Historian Arnoldo De Le6n found that Anglos in Texas systematically
viewed Mexican culture as "backward," "primitive," and "firmly against
innovation." Moreover, De Le6n continued, Anglos habitually identified
"Mexican sections of urban areas with vice, licentiousness, and moral
degradation." But most importantly, as one alluded to earlier, there was a
long-standing Anglo tradition in the West of perceiving Mexicans as
cruel and naturally inclined to violence. For example, stories of Mexican
atrocities against whites in the Lone Star State were common, usually
stirring up passionate feelings of revenge among white populations. Fur
thermore, Sarah Deutsch found that the exact same stereotypes pervaded
in Colorado . "Visions of lawless and irresponsible hordes," she wrote,
"visions unanchored by statistics, floated in the public mind." Therefore,
in a broader historical context, Jews' attitudes toward Mexicans in Den
ver were remarkably similar to their Anglo contemporaries . 48
Despite this pervasively negative attitude toward Mexicans, Perl
mutter and other ADL officials did recognize that there was a severe
problem between the two groups and that something had to be done
about it; whether Jews were at least partly to blame for the situation was
46
47
48

Nathan Perlmutter to L.E. Sidman, October 4, 1 949, box 2, CCR.
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another story. Regardless, the next step i n dealing with the neighbor
hood ' s interracial tension and violence went beyond conducting inter
views , or even the writing of detailed reports, (which the ADL was quite
good at) . Indeed, it took the form of an interracial neighborhood council
where Jews, Mexican Americans, and Anglos could meet, talk, and "de
velop better understandings . . . between pupils, teachers, parents and
other people in the Lake community." 49
Established in November of 1 949, the Lake Junior High School
Human Relations Council (LHRC) was emblematic of a national trend
that historian Stuart Svonkin identified as the "intergroup relations
movement." This movement developed a set of principles that advocated
"improved relations among racial, ethnic, and religious groups" ; equal
opportunity for all groups"; and "improvement of the quality of life
within these groups." Within this multiethnic movement, Svonkin contin
ued, "Jewish organizations played the leading role in defining . . . tactics
and obj ectives." For example, in the aftermath of the 1 943 Zoot Suit
Riots in Los Angeles (a severe outbreak of anti-Mexican sentiment), the
Community Relations Council of the Jewish Federation Council of Los
Angeles led the way in fostering productive partnerships between ethnic
groups in the city . And in other western cities, such as San Francisco,
Seattle, and P011land, Jews spearheaded the formation of committees and
councils that advocated equality and cooperation. Furthermore, secular
Jewish agencies like the ADL and the American Jewish Committee,
which had originally been created to combat anti-Semitism, even em
braced the principles of the intergroup relations movement by reaching
out to African Americans and other groups in order to combat discrimi
nation in housing, education and employment. And for those secular
Jewish agencies in particular, the struggle against anti-Semitism was
strongly associated with the struggle against all forms of prej udice; in
essence, what affected one group affected all groups. 5 0
On the other hand, as Svonkin has observed, the staff members of
these Jewish agencies and other intergroup relations organizations also
believed that eradicating social conflict benefited the country as a whole.
In essence, fostering harmonious intergroup relations during World War
II and into the Cold War period meant undermining the enemies of de
mocracy both domestically and internationally. Therefore, although Jews
stridently contrasted themselves with Mexican Americans, this did not
necessarily preclude a powerful ideological desire, especially among
49 Principal' s Report and Recommendations to the Lake Human Relations Council,
March 2, 1 950, box 2, CCR.
5 0 Stuart Svonkin, lews Against Prejudice: American lews and the Fightfor Civil Liber
lies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 997), 1 ,2, 28; Eisenberg, First to Cry Down,
1 54, 1 55 . I established the approximate date of formation for the LHRC by using the three
remaining minutes of the organization and the Intermountain lewish News.
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members o f secular Jewish agencies like the ADL, to establish peace,
understanding and "inter-racial friendship" in the community. This
meant that an ADL official like Brunswick could privately harbor ill will
toward Mexicans, but simultaneously believe that it was his patriotic
duty as an American to foster interracial tranquility in the neighborhood.
In fact, Brunswick served as the ADL ' s representative on the LHRC .5 1
Evidence suggests that the ADL, along with other ethnic and relig
ious advocacy agencies in Denver, played an important role in guiding
the LHRC in its program of intergroup relations at Lake. The few surviv
ing minutes from the LHRC and records from the ADL hint at a bifur
cated approach to the problems at the school: a sociological study of the
area and activities that fostered harmony and understanding between
groups. As was indicative of intergroup relations organizations of the
period, the LHRC employed "scientific research to analyze and counter
act ethnic, religious, and racial bigotry." In other words, the approach to
eradicating prejudice was similar to fighting a virulent disease, such as
tuberculosis or polio. For example, the LHRC, in conjunction with its
member organizations, which consisted of the ADL, the Mayor' s Human
Relations Commission, the Denver Unity Council, the Latin American
Education Council, Denver Public Schools (DPS), and the Urban
League, developed a comprehensive survey to measure "the basic inter
cultural problems in the community and to chart the course of action in
their solution." Although the raw data and conclusions from this study
are likely lost, a surviving copy of the questionnaire sent out to Lake' s
parents provides some idea as to how the LHRC and its members ap
proached the difficulties at Lake. Many of the questions posed by the
survey focused on the possible causes of conflict within the community;
for example, lack of good parenting, the staff at Lake, socioeconomic
disparities, and ethnoreligious misunderstanding. Still other queries
asked how those problems could be best addressed. Some of the solu
tions, for instance, ranged from increased police patrols to more activities
that encouraged intergroup understanding. The study' s findings, it is rea
sonable to conclude, were put to good use by the LHRC and its member
organizations. 5 2
5 1 Svonkin, Jews Against Prejudice, 5; Intermountain Jewish News, October 6, 1 949, I ;
Lake Junior High School Human Relations Council Minutes, March 2 , 1 950, box 2 .
52 Svonkin, Jews Against Prejudice, 4 , 30. The Mayor' s Human Relations Committee/
Commission was formed by Mayor Quigg Newton in 1 947 to study the socioeconomic condi
tions of Denver' s minorities. The Latin American Education Council, later renamed the Latin
American Education Fund, was established in Denver in 1 949 to provide grants and loans to
Mexican-American youths who were college bound. The Denver branch of the Urban League
was established in 1 947 for the economic and social improvement of African Americans. See
James A. Atkins, Human Relations in Colorado: A Historical Record (Denver: Colorado De
partment of Education, 1 96 8 ) , 1 59- 1 62, 2 1 9 , 1 3 5- 1 4 1 . Well-to-do African Americans and
whites in the city organized the Denver Unity Council in 1 944. Like many intergroup agencies
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By September 1 950, the Intermountain Jewish News reported that
conditions at Lake had markedly improved since the previous year' s vio
lence. DPS made physical improvements to the school, and extra "ath
letic facilities and equipment are planned." Moreover, representatives
from the LHRC told the Intermountain Jewish News that teachers at
Lake were making efforts at "better understanding" between students by
"pointing out the contributions of various racial and religious groups at
every opportunity." Bert Levin, a Jewish student at Lake, "opined that
assemblies dealing with interracial relations last year 'did a lot of good.
As you go thru Lake . . . you make these kids your friends , ' referring to
boys and girls of other faiths." However, other students at the school,
including Connie Martinez and Freyda Blumberg were more reluctant,
cautioning that interracial cooperation and understanding should be al
lowed to grow naturally and not be forced. But forced it was. 53
In conj unction with DPS , the ADL championed j oint observances of
Chanukah and Christmas at Lake and other schools within the district.
Michael L. Freed, mountain states regional director of the ADL, ex
pressed to Harry Nicholson, Lake ' s principal, his "gratification over your
splendid j oint observance I was privileged to witness yesterday. In my
opinion it reflected a fine understanding about, and keen sensitivity of,
the many complex problems inherent in the subject matter." In fact,
throughout the country the ADL and other Jewish organizations were
advocating for j oint observances of Christmas and Chanukah in order to
build harmony and intergroup understanding. In Elizabeth, New Jersey,
for example, the National Jewish Post reported that a Reform temple,
Beth EI, had "launched the community ' s first Hanukah workshop for
public school principals and teachers" to learn the history and customs of
the Festival of Lights. It is fair to assume that programs such as the ones
described above played an important role in easing intergroup tension at
Lake and other schools in Denver and across the country. However, of
more consequence to this case study was the movement of Jews out of
the West Side, which likely brought about a gradual end to the interracial
tension and violence between the two groups and to the LHRC . 54
of this period, its goal was to fight for the equality of all citizens, regardless of race. See Nina
Mjagkiji, Organizing Black America: An Encyclopodia of African American Associations
(New York: Garland Publishing, 200 1 ), 2 1 3 . Principal' s Report and Recommendations to the
Lake Human Relations Council, March 2, 1 950, box 2, CCR; Lake Junior High School Ques
tionnaire for Parents, May 29, 1 950, box 2, CCR.

53
54

Intermountain Jewish News,

September 5 , 1 950, I .
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Defamation League of B ' nai B ' rith Lodge 1 7 1 , Ira M. Beck Memorial Archives, Special Col
lections and Archives, Penrose Library, University of Denver (hereafter cited as ADL); Na
tional Jewish Post, November 28, 1 952, clipping, folder 3, box I I , ADL. For a summation of
joint observances in Denver see Christmas-Chanukah Observances: The Denver Experiment,

20 1 2]

DIRTY JEw-DIRTY MEXICAN

153

B y the late 1 950s and early 1 960s, Jews o n the West S ide began to
abandon their older homes for the newer, whiter, and more fashionable
neighborhood of Hilltop in southeastern Denver. Indeed, by 1 964 the
West Side ' s only Jewish community center, the Guldman Center, had
been shutdown and a new one established near Hilltop. On the other
hand, for those Jews who could not afford to move or chose to stay, they
found that they had to adapt in the wake of a rapidly changing West Side.
For example, Phil ' s Grocery, a fixture in the neighborhood since the late
1 940s, began to sell Mexican food alongside Jewish food. Moreover, a
Spanish language newspaper in Denver honored Phil Rosen, the proprie
tor of the establishment, for his "fairness and concern for his custom
ers" -a noticeable change from previous accusations of Jewish
merchants preying on economically vulnerable Mexicans.55
But even though individual Jews and their families were moving out
of the West Side, signaling their literal geographic movement into white
Denver, this did not mean that secular Jewish agencies like the ADL and
the American Jewish Committee were abandoning their intergroup rela
tions principles or forgetting the social and economic plight of Mexican
Americans. In fact, the rise of the Chicano Movement in Denver and
across the West during the late 1 960s and early 1 970s meant that those
agencies would utilize their resources in an important effort to advocate
directly on behalf of Mexican Americans-primarily through the devel
opment and i mplementation of educational programming in secondary
school and college curriculums and by founding, financing, and adminis
tratively supporting Mexican-American organizations. For example, in
the late 1 960s the ADL launched "Project Mexican American" in an ef
fort to eradicate cultural insensitivity toward Mexican Americans in
western school districts and colleges. And the American Jewish Commit
tee helped found Centro Cultural, a Mexican-American civil rights
agency in Denver. 5 6
CONCLUSION

The 1 949 gang battle, the ADL ' s response to it through the LHRC,
and a very real history of anti-Semitism, suggest that Denver' s Jews were
not as at home in their scenic Rocky Mountain setting as previously
thought; in fact, evidence suggests that they were "uneasy at home." To
be sure, Jews had achieved a great degree of political, professional and
Draft of Talk gi ven at Temple Men ' s Club, Wilshire B oulevard, Los Angeles, CA, March 7,
1 95 6 , folder 6, Box I I , ADL.
5 5 Uchill, Pioneers, 3 1 7- 3 1 8 ; Phil Goodstein, Exploring Jewish Colorado ( Denver: The
Rocky Mountain Jewish Historical Society, 1 9 92 ) , 5 8 ; Zelinger, West Side Story, 77.
5 6 See fi le folder I I , Box 1 8 , ADL for a full account of "Project Mexican"; Intermoun
tain Je wish News, February 1 4 , 1 969, 1 2 .
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economic success in Denver, helping to build a remarkable city. How
ever, that outward veneer of success and self-assuredness did not neces
sarily guarantee that Jews felt inwardly secure about their place in the
city . Indeed, that internal insecurity occasionally manifested itself in the
form of behavior and language that stridently contrasted Jews with Mexi
can Americans. Furthermore, exclusion from elite men' s clubs, being
called Christ killers, stoning at school, instances of murder and outright
lynching, all created a painful memory of anti-Semitism within the city ' s
Jewry . Compounding this situation was also the Jewish West Side ' s
proximity to a growing Mexican-American enclave, which only intensi
fied the desire for distancing. Moreover, even ADL officials succumbed
to this phenomenon, manufacturing contrasts with Mexican Americans,
especially by pointing out perceived psychological deficiencies. This pal
pable uneasiness, one suggests, only made Jews on the West Side breath
deeper the toxic fumes of anti-Mexican sentiment that existed in Denver,
Colorado and the West-all in an effort to shape a racial identity that
was more Anglo than Other.57
However, intergroup relations principles, combined with an acute
crisis and embarrassing press coverage, required Jews to work toward
some kind of cooperation with their Mexican-American neighbors, al
lowing for the organization of an interracial council that was devoted to
reestablishing calm on the West Side. Nevertheless, it was those very
same principles that permitted Jews like J. Peter Brunswick to inwardly
harbor scorn toward Mexican Americans, but outwardly serve on coun
cils with them in the spirit of cooperation. Indeed, cooperating with Mex
ican Americans during the 1 940s and 1 950s was primarily in the interest
of domestic tranquility and fighting anti-Semitism, not necessarily to bet
ter the condition of Mexican Americans in Denver; in fact, if that oc
curred, then it was a bonus, but not an intended goal. And it would not be
until the 1 960s and 1 970s, when most Jews had left the West Side, that
secular Jewish agencies would actually fight against prejudice towards
Mexican Americans, particularly in the schools .
Such motivations, however, did not diminish the fact that the ADL
and the LHRC had improved conditions at Lake and other schools,
chiefly through scientific surveys and joint observances of Christmas and
Chanukah. But it is hard to deny that by the late 1 950s Jews were begin
ning their exodus from the West Side, constructing the most powerful
barrier of all between themselves and Mexican Americans-that of phys
ical separateness and segregated neighborhoods. What had once only ex
isted in the mind now became an unbridgeable reality.
57
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Finally, this article has endeavored to go beyond the optimistic and
triumphal tone of many historians in western American Jewish history,
or American Jewish history for that matter, and inject an element of
healthy skepticism-a skepticism of how truly "minimal" or relatively
absent "overt" anti-Semitism was in the West; and a skepticism of how
really self-assured western Jewish populations actually were. While this
article has examined just one instance of Jewish insecurity, it suggests
that certain aspects of Jewish life in the West were not that different from
the crowded, contested and sometimes violent and cruel urban spaces of
the East.58

5 8 Abrams, Jewish Women, 1 1 , 1 8 1 . Moses Rischin and John Livingston suggest the
same in Jews of the American West. For interpretations of American Jewish history that ex
amine themes of conflict, ambivalence and anxiety see Tony E. Michels, A Fire in Their
Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005 ) ; Eli
Lederhendler, New York Jews and the Decline of Etlmicity 1 950- 1 970 (Syracuse, New York:
Syracuse State University Press, 2001 ) ; Lederhendler, "The New Filiopietism, or Toward a
New History of Jewish Immigration to America," American Jewish History 93 (Mar. 2007) : 1 20; Goldstein, The Price of Whiteness; and Gil Ribak, " 'They are slitting the Throats of Jewish
Children' : The 1 906 New York School Riots and Contending Images of Gentiles," American
Jewish History 94 (Sept. 200 8 ) : l 75- 1 96 .

BLACK POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND
POLITICAL RAP MUSIC '
Lakeyta M. Bonnette
Georgia State University

In 2005 , Chicagoan rap artist Kanye West, one of Hip-Hop ' s most defi
ant and politically incorrect rappers, decided to deviate from the tele
prompter before him and instead voice his opinion on live television
during a fundraiser to raise money for the victims of Hurricane Katrina,
and the rebuilding of New Orleans. When it was his turn to speak, West
publicly stated "George Bush doesn't like Black people." The shocking
comment caught the co-host of the telethon, Michael Myers, and the pro
ducers by surprise. After days of watching Black people in New Orleans
wade through filthy water, beg to be saved from their flooded homes and
be referred to as "refugees" West was simply stating the opinion of many
B lacks. From West' s and many other Black Americans ' perspective the
government could not possibly care about the displacement and agony
that victims of hurricane Katrina in New Orleans experienced based on
its response. West identified former President Bush as the main culprit
because he, as the nation' s chief executive, represented the head of the
American government. While the lack of efficient government response
to its citizens shocked the world, many African Americans viewed the
Federal Emergency Management Agency' s inept response as simply an
other link in the chain of political exclusion, lack of support and disre
gard experienced by a marginalized community. Even before West made
his statement, the slow response had been framed as a racial and class
issue. In homes, barbershops, beauty salons, around water coolers and
other gathering spots the sentiment was that if the disaster had occurred
in a city where the majority residents affected had been White and mid
dle class, the response would have been completely different. 2
West was following a tradition of musicians who used their popular
ity and celebrity status to speak for those whose voices and concerns are
often not considered (Hon, 2008) . From Scott Joplin to Marvin Gaye to
* Acknowledgements : I would like to thank those who have read various iterations of
this work including, but not limited to Niambi Carter, Randy Burnside and Byron D' Andra
Orey . For a more detailed discussion of the points made in this article please see Pulse of the
People: Political Rap Music and Black Political Attitudes by Lakeyta M. Bonnette from the
University of Pennsylvania Press. Thanks also go to all of the scholars who have paved a way
in this area of examining culture and politics.
2 http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2005/09/03/katrinalmain8 1 4623.shtml

1 57

158

ETHNIC STUDIES REVIEW

[Vol. 3 5 : 1 57

now, Kanye West, there has been a history of African American celebri
ties utilizing their notoriety to demand a seat at the political table to ad
vocate against injustice and provide a voice for the voiceless. B illie
Holiday' s "Strange Fruit" about the lynching of B lacks or Same Cooke ' s
" A Change i s Gonna Come" are examples of discussing the govern
ment' s lack of response to African Americans in a time of need. Thus,
Blacks have used both overt and covert measures to resist inj ustice and
demand equality.
It is posited that "Black music may be viewed as a symbolization of
the Black experience" (Walker 1 975, 2). One can gain an understanding
of the various struggles and issues encountered by Blacks throughout
their history in America by studying various forms of B lack music dur
ing different eras. Culture, specifically Black music, historically, has
been a resistance mechanism that Blacks utilized to assert their visibility
in arenas in which majority players deemed them invisible. Blacks have
used culture to disseminate information, increase solidarity, fight against
injustice and maintain political and social movements . Culture has al
lowed those who typically do not have a voice to assert their demands in
political and social spheres from which they were systematically ostra
cized. Music in the Black community has always represented a counter
public for the ideas and attitudes of this community and has been signifi
cant to resistance struggles for African Americans (Spence 20 1 1 ; Ogbar
2007 ; Levine 2006; Norfleet 2006; Harris-Lacewell 2004; Pough 2004).
However, one may question is there a particular Black ideology
presented within political rap songs? I argue that yes, Black Nationalism
is a dominant ideology presented within rap songs and this can be ob
served by analyzing political rap lyrics. This article examines the rela
tionship between music and attitudes by observing the Black Nationalist
attitudes presented in political rap songs.
RAP MUSIC
The oral tradition has been used regularly in the Black community as a
means to articulate feelings and attitudes of members of the Black com
munity. Out of this oral tradition arose one of the most influential music
genres, rap music. It is widely concluded that rap music began with the
Last Poets and the poetry of Gil Scott-Heron in the early 1 970' s (Allen
1 996; Ards 2004; Henderson 1 996). The Last Poets and Gil Scott-Heron
incorporated unique styles in which they recited poetry over musical
beats. While this style can be described as one of the foundations of
modern rap many will trace the style of rap back further to the oral tradi
tion of African griots and Black leaders (Kitwana 2002). Additionally,
in rap there is a direct connection with the oral rhetoric of prominent
B lack leaders, demonstrating its commitment to the oral tradition.
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Rap is defined as "a form of rhymed storytelling accompanied by
highly rhythmic, electronically based music" and "a Black cultural ex
pression that prioritizes Black voices from the margins of urban
America" (Rose 1 994, 2). Similarly, Lusane (2004) defines rap as
" . . . the voice of the alienated, frustrated and rebellious Black youth who
recognize their vulnerability and marginality in post-industrial America"
(35 1 ) . It is asserted that "members of the Hip-Hop movement started
their disruption by making music and creating spaces for themselves
when everything around them suggested exclusion" (Pough 2004, 287).
Therefore, rap music was one avenue for marginalized African Ameri
cans to voice their discontent and present issues relevant to their segment
of the population. Rap was largely a type of party music where the main
emphasis was on the creativity of the disc-j ockey (Rose, 1 994). How
ever, rap began to change and "no longer was it simply 'party' music but
had taken on the character of a . . . political movement that embraced
themes of Black Nationalism" (Southern 1 997, 600) .
From its beginnings in New York, rap has been a vehicle for the
young and disenfranchised. Early on it provided dispatches from
America' s crumbling inner cities ravaged by crack cocaine, violence and
apathy from elected officials. It has evolved into a multi-billion dollar
industry, whose stars accumulate wealth its pioneers could only have
imagined. Rap is used to sell everything from Hillshire Farms meat to
sneakers and cars (Ogbar 2007) . Yet in 20 1 3 , the political and economic
circumstances which gave rise to this music genre persist.
Political rap, a subgenre of the larger rap genre, follows the model
of uniting African Americans through music by discussing issues rele
vant to the Black community and providing information about injustices
the community members face. Rap in general is influential. Michael
Dawson ( 1 999) states, " . . . rap has become an integral part of a grape
vine that is constantly critiquing the state of American race relations"
(322). Similarly, the music of the Hip-Hop generation is critical for
knowledge, awareness, mobilization and action. Rap has a future as a
political agent. In fact, Gwendolyn Pough (2004) contends that " . . . rap ' s
ability to move the crowd has the possibility to do more than make them
dance ; it could very well be used to spark political activism" ( 1 94).
However, it has been debated how much of an impact music has on the
political attitudes of a listener (Henry 1 990) .
For example, Lester Spence (20 1 1 ) argues that rap does impact
B lack political attitudes but not always in the direction proponents of
Hip-Hop suggest. Spence argues that there is a relationship between rap
consumption and support of Black Nationalist tenets as well as a height
ened criticism of the American legal system. He also concludes that
those who consume rap are more xenophobic (Spence 20 1 1 ) . Similarly,
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Cathy Cohen (20 1 0) finds in her research that exposure to rap music also
impacts the political attitudes of youth. Specifically, those who are ex
posed to rap assert more alienation from the political system but many
youth do not think that rap music should be more political (Cohen 20 1 0) .
These analyses are excellent and represent initial examinations o f the
influence of rap on political attitudes ; however, this research does lack a
crucial element that will allow political scientists, politicians and music
artists to make a more concrete decision about how much rap music has
an influence on political attitudes and that is the differentiation of sub
genres of rap music . One cannot discuss rap as if it is a homogenous
genre espousing one set of views and attitudes . Like the B lack commu
nity, there are variations within Hip-Hop that demand separate analysis
of its infl u ence on political attitudes. Rap, depending upon the song pro
duced and the lyrics created, can have various effects on the political
attitudes and behaviors of the B lack community.
MUSIC AS RESISTANCE

Culture is often used to resist dominant ideologies and oppressive situa
tions (Davis 1 989; Martinez 1 997 ; Mitchell and Feagin 1 995 ; Zillman et
al. 1 995). Culture was and continues to be a resistance mechanism uti
lized by Blacks in America since slavery. Researchers have argued that
as they toiled, "through songs slaves could comment on their
problems . . . they could voice their despair and hopes and assert their
humanity in an environment that constantly denied their humanness"
(Southern 1 997, 1 5 6) . Enslaved Africans instituted a system of hidden
transcripts through culture including music to resist (Southern 1 997 ;
Neal 1 999).
Music continued its strong relationship between African American
suffering, oppression and fight for political inclusion during the Civil
Rights era. Black music became more popular among mainstream
American audiences because of its political emphasis on the future.
M any artists used their songs to give commentary on the issues of the
day. For instance, in "Mississippi Goddamn ! " singer Nina Simone
vented her outrage about the deaths of four little girls in a Birmingham
church and other violent acts committed against Blacks in the South
(Neal 1 999). Music not only provided information and attitudes but it
also encouraged dedication, loyalty and persistence during the difficult,
contentious times of the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) (Morris 1 9 84)
Accounts of the CRM detail the use of music to motivate marchers and
reinforce non-violent responses, raise consciousness, provide comfort
during times of incarceration, murder and violence and to express emo
tions during times of pain, suffering, sadness, joy and celebration (Morris
1 984; Garofalo 1 992). Following the CRM, artists continued to write
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and produce political and socially conscious songs which took a stance
against poverty in America, war, cultural pride, determination and segre
gation as exemplified with Marvin Gaye ' s "What' s Going On," and "In
ner City Blues" and Curtis Mayfield' s "Keep on Pushing" and "We
People Who are Darker than B lue" (Neal 1 999). Songs such as James
Brown ' s "Say it Loud: I ' m B lack and I ' m Proud" not only served as
background music for the B lack Power movement within the Black com
munity, but also increased racial solidarity and consciousness among Af
rican Americans (Walker 1 975).
BRING THE PAIN : POLITICAL A N D SOCIAL ISSUES WITHIN HlP-Hop

There are numerous examples in the Hip-Hop community of using rap
music to identify and discuss discrimination, poverty, racism, police bru
tality and other social ills. One song to do this has often been labeled the
first political rap song, "The Message," by rap group Grandmaster Flash
and the Furious Five (Neal 2004). This song described the reality for
many living in urban communities. In this song the artists describe as
pects of their lives in urban communities. They comment on the effects
of living in harsh impoverished neighborhoods and the impact these con
ditions have on a person' s emotional and mental well-being (Southern
1 997) . Similar to the previous Bebop era, rap music emerged as a re
sponse to the injustices felt in urban communities, primarily in the
north. 3
Using rap t o detail the reality o f life for many urban Black Ameri
cans was necessary as the images propagated in mainstream media only
presented a "prototypical" B lack character eliminating a diversity of ex
periences, thoughts and behaviors of urban youth (Neal 2004) . Rap has
literally brought a voice to a segment of the community that was often
alienated and dismissed. Rap allows urban youth to detail their stories
and lives from their perspective instead of seeing distorted images of
themselves in media, by politicians and through other leaders (Allen
1 996; Norfleet 2006 ; Pough 2004; Rose 1 994) .
Rap brings alternate images and relevant issues for people of color
to the attention of larger society. However, these images may not have
been received by mainstream America during the time because of the
marginalization of this segment of the community. Hancock (2004) ex
plains this form of silence by asserting that "members of marginal
groups, even when granted the power of speech, find their voices deval3 In Cathy Cohen' s Boundaries of Blackness ( 1 999) she details the concept of marginal
ization. Stating that marginal groups are "those who exist politically. socially or economically
outside of dominant norms and institutions" (Cohen 1 999, 37). It can be argued that this
marginalization became more evident because of the increased geographical marginalization as
a result of the increased poverty in America.
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ued or disrespected, increasing their isolation and alienation from the
public sphere" (4) . The form of devaluation Hancock describes is preva
lent in rap music as observed by the numerous discussions to censor rap
as well as deem it as an illogical, turbulent, nihilistic musical form (Car
pentier, Knobloch & Zillman 2003 ; Johnson, Jackson & Gatto 1 995 ;
Johnson, Trawalter & Dovidio 2000; Rubin, West & Mitchell 200 1 ) .
Observing that music has played an important role in delivering informa
tion in the Black community, as a form of resistance throughout Ameri
can history and as force to raise consciousness, it can be speculated how
music affects the Black community politically.
KNOWING POLITICAL RA P WHEN You SEE IT

Rap covers a broad spectrum of musical styles. Some rap forms may
transcend two or more genres. For instance, some rappers may produce
songs that are both political and "gangster" such as artists Niggas With
Attitude (NW A), who elaborate on social issues in one track and in the
following track, have a song that obj ectifies women or presents nihilistic
attitudes. Political rap is only a component of the larger rap music genre.
Identifying a subgenre is essential for the understanding of the impact of
media art forms on political attitude acceptance.
Describing political music, some have grouped political songs with
socially relevant songs and labeled them message songs. 4 Another
method is to simply refer to artists who have made some political songs
and group the artists into a political category (Allen 1 996; Decker 1 993 ;
Perry 2004; Rose 1 994) . I, on the other hand, do not categorize artists .
It is my belief that musicians change and grow and they cannot be con
fined to any specific label. Therefore, an artist such as Trick Daddy who
began his career rapping with Luke, 5 and classifies himself as a "thug 6 "
also creates political songs such as "America" and "Thug Holiday. "7 For
this reason my basis of examination are the songs and not the artists .
Using the songs will allow for inclusion of political rap songs from art
ists who are not known for producing political rap music. This categori
zation gives rappers flexibility while still allowing recognition for
political participation through their voice. Similarly, Mark Anthony Neal
(2006) describes political songs as songs " . . . that contained distinct po4 Robert Walker ( 1 976) states in his dissertation on B lack music and society that mes
sage songs are "songs which symbolized solidarity by relating in a specific way" to one or
more solidarity dimensions (p. 7).
5 Luke is a popular artist who was often criticized because of his lewd language but he
is widely known for his creation of bass music. This type of music emphasizes sexual contact
with underlining bass beats that are often used as party songs in the south.
6 This classification is indicated by his album titles, Book of Thugs and Thug Holiday.
7 This song is political because it makes reference to politics and also discusses a social
problem thereby satisfying two criteria of the definition.
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litical commentary . . . . " (624) . Nevertheless, I argue that political rap is
more complicated than simply containing a political reference or com
mentary. I assert that the inclusion of political references is essential to
identifying political songs, but these political references must be accom
panied by other criteria in order to be considered a political rap song.
While a lot of scholars discuss the existence and importance of po
litical music, conscious or "message" rap has not been defined by any
scholar. Case in point, Ernest Allen Jr. , ( 1 996) posits that political rap
does exist and it has a direct connection to two important nationalist
sects, The Nation of Gods and Earths and the Nation of Islam.8 He also
suggests as does Errol Henderson ( 1 996) that message or nationalist rap
has contributed to greater political and racial consciousness. However,
neither of these authors define political rap although both of them give
examples of rappers they consider present political lyrics. Decker comes
the closest to an actual definition of political rap when he divides rap into
two subgenres, Afrocentric Nationalism and what he calls, a sixties-in
spired Nationalism.9 However, this categorization is limited only to rap
pers who espouse a Black Nationalist ideology or B lack Nationalist
themes. Is it possible for rap artists to present political attitudes other
than those typically associated with Black Nationalism? If so, how
should those songs be categorized? Are they no longer political? I offer
a different criterion for identifying and classifying political rap songs.
My criterion for identifying political rap was developed initially by
using those artists who were referenced as political or message rappers.
Next, I have taken into consideration the varied vague categorizations
presented in the literature and the specific definition asserted by Neal and
the Centre for Political Song that suggests a political song must have a
political reference. Finally, I use a previous categorization that was used
to identify message music of the civil rights and the B lack Power era by
Robert Walker. Walker used three main criteria to identify message
songs, which includes 1 ) songs with implicit or explicit ethnic symbols
8 Allen asserts that there are three categories for political rap, " . . . ( 1 ) the Islamic nation
alist orientation of rappers such as Pete Rock and C.L. Smooth . . . (2) the cultural-political
nationalism of Public Enemy . . . and (3) specific, message-oriented expressions embedded in
the more earthy gangsta rap . . . "(Allen 1 996, 1 62).
9 Afrocentric Nationalism is more culturally based using Africa, specifically Egypt, as
the foundation for Black culture. Decker asserts that Afrocentric Nationalist songs are songs
that emphasize African culture with empbasis on specific countries the most popular being
Egypt (Decker 1 993). In contrast, the sixties-inspired Nationalism focuses more on political
and social power. In these songs the artists supports and present rhetoric that was popular
during the 60s and early 70s. These groups present Black power attitudes and ideas. He
asserts that these types of nationalisms are separated by whether the ideas were extensions of
I 960s nationalist rhetoric or whether one agrees that Egypt is the original site of B lack culture.
He separates these genres by differentiating between time ( l 960s) and space (Egypt) (Decker
1 993).
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2) references "social class problems . . . . " and 3) those that refer "to
groups other than ethnic or social class . . . . " (Walker 1 97 5 , 39).
My categorization of political rap is similar to Walker' s classifica
tion of message songs while I make an original contribution to the dis
cussions of "message" songs by including rap as a genre of interest and
emphasizing political references compared to sociological references.
While messages are asserted in many political rap songs, a song is only
political if it displays an implicit or explicit political reference in the
lyrics in addition to satisfying one of two of the other criteria. This pri
oritization of political references also distinguishes my definition from
other attempts to categorize rap as message rap. Therefore, political rap
is rap music that must include the first criteria as well as contain either
the second or third criteria below:

The Criterion: Knowing Political Rap When you Encounter It
1 . Display political references in the lyrics, such as di
rectly referencing a political leader, political office/insti
tution, political activity, political events or political
position.
2. Make reference to a social problem or issue and dis
cuss it in the lyrics, therefore raising awareness about
specific issues or disparities nationally or globally by
discussing those issues in lyrics.

3 . Advocate a solution to injustices or problems in so
ciety either through violent or non-violent means.
The song by popular rap artist Nas, "I Want to Talk to You," if examined
based on my criteria, is political rap song. We can observe how it fits the
categorization and label of political rap song by observing the chorus and
a couple of additional lines from the song. In the chorus Nas raps,

I wanna talk to the
motherfucking
I wanna talk to the
motherfucking

mayor, the governor, the
president
FBI, and the CIA, and the
congressman 10

Here Nas references the mayor, the governor, the president and other
political organizations and positions. This song satisfies the first condi
tion by displaying political references. These political references are ex
p l icit references. All political references may not be explicit.
Sometimes the political references will be implicit using coded language
10

L yrics found from www.ohhla.com
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or a "hidden transcript," a popular element of Black vernacular, such as
references to the system, the man, or other coded words (Scott, 1 990;
Gates & McKay, 1 997). When coded words are present the decoding is
left to the listener to interpret the meaning of the sequence of words and
the context in which they are used. Thus, when words are coded it may
require more interpretation. Having satisfied the first criteria in order for
this song to receive the label of a political rap song at least one of the
other criteria must be met. This song goes on to satisfy the second crite
ria in the second verse where Nas rhymes :
Mr. Mayor imagine i f this was your backyard
Mr. Governor imagine if it was your kids that starved
Imagine your kids gotta sling crack to survive
In this verse N as comments on the social condition of poverty in
America and what he feels is one of the options of survival for many
young Black Americans, namely participating in the illegal drug market
by asking politicians how they would feel and react if their children were
subjected to that reality of life. With these three lines Nas has satisfied
the second category of this criterion by making a reference to poverty, a
social condition and discussing it in the lyrics . However, Nas ' song is
rare because it also satisfies the third condition with the following verse:
I wanna talk to the man understand
Understand this motherfucking G-pack in my hand
In this verse Nas is conveying that he will use weapons or any means to
make sure he is heard by those political leaders or have access to them.
Simply attempting to talk to those in higher positions about the situations
of many African Americans is an example of presenting some solution to
the injustice he sees in society. However, he is also advocating a call to
arms in efforts to be heard by the various political institutions and
politicians.
This political rap categorization is not a catch all criteria. Some
songs that may be classified as message songs are not political. Under
standing that there are differences in subgenres of rap and that rap music
exposure impacts attitudes, it is essential to classify different subgenres
of rap music in order to examine what affects the different subgenres
have on various attitudes. For instance, we know that gangsta rap leads
to more violent and nihilistic behavior and attitudes but how does politi
cal rap impact political attitudes (Johnson et al 1 995)? What political
messages are presented in political rap songs ? B eing able to identify
political rap songs will help us in understanding which Black political
ideologies are asserted within political rap songs, a specific subgenre of
the rap genre. Having established a criteria to identify political rap, I
next turn to the political ideology that is the most prominent within rap
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music, Black Nationalism (Allen 1 996; Henderson 1 996; Dawson 200 1 ;
Harris-Lacewell 2004 and Spence 20 1 2) .
B LACK NATIONALISM
B lack Nationalism is a very old ideology that has survived through
generational shifts, staying mostly intact through existing and past refine
ments and definitions. Some facets of Black Nationalism are a belief in
self reliance, self determination, and community control (Brown & Shaw
2002 ; Davis & Brown 2002; Henderson 1 996; Hill-Collins 2006) . Black
Nationalism as an ideology comprises a set of beliefs that articulate the
need for the cultural, political, and economic independence of African
Americans (Karenga 2002). B lack Nationalism can be defined as "a
body of social thought, attitudes and actions ranging from the simplest
expressions of [Black] ethnocentrism and racial solidarity to the compre
hensive and sophisticated ideologies of Pan-Negroism or Pan African
ism" (Bracey, Meier & Rudwick 1 970, xxvi). As Dawson ( 1 994)
explained "the core concepts behind Black nationalism have historically
been the development of independent political strategies, B lack and Afri
can culture, economic independence, and an African American land
base" ( 1 88). Davis and Brown (2002) contend that "nationalism is a sys
tem of thought that contains two components : a sense of political solidar
ity, consciousness of identity, or a common purpose; and a desire and
striving for political self-determination" (240) . Similarly Hill-Collins
(2006) asserts that nationalism requires the ideas of self-reliance, self
determination and self-definition. Its highly racialized agenda makes it
one of the dominant ideologies in Black political thought (Walton 1 98 5 ;
Dawson 200 1 ) .
Why B lack Nationalism? First, because as Alexander-Floyd (2007)
and others state, Black Nationalism is "the dominant ideology in contem
porary B lack Politics," hence it should also be an ideology represented in
the smaller rap community (3). Second, being a Black Nationalist makes
one more aware of and engaged in issues that affect the B lack commu
nity. The newly acquired interest that results from Black Nationalist atti
tudes makes the supporters of these attitudes concerned about political
and social issues in their communities which affect political behavior and
participation. Finally, according to Lusane (2004) "the dominant ideo
logical trend of the rappers is B lack Nationalism" (355). Consequently,
many rappers adhere to B lack Nationalist ideology that is advanced
through the teachings of the Nation of Gods and Earths (NOG&E) , popu
larly known as the Five Percenters (Miyakawa 2005 ; Norfleet 2006). In
fact, it has been asserted that the Five Percenters deliberately used rap as
a means of disseminating their culture, ideas and beliefs (Perry 2004).
With many of the artists abiding by B lack Nationalist ideology plus the
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continuous references in rap music to Black Nationalist ideology, it is
reasonable to expect that Black Nationalism will be a supported and ac
cepted ideology to those who listen to rap and particularly the subgenre
of political rap.
A lot of Black Nationalist sentiments that are presented in rap songs
may not be as blatant as direct references to Black Nationalist leaders, or
" . . . repetitive soundbites from Malcolm X . . . . or Louis Farrakhan strewn
together" (Allen 1 996, 1 6 1 ) . Sometimes the allusions are to Black Na
tionalist attitudes such as self reliance, self determination, and racial soli
darity which include identifying injustices to African Americans. It is
easier to identify Black Nationalist references in rap songs that specifi
cally identify Black Nationalist leaders . For instance, in his song "Thug
Holiday", Trick Daddy references Black Nationalist leaders Malcolm X
and Louis Farrakhan. He states,
And, I read your books know all the remixes to the
bible
What about a verse for the thugs, a cure for drugs and
survival
Let' s add some chapters name them Martin, Malcolm
and Farrakhan
Similarly, the rap group Wu-Tang Clan also presented B lack Nationalist
attitudes by directly mentioning Black Nationalist leaders . This song
that features popular blaxplotation musical artist Isaac Hayes, "I Can ' t go
to Sleep," opens by discussing police brutality, racial profiling and inter
actions with the criminal justice system because of drugs in their com
munity, specifically crack cocaine and the possible government
involvement with crack being in the Black community. The second verse
deals with political assassinations and exportation of individuals known
to be proponents of Black' s civil rights. B ased on the lyrics by rapper
RZA (pronounced rizzah), the listener is informed about politically re
lated assassinations.
These lyrics make specific references to three Black Nationalist
leaders, Clarence the 1 3th X, Malcolm X and Marcus Garvey. The song
describes the fate of these nationalist leaders as well as other leaders who
were involved in the progression of race relations in the United States. I I
In this verse the listener is prompted to recall famous Black leaders. The
first leader referenced is Clarence 1 3th X, who is known as the founder
of the religious sect, the Nation of Gods and Earths (NG&E) and was
1 1 The reference to the father in the above verse i s referencing Clarence the 1 3th X who
i s known as the father of the Nation of gods and earths or the five percenters. Clarence the
1 3th X received his name when he was a member of the Nation of Islam. He subsequently left
the NOI and started Five Percent using many of the teachings from the NOI plus adding some
of his own ideas (Miyakawa 2005) .
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shot seven times and killed (Miyakawa 2005) . The second leader refer
enced is Malcolm X (EI Hajj MalikEI- Shabazz), former leader and
spokesperson of the Nation of Islam who was assassinated in the Audu
bon B allroom in 1 965 in front of his wife and four children. Next RZA
mentions Martin Luther King Jr, leader of the Southern Christian Leader
ship Conference (SCLC) and promoter of non-violent resistance for the
Civil Rights Movement (CRM) in the United States. King was assassi
nated at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis Tennessee in 1 968 surrounded
by B lack leaders Jesse Jackson and Ralph Abernathy. RZA then refer
ences another Black Nationalist leader, Jamaica native and the founder of
the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and the shipping
line the Black Star Line, Marcus Garvey. Unlike the other victims in this
verse, Marcus Garvey was not killed but instead was indicted of alleged
mail fraud, imprisoned and ultimately deported back to Jamaica. Garvey
was known as the creator of the Black liberation flag (red, black and
green colors) and as having millions of followers internationally. RZA
continues on by discussing assassinations of other leaders including John
F. Kennedy and Medgar Evers. Thus, what RZA does in this verse is
promotes a remembrance and education of these leaders, their untimely
deaths and deportation and possible governmental involvement, which
promotes a distrust of government, especially in aspects of dealing with
African Americans fight for universal freedom and inclusion. Directly
identifying nationalist leaders in lyrics can work to prime listeners for
nationalist views through the invocation of Black Nationalist leaders .
Contrarily, not all songs blatantly identify Black Nationalist leaders.
Some songs reference Black Nationalist attitudes such as racial con
sciousness as expressed in Too Short' s song "The Ghetto." In this song
Too Short expresses :
So much game in a Too Short rap
Blacks can ' t be White and Whites can ' t be Black
Why you wanna act like someone else?
All you gotta do is just be yourself
We' re all the same color underneath
Short Dog' s in the house you ' d better listen to me
Never be ashamed of what you are
Proud to be Black stand tall at heart
Even though some people give you no respect
Be intelligent, when you put em in check
Cause when you ' re ignorant, you get treated that way
In this verse the rapper expresses his racial pride, which is a prominent
trait of cultural Black Nationalist sentiment, as well as discusses the rela
tionships he feels exist between Blacks and Whites. He details that while
he is prideful he may not receive adequate respect from other racial
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groups. These sentiments demonstrate the internalized marginalization
and hostility felt by many African Americans which promotes racial con
sciousness and group cohesiveness. But racial pride is not the only Black
Nationalist attitude you can find in political rap songs. Sometimes the
allusions are to Black Nationalist attitudes such as self reliance, self de
termination, racial consciousness and racial solidarity as expressed in
New York rapper Nas ' s song, "Black Zombies : "
I n this song, Nas invokes the Black Nationalist attitude o f self-reli
ance. Nas advocates B lack-owned businesses, banks, and land as remedy
for dependence on American [white] political, social and economic sys
tems. In other words, owning, investing and controlling businesses, the
economy and land, according to Nas, will help end the control, oppres
sion, and "zombie" -like state of African Americans in America.
Throughout this song he discusses various ways he believes African
Americans are "zombies," those without the ability to reason and control
their own desires, thoughts and actions. While Nas primarily prescribes
self-reliance and self-determination, he also summons racial conscious
ness and solidarity.
More recent and popular political rap songs have also supported and
presented Black Nationalist attitudes in its lyrics. For instance, rapper
J adakiss' 2004 political song "Why" was featured on The O 'Reilly Fac
tor, a right-leaning news show hosted by conservative commentator, Bill
O ' Reilly on Fox News. O ' Reilly, a vocal critic of rap music, featured the
song because he believed that it was an "atrocity" and offered a biased
view of the Republican administration (Heim 2004). Jadakiss' song, a
top 20 single on the Hip-Hop charts, posed many titillating political
questions about past president George W Bush, the Republican adminis
tration, the 2000 national election, and the events of September 1 1 , 200 1
(Heim 2004). After controversy empted over the original version, a
remix featuring rappers, Styles P, Common and Nas was released. While
the initial song had foccll s ed on the events of 9- 1 1 , the remix touched on
themes as diverse as partisanship and race, the 2000 presidential election,
George W. Bush, the war on terror, B arack Obama, Malcolm X, and the
education system. More importantly for my purpose here, the remix
presented aspects of B lack Nationalist ideology. For instance, Styles P,
member of the rap group The L.O.x. with Jadakiss, questions,
Why vote Republican if you Black. . . .
In this lyric, Styles P questioned the logic of voting for the Republi
can Party if you are B lack, because of the belief that the Republican
Party does not advance issues relevant to African Americans and
Michael Dawson' s linked fate theory which argues that African Ameri
cans lack of support or allegiance to parties that do not align with issues
relevant to the Black community (full employment, welfare reform inclu-
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sive o f a guaranteed income, comprehensive health care and minority
business set asides) regardless of individual class differences (Williams
2003 ; Dawson 2004; Walton and Smith 20 1 0) 1 2 . In fact, the Republican
Party has been known to advance implicit racial messages advocating
against African American participation (Mendelberg 200 1 ) . But Styles P
was not the only rapper in the remix to assert Black Nationalist senti
ments in his verse. The recently invited Chicago rapper to the White
House ' s poetry event, Common, took it a step further and advocated for
an administration change.
Why is Bush acting like he trying to get Osama
Why don ' t we impeach him and elect Obama
Common appeals to B lack Nationalist attitudes by suggesting the elec
tion of then Senator B arack Obama to the office of President of the
United States, and is thus supporting a B lack candidate as a means of
inclusion and empowerment within the political system, an aspect of
Black Nationalist sentiments of voting for Black candidates . Common
could have proposed another solution to the problem with the Bush ad
ministration but instead he chose to appeal to Black sentiments and the
belief that electing a Black official had the potential to eliminate
problems and gain concessions . Finally, Nas is more obvious with his
B lack Nationalist appeals by making a direct reference to Black Nation
alist leader Malcolm X in his verse suggesting that Blacks should con
tinue Malcolm X ' s mission. Hip-Hop is therefore inextricably connected
to Black Nationalist paradigms and philosophies, specifically political
rap.
CONCLUSION

It is suggested that the " . . . search for Black ideology must begin with
the oral tradition" and this article examines one aspect of the oral tradi
tion, rap music, specifically political rap and its relationship with B lack
Nationalist ideology (Henry 1 990, 7). Rap music can frame an idea or
viewpoint, set an agenda on a political issue as well as prime certain
ideas or make them more accessible. With Hip-Hop music being situated
as a popular music source; its influence on the attitude formation of indi
viduals is important.
In research, political scientists rarely include rap as a media outlet
that provides political information and impacts a person' s political atti
tudes . This article has made the case for the consideration of rap as a
1 2 Some would argue that because of economic attainment some B lacks should align
with the Republican party because of their emphasis on tax cuts for members of the upper
class. But Dawson concludes that even when economic situations change African Americans
align with political parties that discuss more issues relevant to them.
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relevant and powerful factor i n the formation of political ideology . Rap
music can frame an idea or viewpoint, set an agenda on a political issue
as well as prime certain ideas or make them more accessible. Powell
( 1 99 1 ) asserts that " . . .in addition to entertainment, rap music provides a
significant form of informal education for adolescents . . . that extends
far beyond the confines of the classroom and into their peer group cir
cles" (p. 245) . This atticle provides vital information and examples of
the relationships between rap music and Black Nationalism. What Har
ris-Lacewell (2004) contends is correct, there are various avenues
through which African Americans receive political information that as
sist in the formation of political attitudes and rap music happens to be
one of them.
Why haven' t we observed this before? One of the possibilities why
the socialization potential of rap music has not been examined within
political science is because politically laced rap is not as popular as
mainstream rap and therefore is not as prominent in mainstream society.
Another possibility is the actions and attitudes that stem from political
rap have been attributed to other political sources. However, this is not a
reason to discount the influence of the subgenre. Understanding
marginalized communities must include examination of marginalized
cultural forms within the community. While many aspects of rap are still
seen as deviant there is an understanding that this cultural art form is also
important to behavior and attitudes. With the significant impact Hip
Hop has not only on American culture, but other cultures, the study of
the relationship between Hip-Hop culture, rap music, political behavior
and political ideology is not only necessary in the United States but will
become more relevant on an international level as Hip-Hop gains
popUlarity.
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LOUIS G. MENDOZA.

Conversations Across Our America: Talking

about Immigration and the Latinoization of the United States. (Aus
tin : University of Texas Press, 2012). x, 299 pp., $24.95 cloth.

Louis G. Mendoza' s book, Conversations Across Our America: Talking
about Immigration and the Latinoization of the United States, incorpo
rates thirty-three conversations with forty-two Latinas/os of various na
tionalities in order to better understand the Latino influence in the United
States. To collect this data, Mendoza rode a bicycle approximately 8,500
miles through thirty states from July to December 2007 . He draws upon
Ethnic Studies tradition as he was driven to conduct research that is rele
vant to his community . Mendoza draws upon the oral histories and lived
experience of his participants to demonstrate the diverse nature of La
tinas/os throughout the country. He presents what Perez-Huber (2009)
defines as testimonios
"a verbal journey of a witness who speaks to
reveal the racial, classed, gendered, and nativist injustices they have suf
fered as a means of healing, empowerment, and advocacy for a more
humane present and future" (p. 644).
-

In the introductory chapter, Mendoza presents his pathway to this
study and his desire for challenging the narrow framing of Latinalo im
migration by the media, which commonly shapes public perception.
Each remaining chapter engages a primary theme that emerged from his
interviews. Chapters grapple with how Latinas/os navigate notions of
"home" and politics of belonging in their new geography. Testimonies
reveal that participants have been witnesses to change across generations
as well as agents of change in the pursuit of social justice. To do this,
Latinas/os rely upon cultivating a sense of reciprocity and equity in order
to bridge differences with maj ority populations . In addition, chapters ex

pose the anti-immigrant sentiment that Latinalo communities face and
the strategies they employ to assert their civil and human rights in the
face of such barriers . Participant narratives also demonstrate the internal
migration that takes place within the United States and the increasingly
complex dynamics occurring along the U . S . -Mexico border region.
The emphasis on the work of community leaders and activists for
social change positions this text as a potential guidebook of a national
network of immigrant rights activists . Readers could use this text to
identify a contact prior to traveling to any of the regions featured and/or
to organize collective action across regional boundaries. Mendoza de
scribes the unique nature of his participants' work as he writes,
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They were driven by their everyday life circumstances
and experiences - as workers, immigrants , children of
immigrants, and descendants of Mexican settlers who ar
rived before the establishment of the U.S . , and students
- across generations and geography to acquire the
needed knowledge base and the organizing and speaking
skills to be effective activists and advocates. In thi s
way, they are quintessential practitioners of cultural citi
zenship who seek to advance community well-being by
advocating for social and institutional reforms through
formal and informal means (p. 5).
Conversations Across O u r America would be strengthened by an

elaboration of the themes identified by Mendoza. While he presents a
brief background at the start of each thematic chapter, the reader is left
with the task of identifying the thematic pattern across participants ' nar
ratives. Further, there are no concluding thoughts offered by Mendoza at
the end of each chapter. As a result, the rich narratives presented by the
study ' s participants are lacking analysis . While Mendoza organized the
pieces thematically, the connections across narratives are difficult to de
cipher. Had he proffered an analysis of the narratives , readers could bet
ter identify further social forces that shape the lives of the study
participants, such as assimilation, residential segregation, gentrification,
police brutality, social class differences, and youth empowerment, to
name a few . Analyzing these narratives would be possible by comparing
the experiences of participants to each other' s and/or to those in existing
literature on the immigrant experience across generations (Jimenez 20 1 0 ;
Ochoa 2004; Telles and Ortiz 2008; Vasquez 20 1 1 ) . Engagement with
existing literature would also allow the reader to situate this proj ect
within a larger context of scholarly efforts to understand immigration and
the Latinalo experience in the United States.
In his conclusion, Mendoza identifies the important role of local
leadership in determining a community' S reputation as inclusive or ex
clusive and states, " . . . communities that strive to be inclusive by re
specting and embracing diversity have adopted a moral and ethical
framework that views others as whole human beings with distinct histo
ries, values, and qualities that complement their own and enrich their
lives - not threaten it" (p. 278). Mendoza could use these important
insights to develop and offer policy recommendations, which would
strengthen his concluding chapter. This text would be appropriate for
courses in Ethnic Studies, Sociology, Politics, and others that explore the
Latinalo experience, imlmigration and demography, and race relations in
the United States. It would be beneficial for both undergraduate and
graduate students to read in order to better grasp the shifting
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demographics of the United States and the unique experience of Latinasl
os.
Reviewed by: Brianne Davila
Willamette University
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MARK RIFKIN. When Did Indians Become Straight? Kinship, the His
tory of Sexuality, and Native Sovereignty . (Oxford : Oxford University
Press,

2012). 440

pp.,

$99

(cloth),

$35

(paper) .

Mark Rifkin' s second monograph, When Did Indians Become Straight,
is an intellectually rigorous and theoretically dense work that explores
the relationship between Indigenous political formations and hetero
normativity by presenting a literary history of sexuality that spans the
last two centuries . Rifkin argues that the settler state ' s investment in, and
enforcement of, heterosexuality as the basic organizing structure of soci
ety is a response to the fact that "Indigeneity puts the state in crisis by
raising fundamental questions about the legitimacy of its (continued) ex
istence" (37). As a result, Indigenous geopolitical alliances that exceed
liberal state logics of what counts as "proper governance" are interpel
lated as "aberrant or anomalous modes of (failed) domesticity" in an po
litical economy of privatization, where heterosexual coupling is
portrayed as a natural expression of "the family" (37). Rifkin demon
strates that "heteroconjugality" is the condition of possibility for political
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intelligibility within United States institutions for Native people. On the
one hand, United States discourses of sexuality, work to selectively rec
ognize Native social forms that align with liberal settler frameworks, and
on the other they mark Indigenous difference as a threat to the national
order. Therefore Indigenous political subjectivity, defined by affective
networks of kinship relations, not only falls outside the scope of settler
political reality, but it actively challenges the state ' s continued legiti
macy by insisting on the preexistence of polities external to the state.
Rifkin also interrogates the ways in which Native social formations
have been divorced from their inherent implications for Indigenous sov
ereignty and co-opted as queer alternatives to those opposed to hetero
sexual hegemony. Using the popularity of Two Spirit identity as an
example, Rifkin illustrates how contemporary queers uphold Native so
ciopolitical formations as a "resource" to help non-Natives to articulate a
more inclusive vision of society. In doing so, they position kinship net
works (and Native peoples) as fitting comfortably within the political
landscape of the United States, rather than engaging with Native nations
as discrete polities or recognizing the havoc wreaked on those same net
works by United States policy.
Throughout the book, Rifkin develops a queer methodology that de
pends on a critical redeployment of sovereignty and kinship - one that
not only acknowledges how both terms can mark the interpellation of
Native people into the heteronormative structures of the settler state, but
also how they can also be used to stretch the terms of United Stats legal
discourse to account for collective geopolitical alliances exterior to the
state.
The book consists of three chronologically organized sets of paired
chapters, the first of which examines novels written in the 1 820s, in order
to illustrate the imposition of heterosexual logics of inherited racial
"blood" that superseded preexisting geopolitical kinship dynamics. The
second set of chapters looks at how Native writers contested attempts by
the General Allotment Act and the Indian Reorganization Act to "detrib
alize" Native people by imposing heteronuclearity and rendering Native
governance consistent with settler ideologies. Rifkin' s analysis suggests
that while these authors insisted on the validity and coherence of kinship
networks as political formations, they fell prey to what he calls the "bribe
of straightness" - seeking legitimacy from the state by disavowing as
pects of Native social formations that did not align with the heteroconju
gal norm. The fourth and fifth chapters use contemporary texts to depict
the appropriation of depoliticized versions of Indigenous kinship forms
by non-Native queers in ways that obscure the ongoing presence of Na
tive peoples and the connection between sociocultural formations and
struggles for Native self-determination. Conversely, this final section
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also addresses the modern queer Native crItlque that links Native
homophobia to the intrusions of US imperial policy, and insists on the
coherence of longstanding clan networks as form of peoplehood.
While Rifkin' s work is a significant accomplishment in its own
right, it also serves as a valuable addition to the developing body of work
that combines Queer Studies and Native Studies. Recent works by Jen
nifer Denetdale, Quo-Li Driskill, Chris Finley, Brian Gilley, Scott Lauria
Morgensen, and Andrea Smith also link the operation of heteronormativ
ity to settler colonialism and the denial of Indigenous sovereignty. In
When Did Indians Become Straight, Rifkin critiques Queer Theory for its
unacknowledged investment in settler colonialism, pointing out that
queer challenges to heteroconj ugality as the determining factor for the
organization of resource distribution still position the settler state as the
appropriate distributor of resources. Instead he advocates for a queer cri
tique of heteronormativity that contests, rather than presumes, the exis
tence of the nation state, and centers Indigenous peoples. While it could
be argued that the book ' s considerable length limits its utility in the un
dergraduate classroom, its analytical depth and expansive scope certainly
justify the extra pages. Overall, When Did Indians Become Straight rep
resents a maj or intellectual feat and an important contribution to the
fields of Native, Queer, and Literary Studies.
Reviewed by: Lindsey Schneider
University of California

H. SAMY ALIM AND GENEVA SMITHERMAN. Articulate While Black:
Barack Obama, Language, and Race in the U. S. (Oxford : Oxford Uni
versity Press,

2012). 205

pp.,

$25

(paper).

In his introduction to Articulate While Black Michael Eric Dyson frames
B arack Obama as the Orator-in-Chief and the authors would certainly
agree with that assessment. Alim and Smitherman argue that in order to
have an open and honest discussion about race in the United States, we
must look at its linguistic dimensions ; we need to language race, to view
the racial politics of the United States through the lens of language
(xviii). This book seeks to untangle how we talk about race and what
assumptions are being made based on a speaker' s use of language.
Chapter one delves into Obama' s ability to styleshift or move in and
out of linguistic styles - between varieties of the same language" (5). By
analyzing Obama' s linguistic styles during a visit to Ben ' s Chili Bowl,
Ray ' s Hell Burger, campaign rallies, and his famous race speech, Alim
and Smitherman highlight the ways in which the president moves be-
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tween formal English and what the authors call Black Language. It was
this ability which helped frame Obama as "someone who could speak
directly and comfortably with folks across regions, generations, socio
economic divisions, racial and ethnic groups, and political and religious
views" (5). Alim and Smitherman use the same styleshifting throughout
their text: one paragraph may be heavy with academic j argon while the
next paragraph uses language that would be prevalent in a conversation
between two friends sitting on a stoop engaging in a Jay-Z vs. Nas de
bate. Chapter two engages in a meta-analysis of Obama' s language or
"the talk about the way Barack Obama talks." The authors look at how
the word articulate was used to describe Obama, how he was framed as
"exceptional" or even magical in the words of Rush Limbaugh, and how
these narratives highlight the existence of enlightened exceptionalism.
Alim and Smitherman use chapter three to discuss the "A More Perfect
Union," or "The Race Speech" as it is commonly known, and the authors
do an excellent job of tracing the rhetorical and political work this speech
had to perform during the 2008 election.
Though excerpts from Reverend Jeremiah Wright were played ad
nauseam during the '08 presidential campaign, Alim and Smitherman
take the 0pp0l1unity to provide background information on Reverend
Wright and place Wright' s remarks within the liberation theology and the
B iblical j eremiadic traditions. Chapter four discusses and is literally en
titled "The Fist Bump Heard 'Round the World." The authors trace the
history of The Pound and try to understand how white mainstream
America could have such a profound misunderstanding of a long-stand
ing method of communication within black communities. The chapter
looks at other methods of intra-racial communication such as snappin,
i.e. playing the dozens, as well as use of what the authors call the two
most popular and controversial words in Black Language : muthafucka
and nigga. Alim and Smitherman discu ss in what context these methods
of communication are used as well as when and where they become con
troversial . As the authors point out, the Pound and other methods of
"Black Communication become controversial only in a society that de
preciates Blackness. If people continually deny this racially discrimina
tory context, mutual respect will prove to be elusive as a muthafucka"
( 1 25 - emphasis in original).
The final two chapters use Obama as a jumping off point to discuss
larger issues in black language and culture. Chapter five delves into hip
hop culture and while there is a discussion of Obama' s relationship to rap
and hip hop, it deals primarily with divergent political views within the
hip hop communities . The authors conduct an in-depth analysis of
Young Jeezy and Nas ' s track "My President" as well as the accompany
ing music video and differing reactions to the song. The final chapter in
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the book is a scholarly love letter to African American English/Black
Language. The authors highlight the grammatical complexity and stylis
tic t1exibility of Black Language and argue that "rather than interpreting
Black language behavior through the lens of B lack inferiority, ignorance,
or violence, these creative language practices should be utilized for edu
cational purposes" ( 1 77). The sociolingistic analysis in this chapter was
eye-opening given the negative connotations mainstream media has asso
ciated with Black language.
Overall Alim and Smitherman provide a detailed, scholarly, yet
easy to follow analysis of our racial linguistic traditions, landmines, and
practices. In the introduction the authors state that they goal so to help
push and problematize how we think and talk about race. They have
certainly succeeded.
Reviewed by: Lisa Doris Alexander
Wayne State University
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